Carner v. Shapiro

• Decision Date: 25 June 1958
• Docket Number: No. 158,158
• Parties: Jack CARNER and Jay Sobel, Individually and as co-partners, d/b/a Carner and Sobel, Appellants, v. Herman C. SHAPIRO, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 87

106 So.2d 87

Jack CARNER and Jay Sobel, Individually and as co-partners, d/b/a Carner and Sobel, Appellants, v. Herman C. SHAPIRO, Appellee.

No. 158.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 25, 1958.

Rehearing Denied July 28, 1958.

Tobias Simon, Miami, for appellants.

Coleman & Leonard, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

SMITH, CULVER, Associate Judge.

The appellants here were the defendants below and the appellee was the plaintiff. The parties will be referred to as they stood in the lower Court.

Defendants were the owners of a building, and in 1952 they leased a portion of the first floor to the plaintiff. In July, 1954 the defendants employed a contractor to remodel the upper stories into offices. This project was completed in November, 1954. In August, 1954 plaintiff brought an action in equity, seeking to enjoin the defendants from proceeding, asking for a declaratory decree and for a rescission of his lease. Final hearing was not had until after the completion of the work.

The Court below entered its Final Decree finding, among other things that 'at this late date it would work an injustice on the Defendants to grant Plaintiff's prayer for a mandatory injunction.' The Court denied equitable relief, but awarded damages to the plaintiff for loss of use of the premises, damage to merchandise, and for damage to ceiling and plate glass. Thereafter, the Court entered an order supplying an omission in the record. This was a stipulation entered into between counsel to the effect that the Court could enter judgment for damages, if any were found to have occurred, irrespective of whether or not the Court granted the equitable relief asked in the Complaint.

The defendants rely upon three principal points for reversal. The first of these asks whether a Chancellor may make an award of monetary damages after denying all equitable relief. Involved in this point is the validity of the Stipulation mentioned, which the defendants contend is of no effect because it seeks to confer jurisdiction to award damages, when such jurisdiction, according to defendants, did not exist. There cannot seem to be any question about this case being a proper one, at the outset, for equitable relief. None was granted because of the lapse of time between the filing of the suit and the final hearing. Meanwhile, the defendants had the very work completed which the plaintiff sought to enjoin. Grounds for equitable jurisdiction were proven but, as the Chancellor said in his final decree, the granting of an injunction at that date would have worked an injustice on the defendants. The Florida authorities relied upon by the defendants seem to be those in which the plaintiff was unable to establish his right to equitable relief in the first instance. Such is not the situation here. The Florida Supreme Court, in the case of Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Saffold Brothers Produce Co., 121 Fla. 833, 164 So. 681, 683, held as follows:

'Where a cause within the jurisdiction of a court of equity is begun in good faith, and it thereafter appears that, by reason of the acts of the defendant, the equitable remedy that is due to complainant is impossible to be carried out, the court may decree money compensation in lieu of such other remedy.' (Citations omitted.)

In the case of Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association v. Ott, 151 Fla. 185, 9 So.2d 383, 384, the Supreme Court of Florida held:

'The test of the the jurisdiction of a court of equity is whether facts exist at the time of the commencement of the action sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. If plaintiff is then entitled to the aid of equity the jurisdiction will not be defeated by subsequent events which render equitable relief unnecessary or improper, or where plaintiff has established his equity but the need for equitable relief has ceased pending suit or has become impossible, as distinguished from improper. This rule is applicable, not only where the relief sought is prevented by act of the defendant, but also where the change of circumstances arises from lapse of time, rendering the specific relief unsuitable or inequitable.'

We hold that the instant case is governed by the rules in the two cases cited. Having so held, it is not necessary to consider the stipulation between counsel.

Defendants' second point raises the question of whether monetary damages may be awarded for breach of an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment...