Nauheim v. City of Topeka
| Citation | 432 P.3d 647,309 Kan. 145 |
| Decision Date | 11 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 114,271,114,271 |
| Parties | Charles NAUHEIM d/b/a Kansas Fire and Safety Equipment, and Hal G. Richardson d/b/a Bueno Food Brand, Topeka Vinyl Top, and Minuteman Solar Film, Appellants, v. CITY OF TOPEKA, Kansas, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Kansas |
John R. Hamilton, of Hamilton, Laughlin, Barker, Johnson & Jones, of Topeka, argued the cause, and David A. Brock, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for appellants.
Shelly Starr, assistant city attorney, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
Whenever federal funding is not involved, and real property is acquired by a condemning authority through negotiation in advance of a condemnation action or through a condemnation action, the authority must pay relocation benefits to any person who moves from the property as a direct result of the acquisition. K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 26-518(a) (); 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6)(A)(i)(I) (2012) (). This appeal seeks to define what the statutory phrase "negotiation in advance of a condemnation action" means. The dispute arises from a claim by former tenants for relocation benefits after the City of Topeka negotiated and acquired property where the tenants operated their businesses.
We hold the statute is both temporal and contextual, so it is a question of fact whether a negotiation was in advance of a condemnation action. We reject the tenants' contention that displaced persons are owed relocation benefits anytime a condemning authority acquires real property for a public project. The statute is not that generous.
We affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment although we see the potential evidence that might prove such a claim more expansively than the panel did. See Nauheim v. City of Topeka , 52 Kan. App. 2d 969, Syl. ¶ 5, 381 P.3d 508 (2016) (). The case is remanded for the district court to determine whether condemnation would have followed had the City's negotiation with the property owner failed.
In 2011, the City authorized by ordinance a public works project to replace a structurally deficient drainage system on a tributary to Butcher Creek to alleviate potential flooding within the city limits. The authorizing language did not mention condemnation. After exchanging terms with the owner during 2013, the City bought real property where commercial tenants operated their businesses. During the negotiation, the City made clear it wanted the property vacant before obtaining title. The owner complied, and the transaction concluded without the City exercising its eminent domain power.
Charles Nauheim and Hal G. Richardson, the former tenants, relocated their respective businesses to other property. They sued the City for relocation costs under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 26-518, which states:
The City argued the statute did not apply because it never intended to condemn the property had the negotiation failed. It also contended neither tenant was a "displaced person" as statutorily defined. The City claimed the tenants relocated because of agreements with the property owner—also their landlord. All parties moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the City's motion. It held the tenants were not displaced persons as defined by law. It also found the uncontroverted facts proved the property acquisition was not made "in advance of a condemnation action," but occurred instead by the City exercising its corporate power. The tenants appealed.
A Court of Appeals panel considered three issues: (1) Whether the tenants were displaced persons as defined by K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 26-518(a) and 42 U.S.C. 4601(6)(A)(i)(I) ; (2) whether the phrase "negotiation in advance of a condemnation action" in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 26-518 required a displaced person to prove a condemning authority's intent to condemn; and (3) whether the summary judgment record supported the City's claim it never intended to condemn the property. The panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the district court to resolve disputed material facts. Nauheim , 52 Kan. App. 2d at 970, 381 P.3d 508.
As to the first question, the panel reversed the district court and held the tenants qualified as displaced persons because "the City's acquisition of the subject property was contingent upon the property being vacant at the time of closing." 52 Kan. App. 2d at 973, 381 P.3d 508. In its view, no other motive existed "for the landlord to force the tenants to relocate from the property other than the fact that it was a necessary prerequisite for the sale of the property to the City." 52 Kan. App. 2d at 974, 381 P.3d 508. Therefore, the panel continued, the tenants' relocation "was an event that was inseparably linked to the sale." 52 Kan. App. 2d at 975, 381 P.3d 508.
As for the meaning of the statutory phrase "negotiation in advance of a condemnation action," the panel agreed with the district court that it required a displaced person to show a condemning authority intended to condemn the subject property by proving it "either threatened or took affirmative action towards condemnation prior to the acquisition." 52 Kan. App. 2d 969, Syl. ¶ 5, 381 P.3d 508. The panel reasoned:
52 Kan. App. 2d at 977, 381 P.3d 508.
The panel also determined a genuine issue of material fact remained about whether the City negotiated with the landlord in advance of a condemnation action. 52 Kan. App. 2d at 979-80, 381 P.3d 508. The panel noted the record included emails from City staff and the landlord's affidavit supporting an argument that the City intended to condemn the property if negotiation failed. These disputed facts made summary judgment improper, the panel held. 52 Kan. App. 2d at 979, 381 P.3d 508. It reversed and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
The tenants petitioned this court to review the statutory interpretation question, especially the panel's decision that a displaced person must prove a condemning authority threatened condemnation or took affirmative action to condemn the property before acquisition. We granted review. Jurisdiction is proper. K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (); K.S.A. 60-2101(b) ().
The City does not cross-petition on the issues the panel decided adversely to its argument, i.e., whether the tenants were displaced persons and whether disputed material facts prevented summary judgment. That much is settled on review in the tenants' favor. See Supreme Court Rule 8.03(b)(6)(C)(i) (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 53) (as amended July 1, 2018); In re Adoption of C.L. , 308 Kan. 1268, 1277, 427 P.3d 951 (2018) ; Ullery v. Othick , 304 Kan. 405, 415, 372 P.3d 1135 (2016).
The tenants argue they should not have to prove the City had an intent to condemn to receive statutory relocation assistance. We disagree. But we hold the evidence that might prove whether an acquisition occurred through "negotiation in advance of a condemnation action" is broader than the panel's perspective.
Standard of review
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law subject to de novo review. Central Kansas Medical Center v. Hatesohl , 308 Kan. 992, 1002, 425 P.3d 1253 (2018). When interpreting a statute, a court first attempts to discern legislative intent through the statutory language, giving common words their ordinary meanings. Whaley v. Sharp , 301 Kan. 192, 196, 343 P.3d 63 (2014). When the language is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to its express language, rather than determine what the law should be. The court will not speculate about legislative intent and will not read the statute to add something not readily found in it. Graham v. Dokter Trucking Group , 284 Kan. 547, Syl. ¶ 3, 161 P.3d 695 (2007). It is only when the statute's language is unclear or ambiguous that the court employs the canons of statutory construction, consults legislative history, or considers other background information to ascertain its meaning. Whaley , 301 Kan. at 196, 343 P.3d 63.
Municipalities can acquire or receive property for municipal purposes without resorting to condemnation. See K.S.A. 12-101, Second (authority to purchase or receive real property for city use); K.S.A. 12-101, Fourth (authority to make contracts relating to property). They can also acquire property for municipal purposes through condemnation under the Kansas Eminent Domain Procedure Act, K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 26-501 et seq.
The tenants, of course, argue they should not need to file a lawsuit and prove the City's intention...
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