Carney v. Hadley

• Decision Date: 09 October 1893
• Citation: 32 Fla. 344,14 So. 4
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: CARNEY et al. v. HADLEY. CARNEY et al. v. HADLEY et al.

14 So. 4

32 Fla. 344

CARNEY et al. v. HADLEY.

CARNEY et al. v. HADLEY et al.

Florida Supreme Court

October 9, 1893

Appeal from circuit court, Escambia county; James F. McClellan Judge.

Bill by Jesse Hadley and others against William M. Carney and others for an injunction. Complainants had decree, and defendants appeal. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. As a general rule, two conditions must concur, to give a court of equity jurisdiction to enjoin a mere trespass on property First, the complainant's title must be admitted, or legally established; and, second, the trespass must be of such a nature as to cause irreparable damage, not susceptible of complete pecuniary compensation. The inadequacy of the legal remedy is the foundation and indispensable prerequisite for the interposition of chancery in such cases, for the reason that a legal remedy has been devised to redress such wrongs, and, so long as this remedy is adequate, equity has no right to interfere.

2. The practice of granting injunctions in cases of trespass, it seems, is more liberal now than it was formerly, but a clear case of the inadequacy of the legal remedy must still be shown, in order to justify the interference of the court of chancery.

3. While insolvency, alone, of the defendant, may not be sufficient to authorize an injunction, yet it is an important element, in many cases, in determining whether or not a court of chancery should act in granting injunctions.

4. In cases of repeated trespasses, where it becomes necessary to quiet a rightful, admitted, or established possession chancery has often interposed, to prevent a multiplicity of suits, although there may be a remedy at law. This court will not, however, grant an injunction against one person merely because he is guilty of repeated trespasses, where the legal remedy affords an adequate and complete redress in damages. The rule seemingly well sustained by authority is that before a court of chancery will interfere to prevent a multiplicity of suits, there must be several persons controverting the same right, and each standing upon his own pretension of right.

5. Whenever the complainant's title is disputed, in cases of trespass, a court of equity will not interfere by injunction, on the ground of a multiplicity of suits, until he has successfully established his title by trial at law.

6. Where the alleged trespass or threatened injury is to trees standing on land, in order to justify the granting of an injunction by a court of equity, it must appear that the trees are of such peculiar value and importance to the estate as that the alleged injury to them will so affect the uses and purposes for which the estate was designed as to make the injury to them an irreparable loss to the owner. An allegation that the trees are valueless except for turpentine and timber, and, without them in a condition to produce turpentine and timber, the land would be of little value, and that the acts of defendants, in extracting turpentine from the trees, greatly lessens their value as timber producing trees, does not show that the injury complained of amounts to a destruction of the estate, or that the injury done could not be adequately compensated in damages. This was the rule prior to the enactment of section 1469, Rev. St.

COUNSEL

Mallory & Maxwell, for appellants.

The other facts fully appear in the following statement by MABRY J.:

This is a bill for an injunction filed by appellees against appellants. The bill alleged that complainants were the owners in fee of a certain tract of land situated in Escambia county, Fla., consisting of 640 acres, described by metes and bounds, and known as the 'Benjamin Hadley' or 'Richland Pond' tract, and that they and Benjamin Hadley, under whom they claim title as heirs, had been in possession of this land, with interruptions, for more than 60 years, and were then in possession; that said land was very thickly studded with pitch pine trees, of large size and of great value, and that defendant Carney and his foremen, Gilchrist and Carmichael, have from time to time, during two years prior to filing the bill, trespassed upon the said land for the purpose of boxing the trees, and thereby producing turpentine, which they have removed from said trees and from said land; that not only does the removal of the turpentine from said trees and land deprive complainants of the said turpentine, and the value thereof, but its extraction from said trees greatly lessens the value of the same as timber producing trees, and, except for the purpose of the production of turpentine and timber, said trees are valueless; that said trees constitute, in large part, the value of said land, and without them, in a condition to be made valuable for turpentine and timber, the said land is of little value; that the trespasses of respondents are continuous and frequent, and they threaten not only to trespass in the future upon said land, for the purpose of removing turpentine already collected in boxes on the trees, but, from time to time, to trespass for the purpose of boxing and rescraping said trees; and that said respondents reside in the state of Alabama, and are possessed of no property of any kind in the state of Florida, and, unless they are restrained from their said repeated and innumerable trespasses, complainants are remediless, save by repeated, vexatious, and multiplied suits against respondents, which would be fruitless, in the state of Florida, because of their alleged want of property in this state. The bill prays, among other things, for an order restraining appellants from trespassing upon the said land for the purpose of boxing or scraping or otherwise injuring the trees upon said land, and from removing the turpentine already in the boxes on the same.

