Carlton v. C.O. Pearson

• Decision Date: 19 June 2019
• Docket Number: 1:16-CV-00680 EAW
• Citation: 384 F.Supp.3d 382
• Parties: Corydon CARLTON, Plaintiff, v. C.O. PEARSON, Prison Guard and Employee at Wende Correctional Facility, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

384 F.Supp.3d 382

Corydon CARLTON, Plaintiff,

v.C.O. PEARSON, Prison Guard and Employee at Wende Correctional Facility, Defendant.

1:16-CV-00680 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed June 19, 2019

Filed June 20, 2019

Michael E. Talassazan, Law Offices of M. Talassazan, Albertson, NY, for Plaintiff.

David J. Sleight, Office of the Attorney General, Kathleen M. Kaczor, Attorney General's Office, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION & ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Corydon Carlton ("Plaintiff") filed this action on August 19, 2016, alleging that defendant Correctional Officer Robert Pearson ("Defendant") violated his civil rights by failing to protect him from an assault by another inmate. (Dkt. 1). On August 27, 2018, the Court scheduled a jury trial to commence over six months later—on March 18, 2019. (See Dkt. 47; Dkt. 48). As noted in the Pretrial Order, this was "a day-certain trial that [would] not be adjourned except for the trial of criminal cases which take precedence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161." (Dkt. 47 at 1). At the final pretrial conference held on February 25, 2019, Plaintiff (who up until that point had appeared pro se ) indicated his intention to retain counsel for the upcoming trial. The Court advised Plaintiff at the time that the trial would be going forward as scheduled and if he intended to retain counsel, any such attorney needed to plan to proceed as scheduled.

On March 16, 2019—the Saturday before trial—Michael E. Talassazan, Esq., faxed a notice of appearance on behalf of Plaintiff to the chambers of United States Magistrate Judge H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr., along with a letter requesting an adjournment of the trial date. On Monday, March 18, 2019, Plaintiff appeared without the presence of counsel. That morning, Judge Schroeder's chambers contacted the undersigned's chambers to advise as to the weekend communication from Mr. Talassazan. The Court contacted Mr. Talassazan by phone and confirmed that he was not admitted to practice in the Western District of New York, nor was he even physically present in the District. Mr. Talassazan informed the Court that he was unable to appear on Plaintiff's behalf that day but represented that he would appear before the Court the next day and bring with him the necessary materials to seek pro hac vice admission.

Because the Court had set the trial date over six months earlier, prospective jurors had been called to court and were awaiting jury selection, and Defendant and his counsel were present and prepared to proceed, the Court denied Plaintiff's eleventh-hour request to adjourn the trial date. However, while jury selection proceeded on March 18, 2019, as scheduled, the Court adjourned opening statements and the presentation of proof until the following day, over Defendant's objections.

On March 19, 2019, Mr. Talassazan was permitted to formally appear on Plaintiff's behalf during trial. Following the close of evidence and closing arguments, the jury was instructed on the applicable law. The Court instructed the jury on compensatory damages, in relevant part, as follows:

If you find that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendant, you must render a verdict for a sum of money that will justly and fairly compensate the Plaintiff for all the losses resulting from any injury or injuries he sustained. The purpose of the law of damages is to award, as far as possible, just and fair compensation for the loss, if any, which resulted from the Defendant's violation of the Plaintiff's rights. If you find that the Defendant is liable on the Plaintiff's claim, as I have explained it, then you must award the Plaintiff sufficient damages to compensate him for any injury proximately caused by the Defendant's conduct. Again, an injury is proximately caused by conduct when a reasonable person would regard it as a substantial factor in bringing about such injury.

The Court also instructed the jury on nominal damages, in relevant part, as follows:

Nominal damages must be awarded when a plaintiff has been deprived by a defendant of a constitutional right but has suffered no actual damage as a natural consequence of that deprivation. The mere fact that a constitutional deprivation occurred is an injury to the person entitled to enjoy that right, even when no actual damages flow from the deprivation. Therefore, if you find that the Plaintiff has suffered no injury as a result of the Defendant's conduct other than the fact of a constitutional deprivation, you must award nominal damages not to exceed one dollar.

