Carman v. Gilbert
| Decision Date | 25 November 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-00832,92-00832 |
| Parties | 17 Fla. L. Weekly D2654 Theresa H. CARMAN, Appellant, v. Roy GILBERT, Basil Santana, and Nenet C. Heiser n/k/a Nenet M. Catle, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard C. Langford, St. Petersburg, for appellant.
George M. Osborne, St. Petersburg, for appellees Santana and Catle.
James C. Runyon, St. Petersburg, for appellee Gilbert.
The appellant challenges orders of the trial court determining that she had renounced her interest in the estate of Charles K. Carman, Jr., and awarding attorney's fees to the appellees' attorneys. We affirm the order for renunciation of benefits, reverse the award of attorney's fees, and remand for further findings.
Charles K. Carman, Jr., the appellant's brother, died on January 10, 1991, and his last will and testament was admitted to probate on January 28, 1991. Under the terms of the decedent's will, the appellant was to receive a one-half interest in their father's former residence and the balance of the estate was devised to four individuals, none of whom were related to the decedent. On April 5, 1991, the appellant filed a petition for revocation of probate, asserting that her brother, who was hospitalized at the time of execution of his will, lacked testamentary capacity and that the will was the product of undue influence on the part of the residual beneficiaries. The petition contained the following language:
6. Petitioner, Theresa H. Carman, disclaims any and all interest which she may have under the last will and testament of Charles K. Carman, Jr. dated December 21, 1990.
On July 30, 1991, the appellant voluntarily dismissed the revocation proceeding. On September 11, 1991, the appellees filed a "Petition for Determination of Renunciation of Benefits" requesting the court to rule that the appellant had forfeited her rights in the estate by reason of paragraph 6 of her petition. After hearing, the trial court found the "renunciation was unconditioned in its terms and intent, and upon the facts herein cannot be withdrawn." The court then ordered that the appellant take nothing by the will and that her share of the estate be divided among the residual beneficiaries.
It is a judicially created doctrine that a beneficiary who files a petition to revoke probate must renounce the benefits under the will. In re the Estate of Filion, 353 So.2d 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). The doctrine requires the renunciation as a condition precedent to the remedy. 353 So.2d at 1181. The solidification of the doctrine in Florida can be traced back to Pournelle v. Baxter, 151 Fla. 32, 36, 9 So.2d 162, 163 (1942), where the court said: "It appears to be well settled that a beneficiary under a will who desires to contest that will must first divest himself of any beneficial interest which he has under the will." Later, in Barnett National Bank of Jacksonville v. Murrey, 49 So.2d 535, 537-38 (Fla.1950), an action to set aside a trust, the court held that the required renunciation would not necessarily result in total forfeiture:
By renouncing his right to the property as a condition to contesting the instrument the beneficiary does not thereby forfeit all right or interest regardless of the outcome of the litigation.... [H]e will be free to contest the validity of the instrument and thereafter to take under it, if, after all the evidence is in, he finds himself unable to prove that fraud, duress or some other vitiating influence was present....
Thus was born the doctrine of "qualified" renunciation, which was endorsed by this court in In re Estate of Harby, 269 So.2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972), and which remains the law of this state.
The appellant argues that the language of paragraph 6 of the petition, which facially appears to be an absolute renunciation, should be construed to be "qualified" or "conditional." Support for this position is found in In re Estate of Stein, 301 So.2d 120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). In Stein, the renunciation language of the petition to revoke probate reads:
'The Petitioners disclaim any and all interest which they have under the Last Will and Testament instrument dated September 8, 1972.'
301 So.2d at 121. In reversing the trial court's determination that this language constituted an "absolute" renunciation, the court stated:
We hold that the trial judge committed error in finding that a qualified renunciation is only one that contains certain magic words. It is clear from reading appellant's [sic] petition to revoke probate of the will and the amendment thereto that the renunciation was put in solely for the purpose of complying with the statute and that no further purpose was intended. Therefore, the renunciation must be considered as qualified, and appellants are entitled to take under the will.
The Florida Supreme Court acknowledged early on that the pleading of renunciation is a matter of form rather than substance. See Medary v. Dalman, 69 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla.1954). We cannot formulate an example in which a qualified renunciation would have any legal effect whatsoever. If the revocation proceeding fails, the renunciation is of no effect and the petitioner takes under the will. If, on the other hand, the trial court revokes the probate of the will, then there is nothing left to renounce. In this context, the conclusion reached in Stein is a matter of common sense. Nonetheless, we are unable to follow Stein in this case. This court made it clear in Harby that the pleading of a qualified renunciation was sufficient when we said:
Appellant was a beneficiary under the will sought to be probated herein but apparently stood to gain more under a prior will. Appellant's petition for revocation of probate of the will was dismissed on the ground that appellant made a "qualified" but not an "absolute" renunciation ... of the benefits accruing to appellant under the will being attacked. We hold that the "qualified" renunciation was all that was necessary and, therefore, reverse. 1
269 So.2d at 433. In fact, The Florida Bar's form, "Petition For Revocation Of Probate Of Will," contains the following sample paragraph:
4. Petitioner renounces any devise or interest that he may have under the purported will. This renunciation is made as a condition to contesting the will of the decedent and is a qualified renunciation under the case law of Florida.
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