Carlin v. Worthington

• Decision Date: 25 May 1937
• Docket Number: 21.
• Citation: 192 A. 356,172 Md. 505
• Parties: CARLIN v. WORTHINGTON.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

192 A. 356

172 Md. 505

CARLIN v. WORTHINGTON.

No. 21.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

May 25, 1937

Appeal from Baltimore City Court; Eugene O'Dunne, Judge.

Action by H. Leslie Carlin against Cornelia T. Worthington. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and URNER, OFFUTT, PARKE, SLOAN, MITCHELL SHEHAN, and JOHNSON, JJ.

Edward J. Colgan, Jr., and Nathan Patz, both of Baltimore (Karr & Colgan, Mylander & Patz, and Richard M. Carlin, all of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Joseph D'A. McGrath, of Baltimore, for appellee.

SLOAN Judge.

The collision for the consequences of which, the plaintiff, H Leslie Carlin, sought to recover from the defendant, Cornelia T. Worthington, occurred at the intersection of the Cooksville road, with the Columbia pike, in Montgomery county. From a judgment for the defendant the plaintiff appeals.

There were two trucks involved; the plaintiff's truck, driven by Ralph E. Cullen, the defendant's by Roy C. Brightwell. The plaintiff's truck was on its way from Baltimore to Washington on the Columbia pike, which is a boulevard or favored highway. The defendant's truck was being driven from Glenwood to Washington on the Cooksville road, a secondary or unfavored highway. The roads intersected, and the trucks met at Olney. On the Cooksville road, near the intersection, was a "Stop" sign, erected by the authority of section 209, article 56, of the Code, Acts 1929 c. 224, warning motorists on the Cooksville road of the danger in entering or crossing the Columbia pike. There is a store on the northwest corner of the intersection, so near the roads that it obstructs the view of the other road, to persons traveling on either of the roads, in the directions the participants were respectively going at the time. There was evidence that defendant's driver stopped his truck before entering the intersection, and evidence that he did not stop, and that he slowed the truck and put it in second gear. The plaintiff's driver testified that he reduced his speed approaching the intersection to 25 miles an hour, in obedience to a road sign so restricting the speed at that point, and that the trucks entered the intersection almost simultaneously. The defendant's driver testified that, when he entered the intersection, the plaintiff's truck was 150 or 160 feet away, and traveling just before the collision at from 35 to 40 miles an hour, and that his (defendant's) rear wheels were "about the center of the road (when) he come up there and struck me." The evidence stated shows that it was so conflicting as to require the jury to say who was or were at fault. The defendant did not submit a demurrer prayer, so that the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence was admittedly one of fact for the jury.

The only question argued was the plaintiff's second prayer, refused by the trial court, which asked an instruction defining the rule of the road with respect to favored and unfavored highways, and the duty of a driver on an unfavored highway in regard to "Stop" signs, and he relies upon the opinion in Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md. 77, 188 A. 31, 34, to sustain his contention. The part of the prayer over which there is contention sought an instruction that, if the jury should "find that the defendant's truck did not come to a full and complete stop before entering into or crossing such through highway, and if they shall find that the two trucks collided in or near the intersection of said through highway and said intersecting highway," then their verdict should be for the plaintiff, unless his driver by his negligence directly contributed to the accident.

The rights, duties, and privileges of motorists on favored and unfavored highways is discussed at considerable length in the notes in 58 A.L.R. 1198, 81 A.L.R. 185, and 89 A.L.R. 838. Preferences in certain streets or highways must be created by statute or ordinance, 5 Am.Jur. § 301, p. 668, and in this state they are, by section 209, art. 56, of the Code . The weight of authority seems to be that the right of a driver on a favored highway is not absolute but is to be enjoyed with due regard to the circumstances then and there existing, particularly as to speed and distances of the respective cars from the intersection when in sight of each other. Note, 58 A.L.R. 1198. A "Stop" sign means stop before entering a boulevard or favored highway, Carrigan v. Ashwell, 147 Wash. 597, 266 P. 686, 58 A.L.R. 1194; Flores v. Fitzgerald, 204 Cal. 374, 268 P. 369; Johnston v. Jahncke Service, Inc., 7 La. App. 348, and an unfavored driver must not enter against a favored driver arriving at the intersection at the same time. When the unfavored driver has time, if the favored driver is so far from the intersection that he will not arrive there before the crossing is cleared by the other, if he is not speeding, it is not negligence of an unfavored driver to enter. Heidle v. Baldwin, 118 Ohio St. 375, 161 N.E. 44, 58 A.L.R. 1186; Weber v. Beeson, 197 Mich. 607, 164 N.W. 255; Stryker v. Hastie, 131 Or. 282, 282 P. 1087; McCulley v. Anderson, 119 Neb. 105, 227 N.W. 321; Pline v. Parsons, 231 Mich. 466, 204 N.W. 131, 58 A.L.R. 1204; State, use of Harvey v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 69 Md. 339, 14 A. 685, 688. It has been held that it is negligence per se to enter a main trunk line marked by a stop sign without stopping, Harris v. Blythe, 222 Ala. 48, 130 So. 548; Morris v. Bloomgren, 127 Ohio St. 147, 187 N.E. 2, 89 A.L.R. 831; and that it is the duty of a driver to stop at a stop sign, Svenson v. Vondrak, 200...