Caprara v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 December 1979
• Citation: 423 N.Y.S.2d 694,71 A.D.2d 515
• Parties: Fausto CAPRARA, Respondent, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION et al., Appellants, and Ken Goewey Dodge, Inc., et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 694

423 N.Y.S.2d 694

71 A.D.2d 515

Fausto CAPRARA, Respondent, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION et al., Appellants and Ken Goewey Dodge, Inc., et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Dec. 27, 1979.

Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, New York City, (Sheila L. Birnbaum, New York City, of counsel), and Lester, Schwab, Katz & Dwyer, New York City, for appellants.

E. Stewart Jones, Sr., Troy and Malatesta & Purello, Albany, for respondent.

Before GREENBLOTT, J. P., and SWEENEY, KANE, MAIN and MIKOLL, JJ.

GREENBLOTT, Justice Presiding.

This is an action in which plaintiff has recovered damages for the severe personal injuries he suffered as a result of an automobile accident. In his complaint, he alleged causes of action in negligence, breach of warranty and strict products liability. Based upon negligence and strict products liability, the jury returned a verdict against Chrysler Corporation and Chrysler Motors Corporation (Chrysler) for $3,600,000. Chrysler's subsequent motions to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, contrary to law and excessive were denied by the trial court.

The accident occurred at approximately 1:00 o'clock in the morning on December 7, 1969, while plaintiff was operating a 1969 Dodge Coronet manufactured by Chrysler. Plaintiff was driving the vehicle westerly down Congress Street in Troy, New York, when the car failed to negotiate a left-hand curve and collided with a parked car, a telephone pole and a house. Plaintiff testified that as he was traveling at about 25 miles per hour, and approaching the curve, he attempted to turn, but the steering wheel "seized right up". He applied the brakes and cried out, "Oh, my God, the steering won't turn". The accident severely injured plaintiff, leaving him a quadriplegic. The three passengers were not injured seriously.

At the time of the accident, the car was one year old and had been driven approximately 9,100 miles. Plaintiff had been the principal operator of the vehicle since its purchase, and until the time of the accident, he had never experienced any trouble with the steering.

The theory on which plaintiff sought to recover from Chrysler was that the vehicle had been manufactured with a defective lower right front ball joint. In his bill of particulars, plaintiff contended that defendant improperly designed and assembled the ball joint, causing the ball to wear excessively and abnormally, and to eventually become "egg shape". This created a dangerous condition of "play" in the joint, causing it to seize or partially lock up, thereby preventing plaintiff from controlling the vehicle in a normal manner.

Chrysler raises several points to support its contention that the judgment must be reversed. Initially, we reject Chrysler's position that the overwhelming weight of the credible evidence established that plaintiff's failure to control the car was not due to a defective ball joint, but, rather, due to excessive speed in negotiating the curve. Although Chrysler presented testimony that plaintiff was operating the car at 40 to 50 miles per hour, and other evidence which tended to support its position, there was testimony by plaintiff's witnesses which estimated the speed of plaintiff's vehicle at 25 to 30 miles per hour. This conflict in the evidence raised credibility questions which the jury could resolve in favor of plaintiff (e. g., Kelly v. Watson Elevator Co., 309 N.Y. 49, 51, 127 N.E.2d 802, 803).

Turning to the claim of defect in the ball joint, plaintiff's expert, William Burrill, testified that in his opinion the ball joint was defectively manufactured. He stated that his tests of the right lower ball joint revealed that excessive play existed in the ball joint. His tests showed that the lateral movement of the ball joint exceeded 250 thousandths of an inch. He testified that this exceeded the allowable play of a ball joint as established by the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles and that the car would not pass an inspection test. He further testified that he detected a "binding action" in the ball joint, which could cause a binding condition in the steering of the car.

Plaintiff also called Daniel Doran, an engineer and a supervisor in Chrysler's Steering and Suspension Department. He testified that subsequent to the accident, Chrysler modified its ball joints by adding a plastic insert which eliminated end play or movement. He further testified that movement results in wearing away.

