Capron v. Romeyn
| Decision Date | 05 November 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 71-79,71-79 |
| Citation | 137 Vt. 553,409 A.2d 565 |
| Parties | Charlotte H. CAPRON and Bernard F. Capron v. Dirk ROMEYN. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Parisi & Burke, Castleton, for plaintiffs.
William H. Quinn of Pierson, Affolter & Wadhams, Burlington, for defendant.
Before BARNEY, C. J., LARROW, BILLINGS and HILL, JJ., and SMITH, J. (Ret.), specially assigned.
Plaintiffs' actions were dismissed below on motion, as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The issue was squarely raised by the pleadings, and none of the pertinent facts are in dispute. The statute in question is 12 V.S.A. § 512(4), as amended by 1975, No. 248 (Adj. Sess.), § 2, effective July 1, 1976.
The plaintiffs base their respective actions (the husband's claim is derivative) upon the severely adverse effects of an operation performed by the defendant, on September 20, 1971, without providing plaintiff wife with information necessary for an intelligent election. As the trial court ruled, and unquestioned here, a cause of action was stated. Small v. Gifford Memorial Hospital, 133 Vt. 552, 349 A.2d 703 (1975).
Four dates are of significance to the issues before us. They are:
(1) September 20, 1971, date of the elective surgery.
(2) October 11, 1975, claimed date of discovery of resultant injuries.
(3) July 1, 1976, effective date of amendment to 12 V.S.A. § 512(4).
(4) April 3, 1978, commencement of the instant suit.
The net effect of the amendment to 12 V.S.A. § 512(4) was to change the rule laid down in Murray v. Allen, 103 Vt. 373, 154 A. 678 (1931), which held that a cause of action for personal injury accrued at the time of the injury, not a later date when the act was "discovered." Id. at 376, 154 A. at 679. The amendment clearly specifies that the cause of action accrues upon discovery. It is silent as to effect upon prior injuries or pending suits. Plaintiffs would have us apply the amendment to their suit, even though under Allen their action had both accrued and become barred long before this suit was brought. They urge us, as they did the trial court, either to re-examine Allen or to give the amendment retroactive effect. We decline to do either, and affirm.
Re-examination of Allen has been urged upon us before, without success. A majority of the Court has considered the effect of stare decisis as more cogent than the policy arguments which eventually impelled legislative change. South Burlington School District v. Goodrich, 135 Vt. 601, 382 A.2d 220 (1977); Union School District No. 20 v. Lench, 134 Vt. 424, 365 A.2d 508 (1976). This reasoning appears even more compelling now, where the legislature Has acted to change the rule without the slightest attempt to make the change retroactive. (Cf. discussion infra.) If we viewed as inappropriate efforts to have Allen reconsidered in light of legislative inaction, certainly those efforts are even more inappropriate when they seek to vary the effect of what the legislature has enacted.
Both parties have presented extensive analyses of the retroactive effect of statutes of other jurisdictions. None of the statutes, however, address specifically the retroactivity issue. In general, the majority seems to support the rule that where a statute of limitations has already run, as here (three years from the operation, or September 20, 1974), subsequent enlargement of the statute will not have the effect of reviving the barred action. Various reasons are assigned, some constitutional, some policy, some based on interpretation of the particular statute. We reach the same conclusion, but on other grounds. Our own statutes contain rules for statutory construction which clearly govern the case before us.
In its pertinent part, 1 V.S.A. § 214(b) provides as follows:
(b) The amendment or repeal of an act or statutory provision . . . shall not:
(1) Affect the operation of the act or provision prior to the effective date of the amendment or repeal thereof;
(2) Affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred prior to the effective date of the amendment or repeal; . . . .
These sections, in our view, clearly negate the proposed revival of plaintiffs' actions. The act in question, prior to amendment, operated to bar their actions three years after September 20, 1971, and to revive these actions would violate subsection (b)(1), as quoted. The bar interposed by the statute after three years was a right which accrued to the defendant prior to the effective date of the amendment, within the meaning of subsection (b)(2), as quoted. We reach no constitutional issue, and we do not decide the effect of an amendment purporting to have retroactive effect. We only construe the statute conceded to be applicable in accordance with the general rules of construction applicable to all legislative enactments. These general rules, without more, require affirmance of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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Jacob Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.
...disagreeing with prediction in Murphree). 54. See Murray v. Luzenac Corp., 175 Vt. 529, 530-31, 830 A.2d 1 (2003); Capron v. Romeyn, 137 Vt. 553, 555-56, 409 A.2d 565 (1979). 55. See Green v. Karol, 168 Ind. App. 467, 477, 344 N.E.2d 106 (1976); Johnson v. Gans Furniture Industries, Inc., 1......
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Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.
...disagreeing with prediction in Murphree ).54 See Murray v. Luzenac Corp., 175 Vt. 529, 530–31, 830 A.2d 1 (2003) ; Capron v. Romeyn, 137 Vt. 553, 555–56, 409 A.2d 565 (1979).55 See Green v. Karol, 168 Ind.App. 467, 477, 344 N.E.2d 106 (1976) ; Johnson v. Gans Furniture Industries, Inc., 114......
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T.L.S., In re, 82-439
...date of the amendment or repeal; .... See Stewart v. Darrow, 141 Vt. 248, 253, 448 A.2d 788, 789 (1982); Capron v. Romeyn, 137 Vt. 553, 555, 409 A.2d 565, 566-67 (1979). Accordingly, the amended § 1612, supra, cannot be applied In determining whether the caseworker's testimony was privilege......
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Murray v. Luzenac Corp., 02-140.
...to a party upon the running of a time limitation in a statute of repose or limitations which then bars the action, Capron v. Romeyn, 137 Vt. 553, 555, 409 A.2d 565, 567 (1979), a defendant cannot claim a vested right in such a statute where the time limitation has not run and thereby barred......
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Ruminations
...136 Vt. 29, 31 -32, 383 A.2d 607, 608-609(1978). [52] State v. Howe, 136 Vt. 53, 68-69, 386 A.2d 1125, 1134(1978). [53] Capron v. Romeyn, 137 Vt. 553, 556, 409 A.2d 565,566-567(1979). [54] Preston v. Chabot, 138 Vt. 170, 185, 412 A.2d 930,938(1980). [55] Burlington Free Press, 3 August 1991......