Carnig v. Carr

• Decision Date: 24 February 1897
• Citation: 167 Mass. 544,46 N.E. 117
• Parties: CARNIG v. CARR.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

167 Mass. 544

46 N.E. 117

CARNIG v. CARR.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

February 24, 1897

COUNSEL

Sherman L. Whipple and William R. Sears, for plaintiff.

Charles S. Lincoln and Edwin G. McInnes, for defendant.

OPINION

MORTON J.

There was evidence tending to show that the defendant agreed that if the plaintiff would give up his business, which was that of an enameler, and enter his service in the same occupation he would furnish him with permanent employment at stipulated wages; that the plaintiff gave up his business, and entered defendant's employment, and continued therein several months, receiving wages at the rate agreed, when defendant suspended his employment, and finally ceased altogether to employ him, though he has work of the kind which the plaintiff was to do.The defendant contends that the contract is too indefinite to be capable of enforcement that it is within the statute of frauds; that the plaintiff's agreement to give up his business was unlawful; and that, therefore, the contract is void for want of consideration; and that the action cannot be maintained on the declaration.

To ascertain what the parties intended by "permanent employment," it is necessary to consider the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, its subject, the situation and relation of the parties, and the sense in which, taking these things into account, the words would be commonly understood; for it fairly may be assumed that the parties used and understood them in that sense.Navigation Co. v. Moore, 2 Whart. 491.Looking at the matter in that way, we think that the words would be commonly understood as meaning that so long as the defendant was engaged in enameling, and had work which the plaintiff could do, and desired to do, and so long as the plaintiff was able to do his work satisfactorily, the defendant would employ him, and that in that sense the employment would be permanent; that is, the plaintiff would be under no necessity of looking for work elsewhere, but could rely on the arrangement thus made.So construed, the contract would be capable of enforcement, and there would be no want of mutuality because the plaintiff might not have bound himself to continue in the defendant's employment.The construction contended for by the defendant, namely, that it was for him to say whether he needed the plaintiff's services or not, would put the plaintiff entirely at the defendant's mercy, and, in view of the fact that the plaintiff was to give up his business to enter the defendant's employment, would be such an agreement as he could not necessarily have been expected to make.SeeRussell v. Allerton,108 N.Y. 288, 15 N.E. 391.On the other hand, it would be equally unreasonable to hold that the defendant could have intended to bind himself to employ the plaintiff so long as they both lived, regardless of his continuing in the enameling business, or of the plaintiff's rendering satisfactory service.The plaintiff does not, indeed, contend for such a construction.If it is difficult, as the defendant insists that it is, to lay down a rule for estimating the damages arising from the breach of such a contract as we have construed this to be, the difficulty is no greater than exists in many other cases, and does not...