Plaintiff did not object to any part of the above-referenced jury instructions. On March 22, 2019, the jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff's favor, finding that Defendant had violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and awarding Plaintiff nominal damages in the amount of $ 1.00. (Dkt. 70).

On April 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the damages portion of the verdict. (Dkt. 73). Plaintiff claims that the damages award should be set aside as against the weight of the evidence, and that the "Court should either set a reasonable amount for the plaintiff's damages or in the alternative order a new trial on the issue of damages." (Dkt. 73-1 at ¶ 12). Plaintiff also seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs. (Id. at ¶ 2). Defendant opposes Plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict (Dkt. 75 at 1-11), or, alternatively, requests that if a new trial is ordered, it is ordered as to all issues and not just damages (id. at 11-12). Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's counsel is not entitled to attorney's fees, or, alternatively, in the event attorney's fees are appropriate, the amount of recoverable fees should be capped at $ 1.50. (Id. at 12-16). Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of costs. (Id. at 16).

For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict is denied.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may "grant a new trial on all or some of the issues ... after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." "The Second Circuit has held that a Rule 59 motion for a new trial should be denied ‘unless the trial court is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.’ " Spinelli v. City of New York , No. 02 CIV. 8967, 2011 WL 2802937, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2011) (quoting AIG Global Sec. Lending Corp. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC. , 386 F. App'x 5, 7 (2d Cir. 2010) ); see Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Sols., Inc. , 290 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2002) (same). "On new trial motions, the trial judge may weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses and need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner." Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez , 670 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2012).

"A court considering a Rule 59 motion for a new trial must bear in mind, however, that the court should only grant such a motion when the jury's verdict is egregious." DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park , 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). For this reason, a Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial based "on the ground that the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence must overcome the ‘high degree of deference ... accorded to the jury's evaluation of witness credibility’ and the admonition that ‘jury verdicts should be disturbed with great infrequency.’ " Johnson v. Perry , 763 F. App'x 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting ING Global v. United Parcel Serv. Oasis Supply Corp. , 757 F.3d 92, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2014) ). While "[t]he legal test for granting a new trial is less stringent than for granting judgment as a matter of law," Luv n' Care, Ltd. v. Regent Baby Prod. Corp. , 898 F. Supp. 2d 650, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), "in practice courts do not grant new trials as freely as the language suggests, and movants for a new trial are still held to ‘a heavy burden,’ " Toliver v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr. , 202 F. Supp. 3d 328, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quotations and citation omitted).

II. Plaintiff's Request for Additur is Constitutionally Impermissible

Plaintiff's request for a new trial on damages is made only in the alternative. (See Dkt. 73-1 at ¶ 2). First and foremost, Plaintiff requests that the Court set aside the verdict and simply award additur in a reasonable amount commensurate with Plaintiff's injuries. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 12).

"Additur is the process by which, if a trial court considers a verdict inadequate, it may condition the denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial on defendant's consent to the entry of judgment in excess of the verdict." Elsevier Inc. v. Grossmann , No. 12 Civ. 5121 (KPF), 2018 WL 4908105, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2018). "[I]t is a tool that judges use to fix damages—something that can generally be done only by the fact-finder—without actually having to hold a second trial." Liriano v. Hobart Corp. , 170 F.3d 264, 272 (2d Cir. 1999). However, it is settled law that additur cannot "be employed by federal courts because the procedure involve[s] an unconstitutional reexamination of a jury verdict in violation of the Seventh Amendment." Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co. , 917 F.2d 1320, 1331 (2d Cir. 1990) ; see Dimick v. Schiedt , 293 U.S. 474, 482, 55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935) ("[T]he established practice and the rule of the common law, as it existed in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, forbade the court to increase the amount of damages awarded by a jury in actions such as that here under consideration."); Elyse v. Bridgeside Inc. , 367 F. App'x 266, 267 (2d Cir. 2010) (determining that the "motion to increase the damages award was properly denied by the district court on the ground that additur is constitutionally impermissible").

Therefore, to...