Carl J. Battaglia, M.D., P.A. v. Alexander
| Decision Date | 30 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-0701.,02-0701. |
| Parties | CARL J. BATTAGLIA, M.D., P.A., and Tommy A. Polk, M.D., P.A., Petitioners, v. Lisa Jones ALEXANDER, Individually and as Natural Representative of the Estate of Mark G. Alexander, Deceased, James Alexander, Individually, and Ruby Alexander, Individually, Respondents. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Susan G. Taylor, Donald P. Wilcox, Texas Medical Association, Austin, for Texas Medical Association.
Jack G. Carnegie, Jones Day, David M. Bays, Jones Day, Thomas P. Sartwelle, Beirne Maynard & Parsons L.L.P., Houston, for petitioner.
Jim M. Perdue Jr., Jim M. Perdue, Parker B. Binion, The Perdue Law Firm, L.L.P., Russell S. Post, Beck Redden & Secrest, L.L.P., Kevin H. Dubose, Alexander Dubose Jones & Townsend LLP, Houston, for respondent.
The central issues presented by these health care liability claims are whether, based on the facts and procedural posture of this case, two physicians' professional associations can be held liable for their own direct negligence (as distinguished from vicariously liable for the actions of their employee), whether the professional associations are jointly and severally liable, and how to calculate prejudgment interest when other parties have settled. We hold that 1) liability against the professional associations was not foreclosed by a directed verdict in favor of one physician in his individual capacity and the jury's failure to find the other physician negligent in his individual capacity, 2) there is legally sufficient evidence that the professional associations were negligent, 3) there is legally sufficient evidence that the professional associations engaged in a joint venture separate from the joint venture to which the trial court granted a directed verdict, and 4) the trial court did not properly calculate prejudgment interest under section 16.02 of former article 4590i.1 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in all respects.2 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment in part and remand this case to the trial court to calculate prejudgment interest consistent with this opinion.
Forty-year-old Mark Alexander was to undergo outpatient arthroscopic surgery on his shoulder at TOPS Surgical Specialty Hospital. About an hour and a half into the procedure, the nurse anesthetist attending him, Constance Cernosek, alerted the surgeon that she thought Mr. Alexander was not getting any oxygen into his right lung. The surgeon immediately withdrew his surgical instrument and turned Mr. Alexander over, discovering that his upper body and thighs had turned blue from oxygen deprivation. Mr. Alexander had no pulse and was in cardiac arrest. It was later determined that his brain had been deprived of an adequate supply of oxygen for at least ten and perhaps as many as fourteen minutes before his distress was recognized. Another ten minutes passed without adequate blood flow to his brain while resuscitation efforts were underway. At some point, Mr. Alexander's heart was restarted, but he remained comatose and died fourteen days later. An autopsy revealed that his death was due to brain damage caused by a lack of oxygen. One expert opined that Mark Alexander's brain was completely deprived of oxygen for nine to ten minutes.
The hospital had contracted with two professional associations to jointly operate and staff its anesthesia service. These professional associations were Carl J. Battaglia, M.D., P.A. and Tommy A. Polk, M.D., P.A., which we will refer to as Battaglia P.A. and Polk P.A. for brevity. The contract between the hospital and the professional associations provided that Battaglia and Polk, individually, would serve as anesthesiologists, although the contract contemplated that Battaglia P.A. and Polk P.A. would also furnish other physicians to serve as anesthesiologists. The professional associations retained LaVerta Jane Crowder, an anesthesiologist, on a part-time basis to work in the hospital's surgical arenas when either Battaglia or Polk was unavailable. Polk was not at the hospital the day of Mark Alexander's surgery, and Dr. Crowder was his attending anesthesiologist. Battaglia was on duty, but did not have any contact with Mr. Alexander until resuscitation efforts had begun.
The contract between the hospital and the professional associations provided that the hospital was to employ registered nurse anesthetists to assist the anesthesiologists. But there was evidence that the professional associations directed the details of the nurse anesthetists' work, made decisions about their continuing education, and decided how much they would be compensated.