The injunction, as prayed for, was granted, and respondents answered the bill. The answer denies the allegation that complainants were the owners of the said tract of land, or any part of it, or that they, or any of them, were then in possession of the same, or have at any time been in possession, except for a few days during the month of March, 1888, when they or their agents went upon a portion of said land, but were notified that they were trespassers by Carney, one of the respondents, or his agent, and they shortly thereafter left said premises, and have not since made any effort to take possession of same; that said land was deeded December 18, 1820, by Benjamin Hadley, the ancestor through whom complainants claim title, for valuable consideration, to one William Denman, and the same has never been reconveyed to said Hadley or his heirs; that said land belongs to and is the property of William M. Carney, one of the respondents; and that he is in possession of same as owner, and adversely to all others, and has been so in possession since the 31st day of August, 1882, when the same was deeded to him by John D. Reilly for valuable consideration, and said deed was duly recorded on the 16th day of February, 1883. Further, that, when said Reilly executed said deed, he was in actual possession of said land, as owner thereof, under a deed conveying same to him by James J. Milstead, bearing date March 27, 1852, and that he (Reilly) had been in possession of the said land since the date of said deed; that said Milstead, at the time of making said deed to Reilly, was in possession of said land under chain of title from said William Denman, to whom Benjamin Hadley had conveyed.

The allegation that respondents were with out property in the state of Florida is denied, and it is averred that Carney--one of them--owns about 6,000 acres of land in Escambia county, Fla., and, further, that a suit for damages alleged to have been sustained by complainants by reason of the alleged trespasses on the part of respondents was then pending between said parties in Escambia county, Ala. It is also alleged that the matters contained in complainants' bill are determinable at law, and do not constitute any ground for relief in a court of equity; and pray the same advantage by their answer as if they had demurred to said bill.

Respondents moved to dissolve the injunction because the material allegations of the bill had been denied, and at a subsequent date moved to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the bill for want of jurisdiction in the court, appearing upon the face of the record. The motions to dissolve were refused, and the case proceeded regularly to final hearing, when, upon the pleadings and proofs, a final decree was rendered, adjudging complainants to be the owners of the land in question, and that the respondents, and their agents and attorneys, be perpetually enjoined from going upon said land to box or scrape the pine trees thereon, or to remove any turpentine therefrom, and from committing any acts of trespass on the land. Respondents appealed.

OPINION

MABRY, J., (after stating the facts.)

According to the allegations of the bill before us, the acts, against the doing of which an injunction was sought and obtained, amounted to a trespass upon real estate. This trespass, according to the bill, consisted in entering upon land of complainants, boxing the pine trees standing thereon, for the production of turpentine, and the removal of the turpentine from the trees and the land. The case arose and was determined in the circuit court before the enactment of chapter 3884, Laws 1889, and must be disposed of independently of the provisions of that act.

Courts of equity do not ordinarily extend the harsh remedy of injunction to cases of trespass, but leave the redress of such grievances to the courts of law, where, originally jurisdiction in such matters was lodged. It is said that, originally, courts of...