Caraway v. Flagg, 14912
Decision Date | 11 March 1955 |
Docket Number | No. 14912,14912 |
Citation | 277 S.W.2d 803 |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Parties | B. M. CARAWAY, Appellant, v. W. M. FLAGG, Appellee. |
Alexander D. McNabb, Dallas, for appellant.
De Shazo & Hyde and Ernst T. Foree, Dallas, for appellee.
This was a suit on a $2,500 note given as part consideration for a taxidermy business in the City of Dallas, sold by Caraway to Flagg. Appellee Flagg, material to this appeal, pled that Caraway under the terms of the sales contract bound himself not to thereafter, for a period of five years, work as a taxidermist in Texas; and, if he violated such restriction, the note would be forfeited and considered paid; that appellant had violated such covenant or agreement and did work as a taxidermist in Texas within such five years. Appellant Caraway asserts that the restrictive covenant was too severe; was too exclusive in territory; was in restraint of trade; against public policy; would reduce appellant to a state of peonage, and therefore void and unenforceable.
Trial was had to a jury but, at the close of the evidence, the trial court being of the opinion that the facts were undisputed and that appellant should recover nothing on his note, discharged the jury and entered judgment for Flagg. Caraway has duly perfected this appeal and briefs ten points of error.
Point 1 asserts error in overruling his motion for summary judgment. Appellee's counter point is that the trial court was correct in such action.
The contract contained the following provisions:
The material question raised by the briefs is whether or not such provision which barred Caraway from engaging in the taxidermy business, in the either State of Texas, for a period of five years, is legally valid or void. It is not asserted in the pleadings of Caraway that he did not violate the provision; on the contrary he admitted he had engaged in such business before the note was due. There is no controversy between the parties as to the validity of the time (five years) provision, but the question is limited in the briefs to the space (State of Texas) provision.
The general rule is that a contract unlimited, (1) as to time and space is void; (2) as to time, but not as to space, is ordinarily void; and (3) as to space, but not as to time, is valid only if reasonable. 17 C.J.S., Contracts, §§ 242 to 244 inclusive, page 624.
Our cause here is within the third provision above, with the additional element that the restriction must not be broader than the business sold.
The Texas rule is stated in 8 Tex.Law Review 422-423:
* * *.'
Authorities in Texas directly on this question are few. The Galveston Court of Civil Appeals held, in a case involving a weekly newspaper, The Houston Informer that an agreement not to publish the newspaper in the State of Texas for a period of five years, except for the purchaser, was reasonable and valid and that a threatened violation of the agreement was sufficient to authorize the injunction there involved. Richardson v. Webster-Richardson Pub. Co., 46 S.W.2d 384, no writ history.
We are, unless the facts here are distinguishable, inclined to follow the reasoning and holding in that case. The record shows taxidermy is a specialty and the patrons of such a business are ordinarily those who have the heads, etc., of animals killed by them as a result of recreation, sport, etc.; in other words, those who desire the mounted heads, or the whole animal, as trophies. The record also shows that while most of the customers are residents of the City of the Dallas, some come from other points in and out of the State of Texas,...
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