On the basis of plaintiff's expert testimony, plaintiff established in strict products liability that a defect in the ball joint caused the accident. Moreover, as was succinctly explained by Chief Judge Breitel, "(i)n a products liability case it is now established that, if plaintiff has proven that the product has not performed as intended and excluded all causes of action not attributable to defendant, the fact finder may, even if the particular defect has not been proven, infer that the accident could only have occurred due to some defect in the product or its packaging (citations omitted)" (Halloran v. Virginia Chems., 41 N.Y.2d 386, 388, 393 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343, 361 N.E.2d 991, 993). Plaintiff's testimony that the steering wheel "seized right up" and that it "would not turn" was sufficient to establish prima facie in strict products liability that a defect in the design or construction of his automobile existed at the time of the accident (Iadicicco v. Duffy, 60 A.D.2d 905, 906, 401 N.Y.S.2d 557, 559; see Jackson v. Melvey, 56 A.D.2d 836, 392 N.Y.S.2d 312).

Plaintiff presented evidence that excluded all causes of the accident not attributable to Chrysler. From this evidence the jury could find that intoxication, excessive speed, damage due to misuse, and poor weather were not factors causing the accident (see Golden v. General Motors Corp., App.Div., 419 N.Y.S.2d 211 (1979)). Accordingly, the jury could properly conclude that the accident was due to a defect in the vehicle, i. e., a defective ball joint (Halloran v. Virginia Chems., supra ).

We are also presented with the question of whether the trial court committed reversible error in allowing plaintiff to introduce into evidence testimony concerning Chrysler's post-accident design change of its lower ball joints. We conclude that it did not.

Preliminarily, we conclude that the evidence of design change did not constitute an improper mid-trial change of theory. Defective design was within the pleadings and, as such, proof of a potentially safer design was properly permitted to show that the original ball joint was defective. This also answers Chrysler's contention that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the effect it could give to the design change testimony. The court charged the jury that a design change does not as a matter of law establish that a defect exists with respect to a particular design, and this was consistent with the court's sending the case to the jury on a theory of a manufacturing defect.

We hold that evidence of post-accident design changes should, as a general rule, be admissible into evidence in strict products liability cases involving a physical defect. Since a plaintiff in a strict products liability case need not establish the particular defect of which he complains, evidence of a post-accident design change is relevant to assist the jury where, as here, it has the right to infer that the accident was due to "some defect" in the product (Halloran v. Virginia Chems., supra ). Since the jury may infer that a defect caused the accident, logic compels the conclusion that they should be entitled to know that the very defect claimed to have caused an accident has been subject to a post-accident modification in design.

Moreover, to arbitrarily prohibit such evidence on the grounds of public policy would unjustifiably undermine the doctrinal underpinnings of strict products liability, which themselves are based upon public policy (see Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 340-341, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 467-468, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627-628). Strict products liability does not deal with fault, negligence or culpability; rather, it focuses on the product (Barry v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1, 7, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 874), and protection of the consumer in a market characterized by mass production, mass advertising, mass distribution and technical sophistication. Thus, the subsequent repair doctrine, which was developed in the content of fault, has no theoretical basis to justify its wholesale application in products liability cases. The doctrine of strict products liability was imposed with a view to encourage safety in design and production (Codling v. Paglia, supra, 32 N.Y.2d p. 341, 345 N.Y.S.2d p. 468, 298 N.E.2d p. 627), and evidence of post-accident design modifications in a product should accordingly be admissible for the jury's consideration.

Turning, then, to the evidence of post-accident change in design in this case, Daniel Doran, called by plaintiff, testified that end play or movement in the ball joint, which results in wearing away, was reduced by the modification. This testimony clearly supported plaintiff's contention as espoused in his bill of particulars and supported Burrill's testimony that excessive lateral movement existed in the ball joint. Contrary to the reasoning of the dissent, the jury was entitled to conclude from this testimony that the post-accident design change did correct the defect which plaintiff contended existed in his 1969 automobile. The jury could properly find that since the modification in design reduced movement, the ball joint in plaintiff's automobile was excessively...