Cappuci v. Barone

Decision Date28 March 1929
CitationCappuci v. Barone , 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (Mass. 1929)
PartiesCAPPUCI v. BARONE (two cases).
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Elias B. Bishop, Judge.

Actions by Pascua Cappuci and by Ameto Cappuci against Joseph Barone.The judge found for defendant, and plaintiffs bring exceptions.Exceptions overruled.J. T. Pugh and C. E. Leonardi, both of Boston, for plaintiffs.

M. J. Mulkern, of Boston, for defendant.

PIERCE, J.

These two actions of tort were begun by writs dated September 28, 1926, and entered in the superior court on the first Monday of November, 1926.The first is to recover damages for the alleged negligence of the defendant in performing an abdominal surgical operation.The second is by the husband of the plaintiff in the first action to recover consequential damages.The defendant's answer in each case is a general denial, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the statute of limitations.The cases were tried together.The plaintiff in the first action will be hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff.

At the close of the plaintiffs' evidence the defendant rested in each case and presented a motion, in writing, requesting the judge to rule that upon the evidence and the pleadings the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and to make a finding in each case for the defendant.The judge thereafter found for the defendant, and the plaintiffs duly excepted.

The bill of exceptions purports to contain ‘all the testimony material to the questions of law herein raised,’ and states that ‘the pleadings and the specifications may be referred to.’The plaintiff testified, in substance, that on May 11, 1924, she sent for the defendant; that his brother came and examined her; that in consequence of this examination she went to the Forest Hills Hospital, in Boston; that when she arrived at the hospital she saw a nurse, and about one-half hour afterward the defendant came in and she was examined by him while she was in bed; that the defendant said to her, ‘You need an operation,’ and about an hour and a half later she was taken to the operating room, where she saw the defendant, who told her he was going to operate on her; that just before she went under ether the defendant examined her, and told the nurses to prepare her for the operation room; that in the operation room were the defendant, his brother, a doctor who administered the ether, and a nurse.

She further testified, in substance, that what was done during the operation she did not know.The next thing she knew she was in bed in another room and the nurses took care of her, and in about two weeks she was able to go home.The defendant was the only doctor who talked with her or visited her from the time of her arrival at the hospital.After she came out of the ether the defendant visited her, dressed her wound, which was in the middle of the abdomen, and came every morning for two weeks, when he and a nurse took the stitches out, the defendant saying, ‘I made a good wound there.’She remained in the hospital three days more and then went home and stayed in bed two weeks.After she got out of bed at home she felt pain every day.About a month after she got up she went to see the defendant and told him she was having pain, and he prescribed treatment for it, saying, ‘It will take a year before those pains disappear.’He treated her two or three times at his office.She was having pain every day, and about six or seven months after the operation she went to see another doctor.She saw three doctors, had an X-ray of her abdomen, and was operated upon at the Vincent Memorial Hospital in Boston.The surgeon who operated on the plaintiff, on or about July 1, 1926, testified in substance that ‘where the incision for the operation by the defendant was made * * * he found an inflammatory mass of small intestine, which he dissected out, and inside the mass he found a piece of gauze, a gauze sponge such as surgeons use in an operation.’

The controlling facts of Guell v. Tenney, 262 Mass. 54, 159 N. E. 451, distinguish that...

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45 cases
  • Franklin v. Albert
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • October 09, 1980
    ...for medical malpractice 3 a cause of action "accrues" at the time of the act of malpractice, " 'and not when the actual damage results or is ascertained.' " Id. at 456, 215 N.E.2d at 322, quoting and reaffirming Cappuci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 581, 165 N.E. 653 (1929). It is the court's present opinion that Pasquale placed undue emphasis on legislative history in its refusal to examine the injustice of a rule that can deprive an injured plaintiff of any remedy even beforestatute of limitations for malpractice, in a case involving a gauze sponge left in the plaintiff's abdomen during an operation, this court held that the cause of action accrued on the date of the operation. Cappuci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 581, 165 N.E. 653, 654 (1929). 5 The court reasoned that "(a)ny act of misconduct or negligence on (the) part (of the doctor) in the service undertaken was a breach of his contract, which gave rise to a right of action in contract or tort, anddoctor) in the service undertaken was a breach of his contract, which gave rise to a right of action in contract or tort, and the statutory period began to run at that time, and not when the actual damage results or is ascertained." Id. No suggestion was offered as to how an injured plaintiff could pursue his theoretical right of action before he had any chance to discover he had been The Cappuci doctrine was reaffirmed in 1966 in Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d...
  • Anderson v. Neal
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • April 30, 1981
    ...interpretation of the word "accrues" in that state's statute of limitations governing medical malpractice actions. See Franklin v. Albert, supra, 411 N.E.2d at 461, announcing a discovery rule and overruling Capucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1929), which defined the time of accrual in medical malpractice cases as the date of the malpractice. Agreeing with the Supreme Court of Oregon that " 'no one knows why the legislature did not pass the proposed measures,'...
  • Lindsay v. Romano
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • July 09, 1998
    ...such action is based except where the action is based upon the leaving of a foreign object in the body."3 In Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 411 N.E.2d 458 (1980), we overruled our prior decisions in Cappuci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 581, 165 N.E. 653 (1929), and Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966), where we held that a cause of action for medical malpractice accrued at the time of the act of the malpractice. In Franklin v. Albert, we...
  • Bowen v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • August 06, 1990
    ...malpractice claims, that the statutory period began to run when the negligent act occurred, even if the plaintiff could not reasonably ascertain the harm until later. Id. at 86, 310 N.E.2d 131, citing Capucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 581, 165 N.E. 653 (1929). Two years after the Hendrickson case, we applied the discovery rule to claims of fraudulent misrepresentations in the sale of real estate. Friedman v. Jablonski, 371 Mass. 482, 485, 358 N.E.2d 994 (1976).property, reasonable inquiry would have shown that there was no right of way, and thus the statute of limitations began to run at that time. Id. We extended the discovery rule to medical malpractice actions, thus overruling Capucci v. Barone, supra, in Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 618-619, 411 N.E.2d 458 (1980). We said that medical malpractice "causes of action accrue when the plaintiff learns, or reasonably should have learned, that he has been harmed by the defendant's...
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