Heidle v. Baldwin

• Decision Date: 28 March 1928
• Docket Number: 20586,20686
• Citation: 118 Ohio St. 375,161 N.E. 44
• Parties: Heidle Et Al., Partners, D.B.A. Heidle & Schelle, v. Baldwin.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

161 N.E. 44

118 Ohio St. 375

Heidle Et Al., Partners, D.B.A. Heidle & Schelle, v. Baldwin.

Nos. 20686 , 20586

Supreme Court of Ohio

March 28, 1928

Motor vehicles - Right of way on main thoroughfares - Sections 6310-28, 6810-30 and 6310-31, General Code - Driver not justified in disregarding another vehicle upon intersecting thoroughfare - Statute applies only where collision would result from vehicles proceeding uninterruptedly - Intersecting driver may cross in advance of main thorough-fare driver, when - Question for jury whether intersecting driver obliged to wait - Rule of negligence per se inapplicable to intersecting driver, when - Negligence and contributory negligence of drivers, question for jury - Error to charge jury that main thoroughfare driver has right of way, when - Intersecting driver not required to fully stop by statute - Negligence per se to violate municipal ordinance requiring full stop at main thoroughfare.

1. Right of way, as defined by Section 6310-28, General Code and read in conjunction with Sect.@Lons 6310-30 and 6310-31 General Code, granting a vehicle on a main thoroughfare the right to proceed uninterruptedly in the direction in which it is moving, gives a preference to the vehicle on such main thoroughfare, but does not diminish the duty of the driver of such vehicle to proceed in a lawful manner, nor justify his disregarding another vehicle upon an intersecting thoroughfare.

2. The statute only applies where two vehicles are approaching the crossing from different directions so nearly at the same time and at such rates of speed within lawful limits that if each proceeds without regard to the other a collision is reasonably to be apprehended.

3. Where the driver of a vehicle upon an intersecting highway reaches a main thoroughfare it is his duty to look both to right and left and if another vehicle is approaching the intersection on the main thoroughfare it is his duty to wait until such other vehicle has passed before entering the intersection unless a prudent person would have reasonable ground to believe that such other vehicle proceeding at a lawful speed is so far distant from the intersection that he could safely cross in advance thereof. The question whether the driver of the vehicle on the intersecting road is obliged to wait until the driver on the main thoroughfare has passed is a question for the jury, to be determined under all the circumstances of the case under proper instructions.

4. The duty imposed by the statute upon the driver of a vehicle on the intersecting highway is not a specific requirement to do or to omit to do a definite act but rather a rule of conduct and the rule of per se negligence is not applicable thereto.

5. Upon issues of negligence and contributory negligence where the evidence is in conflict as to the speed of each of the vehicles and the evidence is likewise in conflict as to the distance of each of the vehicles from the intersection at the time when each driver first had reasonable opportunity to observe the approach of the other, elements are presented which the triers of the facts must consider in their estimate of conduct.

6. It is error to instruct the jury in general terms that the law gives the right of way to the (driver of the vehicle upon the main thoroughfare without stating the conditions and limitations upon that right.

7. The state statutes do not require the driver of a vehicle on an intersecting highway to bring his vehicle to a full stop and where this requirement is made by the provisions of a city ordinance a greater obligation is imposed upon drivers upon intersecting streets within the limits of such municipality and it is proper to charge under such an ordinance that the failure to bring the vehicle to a full stop is negligence per se and actionable where such failure is the direct and proximate cause of collision.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs Squire, Sanders & Dempsey and Mr. D. S. Ingalls, for plaintiff in error.

Mr Harry G. Fuerst, and Messrs. Anderson & Lamb, for defendant in error, in cause No. 20586.

Mr. Eugene Rheinfrank, Mr. Carl J. Lindecker, Messrs. Lindsey & Berry and Mr. P. M. Wishon, for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. L. H. Shipman and Mr. A. B. Campbell, for defendant in error, in cause No. 20686.

MARSHALL C. J.

The above-entitled causes have been argued separately in this court, but in cause No. 20586 the question is so similar to one of the questions in cause No. 20686 that one opinion will dispose of both matters. The discussion will be based upon the record of No. 20686.

