Carey v. Statewide Finance Co.

• Decision Date: 19 September 1966
• Docket Number: No. CV,CV
• Citation: 223 A.2d 405,3 Conn.Cir.Ct. 716
• Court: Connecticut Circuit Court
• Parties: Rose CAREY v. The STATEWIDE FINANCE COMPANY. 5-666-6400.

Page 405

223 A.2d 405

3 Conn.Cir.Ct. 716

Rose CAREY v. The STATEWIDE FINANCE COMPANY.

No. CV 5-666-6400.

Circuit Court of Connecticut, Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 19, 1966.

William K. Bennett, Ansonia, for plaintiff.

Leo Vine, Shelton, for defendant.

WISE, Judge.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff, although not indebted to the defendant, began receiving telephone calls and calls at her home by an agent of defendant 'harassing her and insisting she make payment of the alleged debt of her husband,' which harassment and annoyance of the plaintiff continued for many months. The complaint further alleges: 'In December, 1964, Plaintiff was compelled to undergo an operation at the Griffin Hospital, Derby, Connecticut. While a patient there and while she was in the recovery room, Defendant continued to harass and annoy Plaintiff. Such harassment by the Defendant was willful and wanton and an invasion of the Plaintiff's right of privacy. As a result of the wrongful invasion of her right to privacy, the Plaintiff has suffered and will suffer great mental pain, suffering and distress which in turn has impaired her physical well being. The acts of the Defendant were willful and in reckless disregard of the right of the Plaintiff to be free from such unwarranted interference.' The defendant demurred to the plaintiff's complaint 'because it fails to set forth a cause of action in Connecticut.'

From the wording of this demurrer on its face, it is not clear whether it intended to present the question whether, in this state, a tort action will lie for an invasion of the right of privacy or to present the question whether the facts alleged state a cause of action. However, in argument on the instant motion, defendant, if it did not concede without any reservation that an action will lie for an invasion of the right of privacy, proceeded on the theory that the facts alleged in the complaint are inadequate to establish a violation of that right.

The right of privacy has had an interesting history. Its basic concept in various forms is not new, but in this country its chief impetus as an independent right seems to have originated in an article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in 1890 in 4 Harvard Law Review 193. Perhaps the first recognition of the right by court of last resort was in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 69 L.R.A. 101 (1905). Since this decision, the right of privacy has been recognized by nearly half the states, and as stated in Korn v. Rennison, 21 Conn.Sup. 400, 403, 156 A.2d 476, 478, 'No case decided within the last fifteen years has been found in which the existence of a right of privacy has been denied.' Annotations on the subject appear in 138 A.L.R. 22, 91; 168 A.L.R. 446, 462; 14 A.L.R.2d 750; and 91 A.L.R. 1495; see also Prosser, Torts (3d Ed.) § 112, pp. 830, 833, and, generally, Restatement, 4 Torts § 867.

A tort action will lie in this state for an invasion of the right of privacy. This was decided in a well-documented and reasoned opinion in Korn v. Rennison, supra; see Steding v. Battistoni, 3 Conn.Cir. 76, 208 A.2d 559. Does the plaintiff's complaint set forth a cause of action in Connecticut? The court is of the opinion that it does.

The defendant cites Urban v. Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301, 93 A.2d 292, and Stavnezer v. Sage-Allen & Co., 146...