Carlisle v. Phenix City Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 20 July 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-7673,87-7673 |
| Citation | 849 F.2d 1376 |
| Parties | 47 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 616, 47 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,147, 47 Ed. Law Rep. 450 Charles H. CARLISLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PHENIX CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION; Clifford S. Smith, individually and as Superintendent of Education for the Phenix City Board of Education; A.A. Roberts, Jr.; Neal C. Deanhardt; C.F. Floyd, II; Theoria Y. King, et al.; and Lamar Powers, individually and in their official capacities as members of the Phenix City Board of Education, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Kenneth L. Thomas, Massey, Means & Thomas, Solomon S. Seay, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant.
Sydney S. Smith, Smith & Smith, Phenix City, Ala., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.
Before JOHNSON, Circuit Judge, HENDERSON *, Senior Circuit Judge, and PITTMAN **, Senior District Judge.
This is an action brought under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983 and under Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. Secs. 2000e, et seq. This is an Alabama teacher tenure case. Ala.Code Sec. 16-24-1, et seq. The district court granted summary judgment because of res judicata and collateral estoppel. We reverse.
Carlisle was the principal of Susie E. Allen Elementary School from 1982 until 1984 when he was transferred to assistant coordinator of the Alternative Learning Center, a position of equal pay. Superintendent Clifford Smith recommended the transfer to the Phenix City Board of Education. The school board voted and, upholding Smith's decision, gave four reasons for the transfer: 1) lack of confidence in Carlisle's leadership ability; 2) staff dissension resulting from poor leadership; 3) low staff morale; and 4) the superintendent's professional opinion that Carlisle provided ineffective leadership. 1 Carlisle requested a hearing, for which Carlisle employed counsel and which took place over four days. The board again voted and approved the transfer. Carlisle appealed the board's decision to the Alabama State Tenure Commission. The tenure commission reversed the board decision. The board then petitioned the Russell County Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus. The circuit court issued the writ and vacated the commission's reversal, thus reinstating the board's decision. The tenure commission appealed to the state court of civil appeals, which affirmed the circuit court. Alabama State Tenure Comm'n v. Phenix City Bd. of Ed., 467 So.2d 263 (Ala.Civ.App.1985). A motion for rehearing was rejected as untimely and no writ of certiorari was sought.
Carlisle raised a claim of discrimination with the EEOC and received a right-to-sue letter from November 21, 1986. He then filed the present suit on January 9, 1987, alleging that he was transferred because of his race in violation of Title VII and section 1983. The suit seeks declaratory and injunctive relief fully to restore Carlisle's status. On October 8, 1987, the district court held the suit precluded and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Because the parties allege no disputed issues of fact in this case, the summary judgment is reviewed de novo as to the correct application of the law.
In deciding whether res judicata or collateral estoppel bar Carlisle's section 1983 and Title VII suit, we adhere to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 1, implemented by 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1738:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory, or Possession from which they are taken.
The Supreme Court has been unambiguous in directing federal courts regarding section 1983 and Title VII suits fully to apply state principles when considering preclusive effects of state decisions. Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 465 U.S. 75, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) (Sec. 1983 preclusion); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) (Title VII preclusion).
The state proceedings in this case originated from an administrative hearing. This Circuit accords preclusive effects to judicial appeals following state administrative proceedings in accordance with that state's preclusion law. Casines v. Murchek, 766 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir.1985) (no preclusion); Gorin v. Osborne, 756 F.2d 834 (11th Cir.1985) (preclusion). A plaintiff need not seek reversal of an adverse administrative decision through state judicial appeals, but once that course is taken, federal relitigation is foreclosed. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635, 54 U.S.L.W. 5084 (1986); Sharpley v. Davis, 786 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir.1986).
The benchmark Alabama case reciting the elements necessary for a finding of res judicata or collateral estoppel is Wheeler v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham, 364 So.2d 1190 (Ala.1978). According to Wheeler:
The elements of res judicata are as follows: 1) prior judgment rendered by court of competent jurisdiction; 2) prior judgment on the merits; 3) parties to both suits substantially identical; and 4) same cause of action present in both suits. If these elements are present, then the former judgment is an absolute bar to any subsequent suit on the same cause of action, including any issue which was or could have been litigated in the prior action.
Collateral estoppel operates where the subsequent suit between the same parties is not on the same cause of action. Requirements for collateral estoppel to operate are 1) issue identical to one involved in previous suit; 2) issue actually litigated in prior action; and 3) resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment. If these elements are present, the prior judgment is conclusive as to those issues actually determined in the prior suit.
364 So.2d at 1199 (citations omitted). We consider first issue preclusion and then claim preclusion.
Collateral estoppel in this case depends on whether the race discrimination issue was litigated and decided in the state judicial proceedings. If the race claims were not decided in the course of the state appeal, there can be no collateral estoppel. Conley v. Beaver, 437 So.2d 1267 (Ala.1983) (); Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. v. Moore, 349 So.2d 1113 (Ala.1977) ().
The district court concluded that race was a litigated issue in the state proceedings. There is little in the record to support this statement. 2 The district court relied on language from the civil appeals court: 467 So.2d at 265. This finding only remotely relates to Carlisle's Title VII claim. In this federal suit Carlisle is seeking to show that the superintendent and the board were racially motivated in transferring him. The civil appeals court's statement refers to only alleged racial favoritism reflected in the survey responses: that black teachers evaluated Carlisle more favorably than did white teachers. Although the board based its transfer decision in part on the survey results, the failure to substantiate a teacher bias towards Carlisle based on race did not resolve allegations of board bias.
What was decided by the state appeals was that the board did have legitimate reasons that were not political or personal for transferring Carlisle. 467 So.2d at 265. Carlisle could be thus collaterally estopped from asserting that there were no legitimate reasons for his transfer, but he cannot be estopped from asserting that there was an illegitimate racial reason in addition. The absence of racial bias on the part of the board was not a finding necessary to the judgment and was not made in the course of the state proceedings. 3 The district court was wrong to base summary judgment on collateral estoppel.
Res judicata in this case depends on whether the parties are substantially the same in the federal and state actions, whether this case concerns the same cause of action as the case in state court, and whether the racial discrimination issue could have been litigated and decided in state court.
The appellant in this case is only Carlisle. Formally, by statutory directive, the state judicial appeals contraposed the school board against the tenure commission, not Carlisle. 4 Carlisle and the tenure commission are, however, parties in privity. In Alabama, "a person may be bound by a judgment even though not a party to a suit if one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his virtual representative." Century 21 v. Alabama Real Estate Comm'n, 401 So.2d 764 (Ala.1981); Hurt v. Pullman Inc., 764 F.2d 1443 (11th Cir.1985). The district court found that the "[p]laintiff was the real party in interest in the State court proceedings, and his interests were fully represented therein, nominally by the Commission, as well as by his own able counsel who properly represented the Commission in the State trial and appellate courts." Only closely aligned interests could have enabled Carlisle's counsel to represent the tenure commission during the state judicial proceedings without a conflict of interest. Even more indicative is the fact that, although the civil appeals court styles the case as the board against only the commission and its members, the opinion begins with the observation that "Mr. Carlisle and the Tenure Commission appeal." 467 So.2d at 264. We conclude that the tenure commission acted in a representative capacity for Carlisle. 5
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...through state judicial appeals, but once that course is taken, federal relitigation is foreclosed." Carlisle v. Phenix City Bd. of Educ., 849 F.2d 1376, 1378 (11th Cir.1988). Andela chose to appeal to the Florida Third District Court of Appeals. Having elected that state court appeal, Andel......
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