Carnival Corp. v. Beverly
| Decision Date | 16 September 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-2337.,98-2337. |
| Parties | CARNIVAL CORPORATION, a/k/a Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., Curtis J. Mase, and Mase & Sreenan, P.A., Petitioners, v. Yvonne BEVERLY, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Beverly D. Eisenstadt of Mase & Sreenan, P.A., Miami, for petitioners.
Joseph P. Milton of Milton, Leach & D'Andrea, P.A. and William T. Lassiter, Jr. of Lassiter & Sessions, Jacksonville, for respondent.
Carnival Corporation (Carnival), its attorney, Curtis J. Mase, and Mase's law firm, Mase & Sreenan, P.A., seek certiorari review of an order which, as a sanction for Mase's conduct at trial, disqualified Mase from further participation in the underlying personal injury action by Yvonne Beverly, respondent, against petitioner Carnival. Petitioners argue that certiorari relief is appropriate because (i) the trial court lacks the authority to sanction an attorney by disqualification in a case pending before it; (ii) even if the trial court possessed such authority, Mase's actions at trial did not warrant disqualification; and (iii) the disqualification necessarily constituted a finding of criminal contempt against Mase, but without providing the required due process. It is clear that the trial court possesses the summary contempt power to sanction an attorney by disqualification. Nevertheless, because the trial court did not provide clear and unambiguous directions to counsel concerning the conduct requirement at trial, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in exercising its summary contempt power and in assessing the extraordinary sanction of disqualification. Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari, and quash the order.
In May 1995, Beverly and her family took a cruise on a Carnival ship, the Ecstasy. The ship made port in Key West, where some of the Beverly party planned to go ashore. The Beverly family sought to take the elevator down to the lower deck, where they could board a launch to shore. In the action below, Beverly alleged that a Carnival employee refused to allow her and her family to use the elevator and, instead, directed them to take the stairs. She fell on the stairs suffering significant personal injuries.
Beverly's complaint against Carnival was filed in 1995. The matter came to trial on May 28, 1998, where the events occurred which are the subject of this appeal. The record indicates that the trial was highly contentious. Even from the cold record, the animosity between the parties' attorneys is obvious. The focus of our opinion, however, is limited to the trial conduct of Mase which led to his disqualification by the trial court.
During voir dire, Mase asked a venireman if he would agree "that changes in the version of how the accident happened after an individual hires a lawyer are suspect?" Beverly's counsel objected, requesting a sidebar conference at which he argued that Mase's comment impugned the integrity of Beverly's attorneys in that Mase was implying that counsel was involved in the suborning of perjury by Beverly. Mase answered that he had not mentioned the names of any attorneys. The trial court overruled the objection.
As the trial proceeded, in his opening statement Mase pointed out that the medical reports prepared immediately after Beverly's fall indicate that Beverly missed a step or steps and then fell. He noted that, later, Beverly's story changed and she contended she slipped on wet steps. Specifically, Mase said:
There was no immediate objection. Mase continued with his opening statement, during which he was admonished several times by the trial court for presenting argument beyond what the evidence at trial would show and for "making a final argument," rather than an appropriate opening statement. During one of the several sidebar conferences, Beverly's counsel again complained that, when Mase pointed out that Beverly had given a different version of the facts after she retained counsel, Mase was resorting to unprofessional attacks on Beverly's attorneys by implying that Beverly's counsel had suborned perjury in some manner. Beverly asked the trial court to admonish Mase and warn him that he would be sanctioned if he continued. The trial court agreed that Mase's comments could be considered to mean that Beverly had been encouraged by her counsel to change her story. Mase argued that his comments were appropriate and requested leave to provide supporting authority to the court. The trial court instructed Mase that "in this phase of the trial" he was prohibited from referring to the fact that, after Beverly retained counsel, her statements varied from "the statements she gave to the shipboard doctor, to the nurses, and to the emergency-room physician." The trial court emphasized the extent of the ruling, stating that "... at this point, until you [Mase] can give me the case law where I can read it, there will be no further mention of this."
Mase's opening statement continued, and the trial court again was required to admonish Mase for "making a final argument to the jury." Specifically, the court warned: Immediately thereafter, the court said "next, time, there's going to be some sanctions."
The next morning, before the trial proceedings began, the trial court brought up the matter of Beverly's motions to sanction Mase. The trial court advised that it was denying the motions made during the sidebar discussion the previous day, noting that in fact the early medical reports were different than Beverly's later explanation of the accident. The trial court found that Mase had not impugned Beverly's counsel, but advised Mase that "you're on very dangerous ground" and offered to give a curative instruction if counsel for Beverly desired. The trial court ruled that it would allow Mase's cross-examination on the subject, but reminded him that he was "on pretty dangerous ground." Mase acknowledged that he was "on the edge," and the court emphasized that "you're right on the razor's edge." Beverly's motion for a mistrial was denied.
As the trial proceeded, John Brown, Beverly's son, testified that, when he sought to use the elevator while leaving the ship for an earlier snorkeling excursion, a Carnival employee told him that he must use the stairs, rather than the elevator. On cross-examination, Mase sought to impeach Brown concerning his detailed memory of the Carnival employee's instructions, questioning him, as follows:
Another sidebar conference followed. At sidebar, Beverly moved to strike Carnival's pleadings and to hold Mase in contempt. Mase maintained that there was nothing improper about his question. Counsel for Beverly asked the record to show that Mase was standing "smirking" and moved the trial court to sanction Mase by prohibiting him from further participation in the proceedings, arguing that co-counsel for Carnival could proceed in the trial. Beverly contended that Mase had engaged in a pattern of conduct of not honoring the trial court's rulings and of continuing to impugn Beverly's counsel before the jury, and argued the "only way to stop it was to get Mase out of the case." In response, Mase accused Beverly's counsel of intentionally disrupting the proceedings by their continual objections. The trial court noted that this was the second time Mase had implied misconduct by Beverly's attorneys, and that Mase had been warned the first time during his opening statement. The court then indicated that it would disqualify Mase from further participation in the case, but would give him an opportunity to argue the issue further the next morning. At that point, Mase moved for a mistrial on the ground that Carnival was not being represented by counsel of its choosing.
The next morning, the trial court entered a mistrial on its own motion. The trial court then entered a written order disqualifying Mase from further participation in the case. In this order, the trial court made the following findings:
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