Flossie Baldwin, on May 4, 1925, suffered certain personal injuries in a collision between a Ford coupe driven by her and a truck owned and driven by George Heidle, at the intersection of Miami street and South Wayne street, in the city of Piqua, Ohio. In her petition filed in the court of common pleas of Miami county she alleged that the defendant was driving his car at a high rate of speed, and was at the time of the collision in the act of driving his truck in an easterly direction on Miami street, which is not a main thoroughfare, and across South Wayne street, which is a main thoroughfare, and that said intersection is in a closely built-up section of the city of Piqua. The coupe was being driven southwardly on South Wayne street. The accident occurred in the early afternoon, and the pavement was dry at the time. All witnesses agreed that Miss Baldwin was driving her car at the rate of 15 to 20 miles per hour, but the witnesses greatly differed as to the speed of the truck and the time of arrival of each of the cars at the point of intersection. The petition alleged that Heidle was driving the truck at a high rate of speed, carelessly and negligently, and that he did not pause or stop before entering upon South Wayne street; and the petition contained the further allegation of the existence of a city ordinance, as follows:

"That by an ordinance of the council of the city of Piqua said South Wayne street was designated as a main thoroughfare, with legible and appropriate signs erected not nearer than one hundred (100) feet from the intersection of South Wayne street with Miami street, a cross street."

The petition contained no other description of or reference to the ordinance. The answer contained a general denial and a plea of sole negligence of plaintiff, and in a cross-petition damages in the sum of $20 were claimed upon the ground of the sole negligence of the plaintiff. Claiming that the plaintiff was driving on the wrong side of the street, the answer pleaded other portions of the same ordinance referred to in the petition, which provided that vehicles shall be driven in a careful manner and with due regard for the safety of pedestrians, other vehicles, and property, and that all vehicles at all times shall be driven on the right side of the street.

The ordinance referred to in the petition contains a provision in Section 40 thereof, that main thoroughfares "shall be understood to mean all sections of public roads and highways on which street cars or electric cars run," and Section 6310-30, General Code, contains the same provision. It is conceded that South Wayne street carried a street railway and was therefore a main thoroughfare. Section 23 of the ordinance gives to drivers of vehicles traveling on main thoroughfares the right of way over all vehicles, both to the right and left, and requires all vehicles to the right and left to be brought to a full stop, changing gear before entering such main thoroughfare. The state statute gives to vehicles upon the main thoroughfare the right of way, but does not require vehicles entering such main thoroughfare from an intersecting highway to come to a full stop. Both by the ordinance and by the state law, "'Right of way' means the right of a vehicle to proceed uninterruptedly in a lawful manner in the direction in which it is moving in preference to another vehicle approaching from a different direction into its path." A stop line was painted across Miami street at the lot line, which is approximately 11 feet from the west curb of South Wayne avenue, and a stop sign was erected on Miami street about 100 feet from the intersection. Heidle testified that he entered the main thoroughfare at a speed of about 5 miles an hour, but admitted on cross-examination that he did not bring the truck to a full stop. Miss Baldwin endeavored to drive in front of the truck and almost succeeded in doing so, but the truck collided with her coupe at the running board and the cars were in some way locked and the coupe was pushed eastwardly to the curb with sufficient force to break the wheels. The testimony of plaintiff and defendant is wholly irreconcilable, and each of the parties narrated a version of the case which, if believed, would have rendered the collision impossible. Miss Baldwin testified that she first saw Heidle when she was only 30 or 35 feet from the intersection and that Heidle was at that time 50 or 60 feet back of the stop line, and the stop line was approximately 11 feet from the curb. Inasmuch as the truck was preparing to make a left turn, it is impossible that it could have been making the same speed that the coupe was making, and she admitted that she was going 15 or 20 miles an hour. Under such circumstances she would necessarily clear the crossing before his arrival. On the other hand, Heidle testified that when he first saw Miss Baldwin she was 150 feet from the crossing, and that he was at that time at the curb line of Wayne street. He testified that he was traveling about 5 miles an hour, and under those circumstances he would easily have crossed the street before her arrival. The jury rendered a verdict of $8,000, upon which judgment was...