Carlson v. Rent-a-Center, Inc.
Decision Date | 14 January 2003 |
Docket Number | No. Civ. 02-128-PH.,Civ. 02-128-PH. |
Citation | 237 F.Supp.2d 114 |
Parties | Bernard O. CARLSON, Plaintiff v. RENT-A-CENTER, INC. Defendant |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Bernard O. Carlson, Biddeford, ME, plaintiff, pro se.
James R. Erwin, Pierce, Atwood, Portland, ME, for Rent A Center Inc, defendant.
ORDER AFFIRMING RECOMMENDED DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The United States Magistrate Judge filed with the court on December 20, 2002, with copies to the parties, her Recommended Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The time within which to file objections expired on January 10, 2003, and no objections have been filed. The Magistrate Judge notified the parties that failure to object would waive their right to de novo review and appeal.
It is therefore ORDERED that the Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge is hereby ADOPTED. Summary Judgment is GRANTED to the defendant on the plaintiff's claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Maine Human Rights Act. With regard to the plaintiff's denial of leave claims, judgment is GRANTED to the defendant on the plaintiff's Maine Family and Medical Leave Act claim; summary judgment is DENIED to the defendant on the plaintiff's federal Family and Medical Leave Act claim. SO ORDERED.
Bernard Carlson, proceeding pro se, is suing his former employer, Rent-A-Center, for violations of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Maine Human Rights Act, the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Maine Family Medical Leave Act. (Dockets No. 1 & 16.) Carlson is a diabetic who was denied a request for medical leave and was fired by Rent-A-Center in the fall of 2000. Rent-A-Center has filed a motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 8) and Carlson has responded (Docket No. 17). For the reasons herein discussed, I recommend that the Court GRANT the defendant's motion with respect to Carlson's disability discrimination claims, and his claim under the Maine Family Medical Leave Act. However, I recommend that the Court DENY the motion with respect to Carlson's claim under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act.
Rent-A-Center is entitled to summary judgment only if, "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact," Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c), and that Rent-A-Center "is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," id. Though Rent-A-Center's "task is daunting," Carlson also faces a meaningful assignment: he "has a threshold burden to `set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., Inc., 884 F.2d 1510, 1512 (1st Cir.1989) (quoting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)).
Carlson's effort in responding to Rent-A-Center's motion does not pass muster. Carlson's response has a factual summary with no record citations. This pleading does not comply with the District of Maine Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56 as he has not submitted "a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts." D. Me. Loc. R. Civ. P. 56(c).1 As a result, the facts contained in Rent-A-Center's supporting statement of material facts are deemed admitted, but only to the extent Rent-a-Center's record citations support the stated facts. D. Me. Loc. R. Civ. P. 56(e).2 I also note that with respect to his arguments and the unsupported facts, Carlson has focused on responding to Rent-A-Center's arguments regarding his leave-related claim; he has set forth no argument to contravene Rent-A-Center vis-à-vis the disability discrimination claims. (Pl.'s Resp. at 1-6 & Exs. A-D.)3
Though summary judgment is difficult to navigate as a pro se plaintiff the pleading burden of the federal and local rules of civil procedure apply to represented and unrepresented parties alike. Parkinson v. Goord, 116 F.Supp.2d 390, 393 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (). That Carlson envisions providing the court with medical records and other written documents sometime in the future (Def's Resp. Summ. J. at 1) does not arrest the summary judgment gauntlet. See Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990) ( . To excuse Carlson's default with respect to record support for his factual assertions would, in effect, strip Rent-A-Center of its ability to move for a summary disposition of this action.
That said, I can grant Rent-A-Center's motion only if, on the record before me, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Winters v. FDIC, 812 F.Supp. 1, 2 (D.Me.1992) (). I address the material facts properly before me.
In accordance with the discussion above, I identify the following facts as material to Carlson's state and federal law disability and leave claims.
On October 4, 1996, Carlson was hired by an entity named Wilson Enterprises (Carlson Dep. at 46), a Rent-A-Center franchisee that operated multiple Rent-A-Center stores in Maine. His job responsibilities included sales, customer service, and merchandising tasks (Id. at 46) at a store in Sanford, Maine. In October 1999 Carlson was transferred to the accounts department and became an account representative responsible for calling delinquent customers and collecting late payments. (Id. at 52.) Carlson negotiated this change with his supervisor because he was experiencing difficulty with his legs and, as an account representative, Carlson would spend approximately an hour a day on his feet, in contrast to the seven-hour stints required in his former position. (Id. at 54-55.) In his position as account representative Carlson would assist with other in-store responsibilities as needed. (Id. at 52.)
On June 27, 2000, Wilson Enterprises sold the assets of the Rent-A-Center franchise to Rent-A-Center (Colizzi Decl. ¶ 4)4 and on that day Carlson understood that he was no longer employed by Wilson Enterprises . ) He became an account manager for Rent-A-Center. .)
Carlson reports that Rent-A-Center commenced some reorganization of the employees five weeks after the sale; at this juncture two driver employees were fired and two present employees who "knew the territory" were put in charge of pick-up and delivery. (Carlson Dep. at 69-72, 81.) This decreased the number of employees at the Sanford store from nine to seven. (Id. at 72.) At this time, in early August 2000, a representative of Rent-A-Center came and announced that "they were new hire of Rent-A-Center." (Id. at 87-88.) Rent-A-Center explained that all store employees would have to do all tasks, inside and outside (id. at 88) and Carlson understood this to be a Rent-A-Center policy (id. at 126). Carlson also understood that Rent-A-Center wanted him, as a collection department employee, to do both delivery and pick-up (repossession) of merchandise. (Id. at 124.)
In support of its contention that its employees were each required to do a wide range of in and outside tasks Rent-A-Center cites to its Account Manager's Compensation Plan. Effective September 11, 1999, it contains a section describing the positions "ESSENTIAL JOB FUNCTIONS":
Answer phone calls in a professional manner, take orders, deliver and pick-up merchandise, review past due accounts, and call customers with past due accounts. Clean vehicles and make sure that the vehicle is being properly maintained. Clean showroom, restroom, work areas, and merchandise. Make the merchandise available for rent as returned from the customer's home. Prospect for new business through various means including telemarketing and distributing brochures and flyers.
(Erwin Decl. Ex. F to Ex. B.) Carlson understood that as an account manager under Rent-A-Center he would be responsible for doing pick up and deliveries. (Carlson Dep. at 76.)
With respect to benefits, Carlson understood after these August 2000 changes that he lost his vacation time accrued prior to June 27, 2000. (Id. at 89.) Carlson's hours were cut from forty-five hours to forty hours and he received a raise from $8.50 an hour to $13.00 an hour. (Id. at 88.) Colizzi, the former director of operations who started with Wilson Enterprises, perceived the benefits — such as the health and retirement plans — offered by Rent-A-Center to be "substantially different" from those offered by Wilson Enterprises. (Colizzi Decl. ¶ 6.)5 Carlson did not have any retirement accrued under Wilson Enterprises but he perceived that some of his co-workers were able to cash out their Wilson plan and "start all over again." (Carlson Dep. at 90.)6 Additionally, with respect to health benefits, the employees' insurance company changed and Carlson's co-payment went up. (Id. at 91.) When the Rent-A-Center purchase was "complete" Carlson received an employee handbook from Rent-A-Center. (Id. at 172.)7
Colizzi recalls that Rent-A-Center informed Wilson Enterprises managers on June 27, 2000, that all ...
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