Mark Alexander's widow and his parents brought this wrongful death suit against Battaglia and Polk in their individual capacities and against their respective professional associations. The Alexanders also sued Dr. Crowder, the nurse anesthetist Cernosek, the hospital, and a joint venture between Battaglia and Polk, or between their professional associations, known as Red Oak Anesthesia Associates. The hospital and Cernosek settled before trial for $1,875,000 plus $33,266.21 designated as costs.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. Before submission, the trial court directed a verdict for Polk in his individual capacity and for Red Oak Anesthesia Associates. The jury failed to find either "Battaglia, M.D." or the hospital negligent but found others had been negligent and apportioned responsibility as follows:
Cernosek 30%
Crowder 30%
Battaglia P.A. 20%
Polk P.A. 20%
The jury further found that Cernosek was an employee of "Carl Battaglia, M.D., P.A./Tommy A. Polk, M.D., P.A." in providing anesthesia to Mark Alexander, in her efforts to resuscitate him, or both. The jury failed to find that Dr. Crowder was an employee of either professional association but found there was an agency relationship between Dr. Crowder and the professional associations. It also found that the Battaglia and Polk professional associations were engaged in a joint venture on the date of Mark Alexander's surgery.
The jury awarded Lisa Alexander (Mark Alexander's widow) $1,080,000 in past damages and $1,800,000 in future damages, and awarded each of Mark Alexander's parents $180,000 in past damages and $180,000 in future damages, for a total of $360,000 to each parent. The parties stipulated prior to trial that Mark Alexander's medical and funeral expenses were $57,113.05, and accordingly, the total amount of damages was $3,657,113.05. The trial court applied $1,875,000 as a dollar-for-dollar settlement credit, resulting in a damage award in the judgment of $1,782,113.05 plus prejudgment interest. The trial court calculated prejudgment interest on the past losses found by the jury and the $57,113.05 stipulated by the parties (totaling $1,497,113.05 in past damages), resulting in $367,498.05 in prejudgment interest (for a total award of $2,149,611.10), without considering any part of the settlement credit in the calculation. Finally, the trial court held the professional associations jointly and severally liable for one another's share of the judgment as well as jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the judgment.
Battaglia P.A., Polk P.A., and Crowder appealed, but Crowder paid her share of the judgment and was released by the Alexanders before the court of appeals issued its decision. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.3 We granted the petition for review submitted by the professional associations.
Before we consider the questions raised by the professional associations, it is useful to recount what has not been challenged in this Court. The jury found both Cernosek (the nurse anesthetist) and Crowder (the attending anesthesiologist) negligent. The jury further found that Cernosek was an employee of both professional associations and that Crowder was their agent in providing health care services to Mark Alexander. None of these findings is challenged in this Court. Accordingly, each professional association is vicariously liable for the negligence apportioned to Cernosek and Crowder. Crowder fully satisfied her share of the judgment on appeal, which discharged the professional associations' liability for that part of the judgment. But regardless of the outcome of this appeal, Battaglia P.A. and Polk P.A. each remain vicariously liable for Cernosek's negligence. The points of contention in this case have narrowed to whether the professional associations were themselves negligent, whether they should be jointly and severally liable, and finally, the proper calculation of prejudgment interest.
For the reasons considered below, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment in part but reverse the part of the judgment pertaining to prejudgment interest. Prejudgment interest under section 16.02 of former article 4590i4 should not be calculated on damages that a claimant does not actually recover under the trial court's judgment. Therefore, to the extent past damages found by the trier of fact are offset by a settlement credit, prejudgment interest accrues only on the amount awarded in the judgment. When, as here, future damages are also found, the settlement payments should be applied first to past damages, then to future damages.
The first two issues raised in the professional associations' briefing concern calculation of prejudgment interest. However, we will consider their contentions regarding liability issues before we determine how settlement credits should be applied and prejudgment interest should be calculated.
In the court of appeals, the professional associations contended that they owed no duty to the Alexanders. They have not...
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