Carney v. New Orleans City
| Decision Date | 24 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 20-901 |
| Citation | 468 F.Supp.3d 751 |
| Parties | Latoya CARNEY, et al. v. NEW ORLEANS CITY, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
William Brock Most, David Joseph Lanser, Sarah Chervinsky, Law Office of William Most, Allyson Billeaud, Billeaud Law, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Latoya Carney, Byron Wilson, Sr.
Chester Theodore Alpaugh, III, Claude A. Schlesinger, Guste, Barnett, Schlesinger, Henderson & Alpaugh, New Orleans, LA, for Alex Mikkelsen.
ORDER & REASONS
Plaintiffs Latoya Carney and Byron Wilson, Sr. filed this action on behalf of their deceased son, B.W., who was killed in a vehicle chase involving officers of the New Orleans Police Department ("NOPD") on March 20, 2019.1 The plaintiffs have asserted federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state law claims against the City of New Orleans ("City"), members of the NOPD in their individual and official capacities,2 and "ABC Insurance Companies."3
The City, NOPD Superintendent Shaun Ferguson ("Ferguson"), and NOPD Sergeant Stephen Nguyen ("Nguyen") move to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).4 They argue that they cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C § 1983 because the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim of any constitutional violations or a policy, practice, or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violations.5 The defendants further assert that the Court should dismiss the claims against Ferguson and Nguyen in their individual capacities because Ferguson and Nguyen are entitled to qualified immunity.6 The defendants also ask that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state law claims.7 For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
According to the amended complaint, in the evening of March 20, 2019, sixteen-year old B.W. and fourteen-year old C.C. were driving in the Broadmoor neighborhood of New Orleans when four NOPD officers in two marked squad cars began to follow the teenagers’ vehicle.8 Believing that the car was stolen, the officers activated their lights and sirens to signal to B.W. and C.C. that they should pull over.9 B.W. and C.C. accelerated, and the four officers decided to pursue the vehicle.10
Two additional officers followed in pursuit in a third marked squad car.11
During the pursuit, the first two NOPD vehicles neared speeds of eighty miles per hour, while the third vehicle drove in excess of fifty miles per hour, on a street with a thirty-five mile per hour speed limit.12 The officers’ police lights were activated throughout the pursuit.13
After an approximate one-mile high-speed chase, B.W. and C.C. lost control of their vehicle and crashed into the Unity 1 Beauty Supply and Hair Salon at the intersection of Washington Avenue and South White Street.14 Within seconds of impact, the vehicle was engulfed in flames, causing the salon to catch fire.15 B.W., C.C., and a patron of the salon who was inside the building unfortunately did not survive.
Following the incident, the NOPD Public Integrity Bureau conducted an investigation and concluded that the NOPD officers acted in "purposeful" violation of several NOPD policies.16 These included the vehicle pursuit policy, in-car camera policy, and body-worn camera policy.17 Under NOPD policy, officers may engage in a vehicle pursuit only when they have "a reasonable suspicion that a fleeing suspect has committed or has attempted to commit a crime of violence ... and the escape of the subject would pose an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person."18 Vehicle pursuits for property offenses and other non-violent infractions are prohibited.19 Officers must receive supervisory approval before initiating a pursuit.20 NOPD policy also requires activation of body-worn cameras during all vehicle pursuits,21 and in-car cameras are installed in NOPD vehicles to ensure officer compliance with constitutional requirements and NOPD policies.22
Vehicle chases and resulting crashes were a subject of the 2012 Consent Decree between the United States Department of Justice and NOPD.23 A provision of the Consent Decree prohibited vehicle pursuits except in specific circumstances and provided that NOPD would track and analyze vehicle pursuits by officers.24 NOPD's implementation of the Consent Decree's requirements is being evaluated by a Monitor. In January 2019, the Monitor issued a Comprehensive Reassessment, which reported that NOPD was not yet in full compliance with the "Performance Evaluations" and "Supervision" sections of the Consent Decree.25 The report noted that the quality of NOPD's supervisor evaluations was an area of concern.26
During NOPD's investigation of the March 20, 2019 incident, the four officers who first approached B.W. and C.C.’s vehicle admitted that the suspect vehicle was only wanted for a property offense and that the pursuit was in violation of NOPD policies.27 The NOPD investigation determined that those four officers "purposefully ensured the in-car camera in their vehicle was deactivated so as not to capture the events of the incident," and that all six officers failed to properly activate their body-worn cameras.28 The investigation also found that the officers had engaged in multiple unauthorized pursuits before March 20, 2019 without prior discipline.29
Following the investigation, the four officers who first approached and pursued the vehicle were fired, and the other two officers who followed the pursuit were suspended.30
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may dismiss a complaint or part of a complaint when a plaintiff fails to set forth well-pleaded factual allegations that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Gonzalez v. Kay , 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009). The complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
A facially plausible claim is one in which "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. If the well-pleaded factual allegations "do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct," then "the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ) (alteration in original).
In assessing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and liberally construe all such allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Spivey v. Robertson , 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999) ; Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. , 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "the factual information to which the court addresses its inquiry is limited to the (1) the facts set forth in the complaint, (2) documents attached to the complaint, and (3) matters of which judicial notice may be taken under Federal Rule of Evidence 201."31
Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist. , 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019).
"Dismissal is appropriate when the complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’ " Cutrer v. McMillan , 308 F. App'x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co. , 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986) ). Where applicable, qualified immunity can operate as one such bar.
The doctrine of qualified immunity "balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). In striking this balance, qualified immunity shields "government officials performing discretionary functions" from civil liability "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ; see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) ().
Where a public official invokes qualified immunity as a defense to a civil action against him, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a constitutional violation and overcoming the defense. Jackson v. Texas , 959 F.3d 194, 201 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing McClendon v. City of Columbia , 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). To meet this burden, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct." Morgan v. Swanson , 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The court has discretion to decide which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis to examine first. Jackson , 959 F.3d at 200.
At the 12(b)(6) stage, to hold that the defendant violated the law at step one of the qualified immunity analysis is to say that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted—that is, that the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right. Morgan , 659 F.3d at 384 ; Lytle v. Bexar Cty., Tex. , 560 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2009).
As to the second step, "[f]or a right to be clearly established, ‘[t]he contours of the...
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