Carmax Auto Superstores Cal. LLC v. Hernandez

• Decision Date: 30 April 2015
• Docket Number: CASE NO. CV 14–08743 MMM JEMx
• Citation: 94 F.Supp.3d 1078
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: CarMax Auto Superstores California LLC, a Virginia limited liability company, Plaintiff, v. Rosella Michelle Hernandez, an individual, Defendant.

94 F.Supp.3d 1078

CarMax Auto Superstores California LLC, a Virginia limited liability company, Plaintiff

v.Rosella Michelle Hernandez, an individual, Defendant.

CASE NO. CV 14–08743 MMM JEMx

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed April 30, 2015

Jack S. Sholkoff, Patricia M. Jeng, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak and Stewart PC, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.

Ramin R. Younessi, Law Offices of Ramin R. Younessi, A.P.L.C., Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

MARGARET M. MORROW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On November 12, 2014, CarMax Auto Superstores California LLC (“CarMax”) filed a petition for an order compelling arbitration under § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 4 ; it also sought a stay of state court proceedings arising out of its dispute with Rosella Michelle Hernandez.¹ Hernandez filed a motion to dismiss CarMax's petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on December 3, 2014,² and on December 30, 2014, CarMax filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the state court proceedings.³ Both motions are opposed.⁴

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Facts Alleged in the Petition

CarMax alleges that, beginning in 2002, it employed Hernandez as a Management Assistant.⁵ It asserts that, at the time Hernandez applied for employment at CarMax, she executed a Dispute Resolution Agreement (“DRA”).⁶ CarMax attaches a copy of the DRA executed by Hernandez to its petition.⁷ The DRA states, in relevant part:

“[B]oth CarMax and I agree to settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes, or controversies arising out or relating to my application or candidacy for employment, employment, and/or cessation of employment with CarMax, exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator.”⁸

The DRA requires the applicant to “file a claim for arbitration within one (1) year of the day on which [she] know[s] or, through reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts giving rise to [the] claim.” It requires that the arbitration be conducted in accordance with CarMax's Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures (“DRRP”).⁹

Hernandez was purportedly given a copy of the DRRP before signing the DRA.¹⁰ At the time she executed the DRA, the DRRP in effect was dated January 2001; since that time, CarMax has purportedly made various changes to the DRRP, most recently in 2011.¹¹ CarMax attaches copies of the 2001 and 2011 DRRPs to its petition.¹²

On September 25, 2014, Hernandez sued CarMax and Alan Hanna, one of her supervisors, in Orange Superior Court.¹³ Her complaint pleads fifteen claims: (1) discrimination in violation of California Government Code § 12940, et seq . ;¹⁴ (2) harassment in violation of California Government Code § 12940, et seq . ;¹⁵ (3) retaliation in violation of California Government Code § 12940, et seq . ;¹⁶ (4) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of California Government Code § 12940(k) ;¹⁷ (5) failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of California Government Code § 12940, et seq. ;¹⁸ (6) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process in violation of California Government Code § 12940, et seq . ;¹⁹ (7) violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51.7 ;²⁰ (8) violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 52.1 ;²¹ (9) gender violence in violation of California Civil Code § 52.4 ;²² (10) battery;²³ (11) assault;²⁴ (12) sexual battery in violation of California Civil Code § 1708.5 ;²⁵ (13 ) declaratory relief;²⁶ (14) wrongful termination in violation of public policy;²⁷ and (15) intentional infliction of emotional distress.²⁸

CarMax alleges that, prior to filing the state court complaint, Hernandez's attorneys told her in writing of the DRA and her obligation to submit the claims in the complaint to binding arbitration.²⁹ Notwithstanding such notice, Hernandez purportedly refused to submit her claims to arbitration and directed her attorneys to file the state court action.³⁰

B. Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice

CarMax requests that the court take judicial notice of a docket entry in Hernandez's state court action in considering its opposition to Hernandez's motion to dismiss the petition.³¹ The request is unopposed.

