Carlton v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 13 May 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 45,45 |
| Citation | 276 N.C. 564,173 S.E.2d 783 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | A. P. CARLTON v. W. H. ANDERSON and Randall Sheppard. |
Booth, Fish & Adams, by J. Patrick Adams and H. Marshall Simpson, Greensboro, for plaintiff.
Jordan, Wright, Nichols, Caffrey & Hill, by Luke Wright and Edward L. Murrelle, Greensboro, for defendants.
This case presents one clear-cut question of law. Does the memorandum signed by the defendants contain a description of the land sufficiently definite to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds? The requirements are easily stated. Difficulty arises in their application. Some descriptions are so precise and definite as to leave no doubt about their sufficiency. Others are so vague and indefinite as to leave no doubt as to their insufficiency. Somewhere between these extremes is a dividing line. Near the line on either side is a twilight zone where the court must decide on which side a contested description falls. Trouble arises in the borderline cases.
G.S. § 22--2, in material substance, provides all contracts to sell and convey land or any interest therein '* * * shall be void unless said contract, or some memorandum or note thereof, be put in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some other person by him thereto lawfully authorized'. Many times this Court has been confronted with and has decided the question whether a description is sufficiently definite to identify the land involved. The cases are listed and annotated in Volume D1, Michie's Replacement, 1965, and in the 1969 Cumulative Supplement thereto. The general rule governing decision was stated in Searcy v. Logan, 226 N.C. 562, 39 S.E.2d 593 (opinion by Winborne, J., later C.J.):
'This Court has uniformly recognized the principle that a deed conveying land, or a contract to sell or convey land, or a memorandum thereof, within the meaning of the statute of frauds, G.S., 22--2, must contain a description of the land, the subject matter thereof, either certain in itself or capable of being reduced to certainty by reference to something extrinsic to which the deed, contract or memorandum refers.'
We quote here the full description as disclosed in the written memorandum: '* * * a certain tract or parcel of land located in _ _ Township, Guilford County, North Carolina, and described as follows: About Four Acres situated at the North-East Intersection of Mt. Hope Church Road and Interstate 85.' It is obvious the memorandum is...
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River Birch Associates v. City of Raleigh
...8,] at 13, 136 S.E.2d [269,] at 273 [ (1964) ]. Whether a description is patently ambiguous is a question of law. Carlton v. Anderson, 276 N.C. 564, 173 S.E.2d 783 (1970). "A description is ... latently ambiguous if it is insufficient in itself to identify the property but refers to somethi......
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...v. Coe, supra, 262 N.C. at 13, 136 S.E.2d at 273. Whether a description is patently ambiguous is a question of law. Carlton v. Anderson, 276 N.C. 564, 173 S.E.2d 783 (1970). 'A description is . . . latently ambiguous if it is insufficient in itself to identify the property but refers to som......
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Hankins v. Bartlett
...our courts have found writings inadequate even when the writing clearly referenced real estate. See, e.g., Carlton v. Anderson, 276 N.C. 564, 566, 173 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1970) (holding inadequate description that referred only to “ ‘a certain tract or parcel of land located in –––– Township, ......
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SSC Statesville Maple Leaf Operating Co. v. Morgan
...at *3 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 16, 2011) (citing River Birch Assoc. v. City of Raleigh, 388 S.E.2d 538, 551 (N.C. 1990); Carlton v. Anderson, 173 S.E.2d 783, 784 (N.C. 1970)). As the North Carolina Court of Appeals has observed, "[t]he FAA [Federal Arbitration Act] requires that agreements to arbitra......