Carl R. Miller Tractor Co. v. Hope, 42564.
| Decision Date | 13 November 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 42564.,42564. |
| Citation | 218 Iowa 1235,257 N.W. 312 |
| Parties | CARL R. MILLER TRACTOR CO. et al. v. HOPE, County Auditor (ROMP et al., Interveners). |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Monroe County; C. F. Wennerstrum, Judge.
Action in mandamus to compel the defendant county auditor to issue a warrant upon a claim allowed the board of supervisors of Monroe county in conjunction with a compromise agreement settling differences growing out of the purchase of road machinery by the county from the tractor company. Subsequent to suit being commenced, the receiver of the tractor company was substituted as plaintiff. The facts essential to an understanding of the case are stated in the opinion. The court ordered the writ issued as prayed. The appearance of interveners in the case has no significance. In effect interveners, who were taxpayers of Monroe county, merely adopted the allegations and prayer of the defendant county auditor. Defendant and interveners appeal.
Affirmed.
F. A. Nichol, Co. Atty., and Mabry & Mabry, all of Albia, for appellants.
D. M. Anderson, of Albia, for appellee.
A contract was entered into between the Carl R. Miller Tractor Company and Monroe county by which the county agreed to buy certain road machinery. The machinery was delivered to the county and was used for several months. It was not paid for by the county. Subsequently the difficulties between the tractor company and the county were adjusted by an agreement by which the machinery was to be taken back by the company and a stipulated amount was to be paid by the county for the use of the machinery. Pursuant to such agreement the machinery was taken back by the company and the board of supervisors allowed a claim in favor of the tractor company for the amount agreed upon. The agreement last referred to was entered into in December of 1931. The defendant county auditor refused to issue a warrant for such amount. On January 3d, 1932, this action was brought to compel the auditor to issue and deliver such warrant to the tractor company.
[1] The action is in mandamus. At the outset the defendant county auditor contends that mandamus will not lie to compel her to issue a warrant on the claim allowed by the board of supervisors. She contends that the tractor company has a remedy at law, in that if the warrant is not issued it may bring an action at law to enforce its rights against the county. Mandamus will lie to compel an officer to discharge a duty enjoined upon him by law. Code, § 12440. By Code, § 5141, it is made the duty of the county auditor to “sign all orders issued by the board for the payment of money.” Under ordinary circumstances it is the duty of the county auditor to issue warrants upon claims allowed by the board of supervisors. The performance of this duty may be enforced by mandamus. Of what avail would it be to plaintiff to commence an action at law against the county for the establishment of its demand against the county, when the board of supervisors has already determined that the demand is proper and allowed the claim? The effect of one proceeding is the same as the other. The demand is established as one entitled to payment. See Code, § 11675. There is no reason to suppose that an officer will respect a determination of the merit of the claim by a court more highly than the determination of the question by the board of supervisors, for the validity of the determination in either instance rests on the same foundation-jurisdiction given by the law. When a claim has been established by either method, payment is in order, and in either event ministerial acts are necessary on the part of the auditor and treasurer before payment is actually made, for it is seldom that property of a county subject to execution exists. In either event the performance of the ministerial acts can be enforced by mandamus. What has been said is in relation to enforcing the issuance of warrants under ordinary circumstances. In this view our holding is consistent with the weight of authority (38 C. J. p. 767, § 406) and is in a measure sustained by our prior decisions. Bryan v. Cattell, 15 Iowa, 538;Conrad v. Shearer, 197 Iowa, 1078, 198 N. W. 633;Morris v. Hosmer, 182 Iowa, 883, 166 N. W. 295;Ireland v. Hunnel, 90 Iowa, 98, 57 N. W. 715;Prescott v. Gonser, 34 Iowa, 175. It must also be borne in mind that the court has a large measure of discretion in the matter of issuing a writ of mandamus. Conrad v. Shearer, 197 Iowa, 1078, 198 N. W. 633.
[2] But the auditor insists that there are unusual circumstances present in this case which make the issuance of the writ improper. She insists that under the provisions of Code, § 5258, the contracts and agreement were invalid, in that sufficient funds were not available in the collectible revenue of the year to discharge the agreements. The record upon this matter is somewhat involved, but a very careful examination of the record leads inevitably to the conclusion that sufficient funds were available in collectible revenue, both at the time the first contract was made and at the time the compromise agreement was entered into, to pay the obligations created by such contract and such agreement. The position of the auditor can only be reached by assuming as she did, as a witness, that road maintenance costs and expenditures incurred after such agreement and contract had been entered into must first be subtracted from available funds in determining the validity of plaintiffs' claim. It is of course obvious that under the statute the contract and agreement were invalid only in the event that when entered into the expenditure thereby created would be in excess of collectible revenues of the year. It seems certain that if expenditures during any year were in excess of collectible revenues the...
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