A court can consider evidence in deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, including documents that can be judicially noticed. See, e.g., Villegas v. United States, 963 F.Supp.2d 1145, 1158 (E.D.Wash.2013) (“A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction permits a court to consider ‘affidavits or any other evidence properly before the court,’ even material extrinsic to the pleadings,” quoting Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir.2000) ); Ellis v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 950 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1072–73 (N.D.Cal.2013) (taking judicial notice of various documents in deciding defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss); Smith v. Kim, No. C 05–01439 JK, 2006 WL 1320483, *2–3 (N.D.Cal. May 15, 2006) (same). Thus, in deciding Hernandez's motion to dismiss, the court can consider material that can be judicially noticed under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 201. Under Rule 201, the court can take judicial notice of “[o]fficial acts of legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States,” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably undisputable accuracy.”

As noted, CarMax requests that the court take notice of an order issued in the parallel state court proceeding.³² “Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the [c]ourt may take judicial notice of matters of public record if the facts are not ‘subject to a reasonable dispute.’ ” Olds v. Metlife Home Loans, No. SACV 12–55 JVS (RNBx), 2012 WL 10420298, *1 n. 1 (C.D.Cal. Mar. 19, 2012) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir.2001) ). Court orders and filings are proper subjects of judicial notice. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.2007) (noting that a court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”); Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n. 6 (9th Cir.2006) (taking judicial notice of pleadings, memoranda, and other court filings); Asdar Group v. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, 99 F.3d 289, 290 n. 1 (9th Cir.1996) (court may take judicial notice of pleadings and court orders in related proceedings); United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Coun ci l v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir.1992) (a court may take judicial notice “of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relationship to the matters at issue”). Because the document is a proper subject of judicial notice, the court grants CarMax's request, and will consider it in deciding Hernandez's motion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Petition

1. Defendant's Alleged Failure to Meet and Confer

CarMax argues that Hernandez's motion should be denied because she failed to comply with Local Rule 7–3.³³ Local Rule 7–3 provides, in relevant part:

“In all cases ..., counsel contemplating the filing of any motion shall first contact opposing counsel to discuss thoroughly, preferably in person, the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential resolution. The conference shall take place at least seven (7) days prior to the filing of the motion. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution which eliminates the necessity for a hearing, counsel for the moving party shall include in the notice of motion a statement to the following effect: ‘This motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to L.R. 7–3 which took place on (date).’ ” CA CD L.R. 7–3.

When a party fails to comply with Local Rule 7–3, the court can, in its discretion, refuse to consider the motion. See, e.g., Singer v. Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., No. SACV 11–0427 DOC (MLGx), 2012 WL 123146, *2 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 13, 2012) (denying a motion for summary judgment because the moving party failed to comply with Local Rule 7–3); Alcatel–Lucent USA, Inc. v. Dugdale Communications, Inc., No. CV 09–2140 PSG (JCx), 2009 WL 3346784, *4 (C.D.Cal. Oct. 13, 2009) (“The meet and confer requirements of Local Rule 7–3 are in place for a reason, and counsel is warned that nothing short of strict compliance with the local rules will be expected in this Court. Thus, the motion is ... denied for failure to comply with Local Rule 7–3”).

In her reply, Hernandez concedes that she did not meet and confer with CarMax prior to filing the motion to dismiss. She asserts, however, that “the parties subsequently met and conferred, and [she] filed an amended notice [of motion] following” that meeting.³⁴ This does not constitute compliance with Local Rule 7–3. First, despite Hernandez's representation that she “filed an amended notice following the meet and confer,” no such notice has been filed. More fundamentally, an after-the-fact conference does not satisfy Rule 7–3. Counsel must confer before the motion is filed so that the parties can determine whether it is possible to come to an agreement that obviates the need for the motion; conferences that take place after the motion has been filed cannot serve this purpose. Accordingly, even if Hernandez met and conferred with CarMax after filing her motion—of which there is no evidence—the court would conclude that she had not complied with the Local Rules.

In its discretion, therefore, the court could deny Hernandez's motion. Failure to comply with the Local Rules does not automatically require the denial...