Carman v. Harris

• Decision Date: 30 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 118,734,118,734
• Citation: 485 P.3d 644
• Parties: Ayse CARMAN, Appellant, v. Bryant HARRIS, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

485 P.3d 644

Ayse CARMAN, Appellant,

v.Bryant HARRIS, Appellee.

No. 118,734

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion filed April 30, 2021.

Ayse Carman, appellant pro se, was on the briefs.

Bryant Harris, appellee pro se, was on the brief.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Biles, J.:

Ayse Carman seeks our review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming a district court's refusal to order her child's father to pay half of her expenses for prenatal medical care and the child's birth. But Carman waited too long to correct what she argues was an oversight at the time of the initial paternity award. We agree with both lower courts that the court's authority to order payment expired before Carman sought reimbursement.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Carman gave birth to E.C. in 2014. She assigned her support rights to the Kansas Department for Children and Families. In December 2014, DCF filed a petition to determine paternity, alleging Bryant Harris was the father and that he owed support. DCF also alleged he was liable for expenses Carman incurred for the child's support, education, and medical care since birth. But the petition did not seek expenses for Carman's prenatal medical care or the birth.

A hearing officer heard the matter on March 10, 2015, and filed a journal entry a week later approved by a district court judge. That journal entry shows Carman appeared pro se, but Harris did not appear. The hearing officer found Harris was E.C.'s father and ordered him to pay monthly child support prospectively and to repay DCF $818 for support it provided to date.

Harris asked for a rehearing. In an April 2015 journal entry, the hearing officer reduced the support obligation. That order notified the parties that

"this order is subject to the approval of a District Court Judge. This order will become a final order unless one of the parties files a motion, within 14 days of the filing of this order, with the Clerk of the District Court asking for review of this order by a District Court Judge . See Supreme Court Rule 172(h)." (Emphasis added.)

On May 5, 2015, the hearing officer denied another request for rehearing. But the motion prompting this May 2015 order is not in the record, so its basis is unknown. The order contained the same warning about its finality as the April 2015 journal entry. The record contains no requests for modifications. In August 2015, Carman and Harris agreed to a court-approved parenting plan.

On August 3, 2016, Carman filed the request for expenses that prompts this appeal. She asked for $3,054.41 from Harris to pay half her prenatal medical and child birth expenses. She attached bills from her health care providers. She also asked to modify Harris' support obligation. Shortly after these motions, Harris moved to modify custody, parenting time, and child support. He also asked to change the child's last name. In September 2016, Harris also moved to enforce parenting time required by the agreed parenting plan.

At a June 2017 evidentiary hearing on these various motions, Carman represented herself. She testified briefly. As to her expenses, she said

"I'm also asking for judgment towards prenatal care and birthing expense[s] that are on my credit report. Respondent told me that these are my expenses only. I tried resolving the issue with him in the last three years. I did not even ask him—ask us to pay based on the percentages of our income. Which would mean that he would pay the higher percentages. I only asked that we pay 50 percent."

As the hearing concluded, the court made orders for parenting time and the parties' prospective child support obligations. It then asked if it had covered everything, and Carman mentioned her motion for prenatal care and birth expenses. The court said it did not think it could do anything about them because the paternity journal entry controlled expenses before March 10, 2015—the date the hearing officer considered DCF's first petition. The court noted the paternity order granted the $818 and said "it doesn't appear that there was any request made for birth expenses or anything of that." Carman pointed out the $818 reimbursed DCF for support since E.C.'s birth and argued "[t]here is one sentence ... that mother incurred medical expenses but the Hearing Officer didn't rule on that." The district court denied her request for prenatal care and birth expenses because "that was previously addressed and ruled upon" in the original paternity order.

Carman appealed on various issues, including the refusal to award her expenses for the pregnancy and child birth. On this point, she argued the August 3, 2016 motion covered those expenses, but in her view the district court mistakenly considered the $818 to DCF as covering her expenses. A Court of Appeals panel affirmed. Carman v. Harris , No. 118,734, 2019 WL 2237381 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion).

On the expenses issue, the panel reasoned that besides the reference to the $818, the district court also found Harris was not responsible for any expenses before the paternity order and denied recovery of the mother's birth expenses from 2014 because they predated the paternity order and were not included in that order. The panel simply held without further explanation, "We find no error in that." 2019 WL 2237381, at *8.

Carman petitioned this court for review, which we granted to consider whether the district court correctly refused to award her prenatal care and birth expenses. Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (providing for petitions for review of Court of Appeals decisions); K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review Court of Appeals decisions upon petition for review).

ANALYSIS

Our question is whether the district court erred when it concluded it could not order prenatal care and birth expenses at the June 2017 hearing on child support modification. As explained, we agree that authority had lapsed by that time.

Standard of review

Whether the district court could grant Carman's request turns on an interpretation of Kansas' paternity and child support statutes. Statutory interpretation is a legal question subject to de novo review. Nauheim v. City of Topeka , 309 Kan. 145, 149, 432 P.3d 647 (2019).

"The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that the intent of the Legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. In ascertaining this intent, we begin with the plain language of the statute, giving common words their ordinary meaning. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court should not speculate about the legislative intent behind that clear language, and it should refrain from reading something into the statute that is not readily found in its words. [The court] will only review legislative history or use canons of construction if the statute's language or text is ambiguous. [Citations omitted.]" In re M.M. , 312 Kan. 872, 874, 482 P.3d 583 (2021).

Discussion

DCF initiated this case as a parentage action to establish Harris' paternity and support obligation, as permitted by K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-2209(b). That statute is part of the Kansas Parentage Act, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-2201 et seq. The Act governs "[p]roceedings concerning parentage of a child." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-2201(b). The Parentage Act is part of the Kansas Family Law Code. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-2102 ("The provisions of the Kansas family law code shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, inexpensive and equitable determination of issues in all domestic relations matters.").

Carman refers us to two statutes: K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-2204 and K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-2215. But the first, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-2204, is not relevant to the issue. It provides:

"(b) A written description of the rights and responsibilities of acknowledging paternity shall state the following:

....

(2) both the father and the mother are responsible for the care and support of the child. If necessary, this duty may be enforced through legal action such as a child support order, an order to pay birth or other medical expenses of the child or an order to repay government assistance payments for the child's care. A parent's willful failure to support the parent's child is a crime." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-2204.

This case did not involve a paternity acknowledgment, so K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-2204 is inapplicable. Instead, DCF initiated this action to establish Harris' paternity and support obligation. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 23-2215 —the second statute Carman directs us to—defines the scope of orders in a parentage action. It provides in part that

"(c) Upon adjudging that a party is the parent of a minor child, the court shall make provision for support and education of the child under article 30 of chapter 23 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto. The court may order the payment of all or a portion of the necessary medical expenses incident to the child's birth. The court may order the support and education expenses to be paid by either or both parents for the minor child.

....

"(f)(1) In entering an original order for support of a child under this section, the court may award an additional judgment to the mother or any other party who made expenditures for support and education of the child from the date of birth to the date the order is entered . If the determination of paternity is based upon a presumption arising under K.S.A. 23-2208, and amendments thereto, the court shall award an additional judgment to reimburse all or part of the expenses of support and education of the child from at least the date the presumption first arose to the date the order is entered, except that no additional judgment need be awarded for amounts accrued under a previous order for the child's support.

(2) The court may consider any affirmative defenses pled and proved in making an award under this subsection.

(3) The amount of any award made under this subsection shall be determined by application of the Kansas child support guidelines. For any period

...