Cardwell v. Auburn Univ. Montgomery

• Decision Date: 22 April 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:12–cv–00522–MEF.
• Parties: Mary CARDWELL, Plaintiff, v. AUBURN UNIVERSITY MONTGOMERY, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

941 F.Supp.2d 1322

Mary CARDWELL, Plaintiff,

v.AUBURN UNIVERSITY MONTGOMERY, Defendants.

Case No. 2:12–cv–00522–MEF.

United States District Court,

M.D. Alabama,

Northern Division.

April 22, 2013.

Jamie Austin Johnston, Jamie A. Johnston, PC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Aaron Linden Dettling, Balch & Bingham LLP, Birmingham, AL, David R. Boyd, Neah L. Mitchell, Balch & Bingham LLP, Montgomery, AL, Lee Ford Armstrong, Auburn University, Auburn, AL, for Defendants.

Memorandum Opinion & Order

MARK E. FULLER, District Judge.

I. Introduction

This case involves claims of age, disability, race, and gender discrimination, as well as claims of fraud, hostile work environment, and retaliation. Before the Court is Defendant Auburn University Montgomery's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 6), filed on July 19, 2012. In its motion, Defendant Auburn University Montgomery (“Defendant” or “AUM”) contends that Plaintiff Mary Cardwell's (“Plaintiff”) claims for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),¹ the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),² and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,³ as well as her state-law fraud claim, are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and accordingly, this Court must dismiss those claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Further, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has also failed to allege sufficient facts to state any other claims against AUM that are plausible on their face. Plaintiff responds that she has supported each of her claims with adequate factual allegations, but if the Court finds that she has not, Plaintiff requests an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint with more detailed factual allegations.

The Court has carefully considered the arguments and authorities offered in support of and in opposition to this motion and finds that it is due to be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as set forth below.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question), 1343(a) (civil rights), and 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). Additionally, Defendant has not argued that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it, and the Court finds adequate allegations to support this jurisdiction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is appropriate in this district and division.

III. Background

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that she is a female employee over the age of forty (40) who suffers from major depressive disorder, panic disorder, and attention deficit hyperactive disorder. Plaintiff does not specify her race in the Complaint. For nineteen years Plaintiff was employed by AUM, with her last position being Director of Central Advising.

After taking approximately six weeks of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) for “significant depression, anxiety, and [a] new onset of panic disorder[,]” Plaintiff returned to work on July 28, 2009. (Doc. # 1, at 2.) Approximately three weeks later, on August 17, 2009, Plaintiff received an office visit by Kathy Mitchell (“Mitchell”), Interim Dean of Students, and Kevin Deravi (“Deravi”), Interim Vice–Chancellor for Academic Affairs. During that visit, Mitchell and Deravi told Plaintiff that it was her last day of work and that her layoff status would begin October 1, 2009.

AUM has a published, seniority-based layoff policy. According to the policy, layoffs were to be initiated considering “University seniority,” defined by “date of last continuous full-time employment” at AUM. Where affected employees had equal University seniority, “unit seniority” was to be the guiding factor. AUM was not to place an employee on layoff status who was currently on “Sick Leave” or “Leave Without Pay” until such leave period had expired. Announcements of layoffs were to be provided as much in advance as possible, with two weeks being the minimum notification period. Under the policy, qualified employees in layoff status would have first priority for consideration for openings for comparable jobs to those they once held. Finally, employees could be in layoff status for a period of up to 180 days from the date of layoff.

It is alleged that no one in Plaintiff's department had equal or more continuous service years than her. Following Plaintiff's layoff, the University publically reported that there had been no layoffs despite Plaintiff being placed on layoff status. Plaintiff alleges that younger employees, those without disabilities, those with less experience, and those of a different race and gender assumed her job responsibilities after her termination. Plaintiff also alleges that during her tenure, she received less pay than males in comparable roles. Plaintiff alleges that AUM's decision to characterize her termination as a layoff was a pretext for the true bases for her firing—her disabilities, age, gender, and race, as well as retaliation for her requests and use of FMLA leave.

Plaintiff alleges that AUM's decision to terminate her employment negatively impacted her mental and emotional health, leading to medical treatment, family problems, financial difficulties, worry, anxiety, and embarrassment.

IV. Discussion

Defendant argues for dismissal of Plaintiff's claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims for violations of the ADA, ADEA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as her state-law fraud claim, should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because AUM has sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Second, Defendant argues that the remainder of Plaintiff's claims are due to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) due to their failure to adequately state claims upon which relief may be granted. Each will be taken up in turn.

A. Rule 12(b)(1) Grounds for Dismissal1. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard

Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. To establish a claim in federal court, the plaintiff must display complete diversity of citizenship or raise a question of federal law for subject matter jurisdiction to exist. The Eleventh Circuit recognizestwo challenges to a district court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: facial and factual attacks. See Whitson v. Staff Acquisition, Inc., 41 F.Supp.2d 1294, 1296 (M.D.Ala.1999). “A facial attack questions the sufficiency of the pleading and the plaintiff enjoys similar safeguards to those provided when opposing a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. “The court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true, construes them most favorably to the plaintiff, and will not look beyond the face of the complaint to determine jurisdiction.” Id.

“A factual attack, on the other hand, permits ‘the trial court [to] proceed as it never could under [Rule] 12(b)(6).’ ” Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1990) (per curiam)). A district court may consider “matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits[.]” Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529. Indeed, to determine whether it has the power to hear a case, the district court “may weigh the evidence to confirm its jurisdiction.” Whitson, 41 F.Supp.2d at 1296. “ ‘No presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts does not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.’ ” Id. (quoting Dunbar, 919 F.2d at 1529).

“However, there is an important, if not always clear, distinction between the court's power to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction and its ability to reach the substantive federal-law claims which form the basis of the case.” Id. “When a jurisdictional challenge implicates the merits of a plaintiff's underlying claim, the proper course of action is to find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff's cause of action.” Giannola v. WW Zephyrhills, LLC, No. 8:10–cv–2541–T–17TBM, 2011 WL 2784617, at *3 (M.D.Fla. July 14, 2011) (citing Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920 (11th Cir.2003)). This procedural course provides a plaintiff with “protection from the court's power to weigh the facts under a Rule 12(b)(1) motion” and to consider matters outside the four corners of the complaint. Whitson, 41 F.Supp.2d at 1296.

The Court construes Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as a facial attack on the sufficiency of subject-matter jurisdiction as plead in Plaintiff's Complaint and will proceed accordingly. See Adamore v. Sw. Airlines Corp., No. H–11–0564, slip op. at 2, 2011 WL 6301398 (S.D.Tex. Dec. 15, 2011) (Werlein, J.) (“A facial attack, which consists of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion unaccompanied by supporting evidence, challenges the court's jurisdiction based solely on the pleadings.”).

2. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. It has been further established through case law that “[a]lthough the express language of the [Eleventh] [A]mendment does not bar suits against a state by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has held that an unconsenting state is immune from lawsuits brought in federal court by the state's own citizens.” Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir.1990) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)) (emphasis added). Furthermore, it is “well-settled that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits brought in federal court when ... an ‘arm of the State’ is sued.” Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)); Florida Dept. of Health &...