Wright v. Levitt
| Docket Number | 13-CV-563-FPG |
| Decision Date | 11 February 2022 |
| Parties | LEDARRIUS WRIGHT, Plaintiff, v. JACQUELYN LEVITT, M.D., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 13, 2021, the Court denied without prejudice several motions in limine brought by Defendants Carl Koenigsmann, Jacquelyn Levitt, and Christina Misa. The Court indicated that Defendants could renew and refile those motions once the Court had held a hearing on administrative exhaustion and ruled on that threshold issue. ECF No. 146 at 4. On December 7, 2021, and December 8, 2021, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on exhaustion, ECF Nos. 161, 162, and subsequently issued a written decision finding that Plaintiff had met his burden to show that Defendants' nominally available administrative grievance procedure was unavailable to Plaintiff as a matter of fact. ECF No. 169 at 11.
On January 19, 2022, Defendants renewed their motions in limine. They request an order granting the following relief: (1) limiting Plaintiff to recovering nominal and punitive damages only and precluding him from recovering compensatory damages (2) permitting Defendants to rely on Plaintiff's prior criminal trial testimony, in the event the Court does not preclude compensatory damages; (3) precluding the expert testimony of Dr. Roger Miles Rose; (4) precluding the expert testimony of Dr. Paul Adler; and (5) precluding Plaintiff from maintaining claims against Defendants Koenigsmann and Misa. See generally ECF No. 167. On January 28, 2022, Plaintiff responded in opposition, ECF No. 173, and on February 2, 2022, Defendants replied, ECF No. 174.
For the following reasons, and as discussed below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART WITH PREJUDICE, and DENIED IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff's sole claim is that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying him necessary medical care and that such denial “amounted to cruel and inhuman treatment and demonstrated deliberate indifference to his needs and his suffering.” ECF No. 43 at 6. Plaintiff is deaf, and the crux of his claim is that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights in denying him a cochlear implant consultation with an Ear Nose and Throat (“ENT”) specialist. Plaintiff seeks $5, 000, 000 in compensatory damages, which includes recovery for “physical pain and suffering, emotional pain & suffering and inconvenience.” Id. Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages in the amount of $1, 000, 000. Id.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff should be limited to recovering nominal and punitive damages because Plaintiff cannot show he suffered a “physical injury” caused by Defendants- which they contend is a prerequisite to recovery under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). ECF No. 167-1 at 3-6.
In response, Plaintiff contends that he suffered sufficient physical injury to permit compensatory damages for mental and emotional suffering. ECF No. 173 at 1-4. Plaintiff points to the fact that as a deaf person he was an easy target for the multiple beatings he suffered at the hands of prison staff and fellow inmates. ECF No. 173 at 2. Plaintiff's position is that these beatings, which were physical in nature, foreseeably resulted from Defendants' “decision to leave [Plaintiff] deaf.” Id. As an alternate theory, Plaintiff argues he is entitled to seek compensatory damages because “[b]eing left deaf for years is an inherently physical injury.” ECF No. 173 at 2.
Defendants disagree and contend that Plaintiff's deafness does not qualify as a “physical injury” under the statute because it was not caused by Defendants in the first place. ECF No. 167-1 at 4. Rather, Defendants point out, his claim stems from Defendants' denial of an ENT consult. Furthermore, they argue that the alleged beatings may not properly be considered a “physical injury” because they were carried out by others, not Defendants. Id. at 5.
The PLRA states that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Thus, the statute “bars recovery of compensatory damages for mental and emotional injuries, absent physical injury, in § 1983 actions.” Brown v. Napoli, 687 F.Supp.2d 295, 299 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir. 2002)). Section 1997e(e) does not define “physical injury”, but case law has developed which specifies the term's metes and bounds. “[C]ourts have held that in order to constitute a physical injury under 1997e(e), an injury must be more than de minimis, but need not be significant.” May v. Donneli, No. 9:06-cv- 437, 2009 WL 3049613, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009).
“It is well settled that in order to ‘recover compensatory damages under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove that his injuries were proximately caused by the constitutional violation.'” Carlton v. C.O. Pearson, 384 F.Supp.3d 382, 387 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (emphasis in original) (quoting Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1994)). Thus, “[u]nless a plaintiff proves that he or she has suffered an injury that resulted from a constitutional violation, the plaintiff is entitled only to nominal damages.” Id. at 388 (emphasis in original).
The Court considers first Plaintiff's argument that his deafness, in and of itself, is a “physical injury” that would satisfy § 1997e(e).[1] Plaintiff does not argue that Defendants caused his deafness; his theory is that their inaction caused him to remain deaf which is “an inherently physical injury.” ECF No. 173 at 2.
The Court finds that Plaintiff's argument fails under the reasoning of Leon v. Johnson, 96 F.Supp.2d 244 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). In Leon, the defendants argued that there was no evidence that the plaintiff suffered a physical injury due to a delay in receipt of prescribed medication. Leon, 96 F.Supp.2d at 248. In response, plaintiff contended “that the denial of his prescribed medication alone satisfies the physical injury requirement of § 1997e(e).” Id. The court considered whether the defendants' failure to administer the prescribed medication to plaintiff, standing alone, was a sufficient “physical injury” under the statute and reasoned as follows:
[A]bsent some concrete physical harm, a delay in providing medication is not an “injury” of the type contemplated by the statute. First, there are the words themselves: “physical injury.” Congress's use of these words suggests that there must be some actual harm to the plaintiff, and that the harm must be bodily in nature. The “harm” alleged here, however-a delay in receipt of medication to treat plaintiff's disease-is at most merely a potential harm, possibly putting plaintiff at risk of a worsened condition. Plaintiff does not allege that his condition did become worse as a result of not taking his medication, however, and there is no evidence that he suffered any adverse effects from the delay
The Court finds this reasoning to be sound, and on the facts of this case, it mandates a finding that Plaintiff “being left deaf” is not a sufficient physical injury for purposes of § 1997e(e).[2] Plaintiff does not argue that his ability to hear diminished because Defendants' denial of the ENT consultation for cochlear implants, or that earlier intervention with cochlear implants would have prevented some hearing-related harm. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot rely on his deafness, standing alone, to satisfy the “physical injury” requirement.
Plaintiffs argue that he “was abused and beaten multiple times, by both prison staff and other inmates.” ECF No. 173 at 2. Plaintiff argues that these beatings were a “foreseeable consequence” of the Defendants' inaction which left him deaf and vulnerable. Id. at 2-3. In addition to beatings, Plaintiff, quoting his Amended Complaint, notes that he suffered “isolation, solitary confinement and other harsh consequences of his inability to hear other inmates and prison staff, which caused the plaintiff both physical and emotional harm.” ECF No. 173 at 2 (citing ECF No. 43 ¶ 21) (emphasis in original).
In response, Defendants argue that isolation and solitary confinement do not qualify as a “physical injury” under § 1997e(e); that any beatings Plaintiff suffered were not proximately caused by the Defendants because Defendants did not render him deaf in the first place; and that Plaintiff's have not alleged sufficient information about the beatings to permit the Court to conclude that any injury was more than de minimis. ECF No. 167-1 at 2-6; ECF No. 174 at 3. The Court considers each of these arguments in turn.
Plaintiff's alleged “isolation, solitary confinement, and other harsh consequences” do not qualify as a “physical injury” under § 1997e(e). See Amaker v Goord, No. 06-CV-490A, 2015 WL 3603970, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. 2015) (); see also Kimbrough v. Fischer, No. 9:13-CV-100, 2017 WL 1333549, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2017) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial