Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC
| Decision Date | 09 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-2877 (DMC)(MF) |
| Parties | RAY V . CAPRIO, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff(s), v. HEALTHCARE REVENUE RECOVERY GROUP, LLC, and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Hon. Dennis M. Cavanaugh
This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion filed by Defendant Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC ("Defendant") for Judgment on the Pleadings. ECF No. 10. Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 78, no oral argument was heard. After carefully considering the submissions of the parties, and based upon the following, it is the finding of this Court that Defendant's Motion is granted.
This matter involves allegedly unlawful debt collection practices. Plaintiff Ray V. Caprio ("Plaintiff") seeks to bring this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 13, ECF No. 1. Defendant is a foreign limited liability company with its office located in Florida, and is primarily engaged in the business of acquiring and collecting debts that are allegedly owed to others. Compl. ¶¶ 7-8. Plaintiff seeks damages and declaratory and injunctive relief arising from Defendant's alleged violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 etseq. (the "FDCPA"). Compl. ¶ 1.
Plaintiff had an account with non-party Physician Services, which became past due on or before December 7, 2010. Compl. ¶ 16. Physician Services placed Plaintiff's account with Defendant for collection. Compl. ¶ 18. On or before December 7, 2010, Defendant sent Plaintiff a collection letter. Compl. ¶ 19; Ex. A to Compl. (the "Collection Letter"). The Collection Letter consists of three paragraphs on the front, a detachable payment slip at the bottom, and required validation notice information on the reverse side of the letter. The first paragraph of the Collection Letter indicates that Physician Services hired Defendant to collect the balance of Plaintiff's account. The second paragraph forms the basis of this action, and states, in full:
If we can answer any questions, or if you feel you do not owe this amount, please call us toll free at 800-984-9115 or write us at the above address. This is an attempt to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose. (NOTICE: SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION.)
Collection Letter (emphasis in original). The third paragraph indicates that Plaintiff "may send payment in full," and provides instructions for doing so by credit card, check, or money order.
The reverse side of the Collection Letter contains the following validation notice:
This is an attempt to collect a debt from a debt collection agency. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose. Pursuant to Sec. 809 of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing within 30 days from receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will: obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such judgement or verification. If you request this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice, this office will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court on May 19, 2011, alleging claims for relief under two sections of the FDCPA. First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5)because the "least sophisticated consumer," upon reading the second paragraph of the Collection Letter, would believe that either calling Defendant at the toll free number or writing to Defendant's address would suffice to dispute the alleged debt. Compl. ¶¶ 24-34. According to Plaintiff, this violates the FDCPA because it provides confusing instructional language. Compl. ¶ 33. Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) by providing language that misrepresents to the "least sophisticated consumer" that either calling or writing would be sufficient to dispute the debt, despite the fact that disputes are only effective when in writing. Compl. ¶¶ 35-38.
On June 24, 2011, Defendant filed an Answer setting forth a number of affirmative defenses, including an assertion that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 6. Defendant filed the present Motion on August 9, 2011, which further contends that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Def.'s Mot. Br. 13, ECF No. 10-1. Plaintiff filed his Opposition on August 30, 2011. ECF No. 12. Defendant filed its Reply Brief on September 9, 2011. ECF No. 15. The matter is now before this Court.
"A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint or parts of a complaint before or after filing an answer." Wyeth v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 2d 607, 609 (D.N.J. 2006). "A motion made before an answer is filed is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Id.. "A motion made after an answer is filed is a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c)." Id.. "A motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the defense that the plaintiff failed to state a claim is analyzed under the same standards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Revell v. Port Auth. of New York, New Jersey, 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir.2010); see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004) (). "In evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court may consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and undisputedly authentic documents if the plaintiff's claims are based upon those documents." Alves v. Ferguson, No. 01-789, 2010 WL 3155128, *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Bearing these standards in mind, a district court is "required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff]." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). "[A] complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, the plaintiff's "obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id., (internal citations omitted). "[A court is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Instead, assuming that the factual allegations in the complaint are true, those "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
"A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for misconduct alleged." Id."Determining whether the allegations in a complaint are 'plausible' is a 'context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" Young v. Speziale, No. 07-3129, 2009 WL 3806296 at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'shown'—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from using "any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Under the Act, a communication is deceptive if it "can be reasonably read to have two different meanings, one of which is inaccurate." D'Addario v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, 798 F.Supp.2d 570, 572 (D.N.J. 2011) (citing Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2008). Additionally, the FDCPA requires debt collection letters to include certain debt validation provisions advising consumers of their rights. Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 1991); 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. The first statement that must be included is one noting that unless the debtor, within thirty days of receipt of notice, disputes the validity of the debt, the debt will be assumed. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(3). Further, debt collection letters must contain a statement that if the debtor notifies the collector in writing within those thirty days that the debt is disputed, the debt collector will obtain and mail to the debtor either verification of the debt or a judgment against the debtor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(4). Debt collectors must also inform debtors that upon a written request within the thirty day period, the debt collector will provide the debtor with the name and address of the original creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(5). These notices must be communicated effectively.Graziano, 950 F.2d at 111. "Thus, a debt collector violates the FDCPA when the validation notice is 'overshadowed' or 'contradicted' by other portions of the communication." D'Addario, 798 F.Supp.2d at 573 (citing Graziano, 950 F.2d at 111). "Whether a...
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