Korn v. Rennison

Decision Date12 November 1959
Docket NumberNo. 90257,90257
Citation156 A.2d 476,21 Conn.Supp. 400
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
PartiesPamela KORN v. Marion R. RENNISON.

Benjamin M. Chapnick, New Haven, for plaintiff.

Francis R. Danaher, Meriden, for defendant Marion R. Rennison.

Wiggin & Dana, New Haven, for defendant Register Publishing Co.

Emanuelson & Wynne, New Haven, for defendant E. W. Malley Co.

ALCORN, Judge.

The plaintiff, a minor, brings this action by her mother to recover damages. The substance of the complaint is that, through an arrangement and agreement between the three defendants, a photograph of the plaintiff was published for advertising purposes in the defendant newspaper without the knowledge, consent or permission of the plaintiff and in violation of her personal liberties and private rights, as a result of which the defendants received pecuniary and monetary benefits and advantages while the plaintiff received none and was subjected to ridicule, embarrassment, vexation and humiliation.

The defendants demur upon three grounds: that the complaint fails to state a cause of action recognized in Connecticut; that the facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action; and that reference to the publication, which is made a part of the complaint, demonstrates that the plaintiff suffered no damage.

The first ground of demurrer presents the question as to whether or not, in this state, a tort action will lie for an invasion of the right of privacy. The question has never been decided. The subject was referred to in Urban v. Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301, at page 309, 93 A.2d 292, at page 296, where the court said, 'Even if we were to hold that the right of privacy exists in Connecticut, the facts alleged in the complaint are inadequate to establish a violation of that right.' In O'Connell v. Hartford Times, Inc., 15 Conn.Sup. 85, 86, an action for violation of the right of privacy was discussed but there again the decision turned upon the fact that even if such a right of action existed the complaint was insufficient to allege it.

The defendants argue that such a right of action was not recognized at common law and therefore, in the absence of statute, it cannot exist in Connecticut today. When Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis first gave form and substance to the right to privacy in 1890, it was one objective of their discussion in 4 Harvard Law Review 193 to demonstrate that the right found support in common-law principles. Underlying their reasoning is the premise that the common law is not static and its protecting arm does not become immobilized from lack of precedent.

In the years intervening since the right was thus defined, a constantly increasing number of jurisdictions have recognized its independent existence. Press, photography, radio and television represent elements in constantly changing conditions which impinge upon individual privacy. With the environmental changes of modern living has grown the need that man's inner nature and feelings as well as his body and possessions receive the protection of the law. Hence, the right to privacy has become established in nearly half the states.

Nice distinctions between the traditional fields of law and equity are not always made in the reported cases, and in a few states the problem has been met by statute. The line to be drawn between reasonable demands of individual privacy and the public interest in legitimate news is not always easy to define, but the boundary is more readily perceived in the case of commercial advertising. A leading case supporting the right as it relates to the use of a picture...

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13 cases
  • Perkins v. Freedom of Information Com'n
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 21 Diciembre 1993
    ...Law of Torts (3rd Ed.1991) § 166. The tort of invasion of privacy was first recognized in Connecticut in 1959. Korn v. Rennison, 21 Conn.Sup. 400, 156 A.2d 476 (1959). This recognition occurred two years after the FOIA was first enacted and before the 1967 amendments which included the curr......
  • Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 17 Agosto 1982
    ...Inc., 33 Conn.Sup. 66, 70-73, 360 A.2d 899 (1976) (judgment notwithstanding the verdict entered for defendant); Korn v. Rennison, 21 Conn.Sup. 400, 403, 156 A.2d 476 (1959) (demurrer overruled); Carey v. Statewide Finance Co., 3 Conn.Cir. 716, 717, 223 A.2d 405 (1966) (demurrer overruled); ......
  • Falco v. Institute of Living
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 6 Octubre 1998
    ...Connecticut, the tort of invasion of privacy was first recognized in 1959. Id., at 172 n. 16, 635 A.2d 783, citing Korn v. Rennison, 21 Conn.Supp. 400, 156 A.2d 476 (1959). As such, the tort of invasion of privacy is not a constitutionally incorporated common-law There appears to be no Conn......
  • Travers v. Paton
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • 25 Noviembre 1966
    ...follows the Warren-Brandeis rationale and recognizes a common law right of action for the invasion of privacy. Korn v. Rennison, 21 Conn.Supp. 400, 156 A.2d 476 (1959); Steding v. Battistoni, 3 Conn. Cir. 76, 208 A.2d 559 (1964). Cf. Carey v. Statewide Fin. Co., 3 Conn. Cir. 716, 223 A.2d 4......
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