Caraballo v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 30 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:14-cv-260-T-36TBM |
| Parties | RICARDO CARABALLO, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Ricardo Caraballo ("Caraballo"), a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. (Doc. 1) He challenges his convictions for sexual battery and lewd battery entered by the Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit for Polk County, Florida. The Respondent filed a response and supporting exhibits. (Docs. 11, 14) Caraballo has not filed a reply. The Respondent concedes the petition is timely. (Doc. 11 at 4) Upon review, the petition must be denied.
Caraballo was charged with sexual battery on a child less than 12 years of age (count one), lewd molestation of a child 12 years of age or older but under 16 years of age (count two), and lewd battery on a child 12 years of age or older but under 16 years of age (count three). The charges stem from alleged incidents of Caraballo's sexual abuse of A.O. at Caraballo's house and apartment.
Caraballo was tried by jury and found guilty of counts one and three as charged. He was found not guilty on count two. Caraballo was sentenced to life in prison on his sexual battery conviction and to a concurrent 15-year prison term on his lewd battery conviction. The Florida appellate court per curiam affirmed the judgment without written opinion. Caraballo v. State, 965 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) [table].
Caraballo filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance on direct appeal. (Ex. 7) The State responded (Ex. 8), and the Florida appellate court denied the petition without elaboration. Caraballo v. State, 988 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) [table].
Caraballo raised five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a pro se motion for postconviction relief filed under Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Ex. 11) The state trial court summarily denied two of Caraballo's claims; the remaining claims were denied after an evidentiary hearing. (Exs. 12, 15, 16) The Florida appellate court per curiam affirmed without written opinion. Caraballo v. State, 121 So. 3d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) [table].
Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Exhaustion of state remedies requires that the state prisoner "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights[.]" Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). To provide the State with the necessary"opportunity," a state prisoner must fairly present his claim in each appropriate state court. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). See also O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (). A petitioner must present his claims to the state courts such that the reasonable reader would understand each claim's particular legal basis and specific factual foundation. Kelley v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1344 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Picard, 404 U.S. at 277).
A petitioner who fails to raise a federal constitutional claim in state court, or who attempts to raise it in a manner not permitted by state procedural rules is barred from pursuing the same claim in federal court absent a showing of cause for and actual prejudice from the default. Alderman v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541, 1549 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Alderman v. Thomas, 513 U.S. 1061 (1994). Alternatively, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim if review is necessary to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. This only occurs in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is "actually innocent." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 479-80 (1986). To meet the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception, a petitioner must show constitutional error coupled with "new reliable evidence — whether . . . exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016). Section 2254(d), which creates a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states:
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412. "The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and . . . anunreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (). "AEDPA prevents defendants — and federal courts — from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) () (citations omitted). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 786-87 (2011).
Before applying AEDPA deference, the federal habeas court must first identify the last state court decision that evaluated the claim on the merits. Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 834 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. granted, Wilson v. Sellers, --- S. Ct. ----, 2017 WL 737820 (No. 16-6855) (Feb. 27, 2017). "When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, a petitioner's burden under Section 2254(d) is to "show[ ] there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. A habeas court must determine what arguments ortheories supported or could have supported, the state court's decision, and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of the Court. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.
Review under Section 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. The Court must presume the state court's factual determinations are correct, unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption with "clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1311 (11th Cir. 2016). "When considering a determination of a mixed question of law and fact, such as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the statutory presumption of correctness applies to only the underlying factual determinations." Daniel v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Tanzi v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 772 F.3d 644, 651 (11th Cir. 2014)).
Section 2254(d)(2), like Section 2254(d)(1), requires that a federal court afford substantial deference to a state court's factual determinations. If "[r]easonable minds reviewing the record...
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