Carnival Corp. v. Carlisle

Decision Date15 February 2007
Docket NumberNo. SC04-393.,SC04-393.
Citation953 So.2d 461
PartiesCARNIVAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. Darce CARLISLE, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

QUINCE, J.

We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal on the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance:

WHETHER A CRUISE LINE IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE OF THE SHIPBOARD DOCTOR, COMMITTED ON A SHIP'S PASSENGER?

Carlisle v. Carnival Corp., 864 So.2d 1, 8 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified question in the negative.

Factual and Procedural History

The material facts, taken from the Third District's decision, are as follows:

In March 1997, the Carlisle family embarked on a cruise aboard the Carnival cruise ship, the Ecstasy. During the cruise, 14 year old Elizabeth Carlisle felt ill with abdominal pain, lower back pain and diarrhea and was seen several times in the ship's hospital by the ship's physician, Dr. Mauro Neri. Over the course of several days Dr. Neri repeatedly advised the Carlisles that Elizabeth was suffering from the flu, assured them in response to their questions that it was not appendicitis, and provided antibiotics. Ultimately, the Carlisle family decided to discontinue their cruise and returned home to Michigan where Elizabeth was diagnosed as having a ruptured appendix. Her appendix was removed, and as a result of the rupture and subsequent infection, Elizabeth was rendered sterile.

Her parents filed the instant suit against Carnival and Dr. Neri, alleging, inter alia, that the doctor had acted negligently in his treatment of Elizabeth and that Carnival should be held vicariously liable for such negligence under theories of agency and apparent agency, and that Carnival was negligent in the hiring of Dr. Neri. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Carnival and this appeal followed.

Id. at 2. Third District found that the issue had never been addressed by this Court and concluded that, of the conflicting precedents on the issue, Nietes v. American President Lines, Ltd., 188 F.Supp. 219 (N.D.Cal.1959), provided the better-reasoned rationale for resolving the issue of a cruise liner's liability for the medical negligence of its shipboard doctor.

The district court found that because the record indicated control by Carnival over the doctor's medical services, the question of agency had not been refuted. The court held, "[R]egardless of the contractual status ascribed to the doctor, for purposes of fulfilling the cruise line's duty to exercise reasonable care, the ship's doctor is an agent of the cruise line whose negligence should be imputed to the cruise line." Id. at 7. The court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Carnival, remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its holding, and certified to this Court the above-stated question as one of great public importance.

ANALYSIS
Applicable Law Under the Concurrent Jurisdiction of Maritime Torts

The parties in this case agree that the instant action, involving the malpractice of a doctor on the high seas, falls within the purview of federal admiralty jurisdiction. See Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 912 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, 145 F.Supp.2d 1337 (S.D.Fla.2001). Under the "saving to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789, currently codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2000), state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts as to in personam claims based on maritime torts.1 Both federal and state courts must apply federal maritime law that directly addresses the issues at hand. See Greenly v. Mariner Mgmt. Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 22, 25-26 (1st Cir.1999) (citing Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 320-21, 75 S.Ct. 368, 99 L.Ed. 337 (1955)).

Federal maritime law is an amalgamation of federal legislation, federal common law, and state maritime law. A court sitting in admiralty jurisdiction "may—and should—resort to state law when no federal rule covers a particular situation." Greenly, 192 F.3d at 26. Indeed, there is an established line of United States Supreme Court precedent recognizing that maritime law may be supplemented or modified by the states where the supplement or modification does not conflict with an essential feature of exclusive federal jurisdiction.2 State courts are specifically empowered to create new remedial maritime law within those narrow constraints. In the instant case, however, there are federal decisions and established rules of law that directly address the liability of a ship owner for the alleged negligence of the ship's physician.

Controlling Precedent in Maritime Law

This Court must determine whether the Third District Court of Appeal could follow the holding in Nietes v. American President Lines, Ltd., 188 F.Supp. 219 (N.D.Cal.1959), or whether the Third District was bound to follow the other precedent as outlined in Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.1988). Carnival and Carlisle differ in their views as to whether the district court was required to follow the rule of maritime law stated in Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star and espoused by the majority of federal courts that have ruled upon this liability issue. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has directly ruled on the issue of whether a ship owner may be held vicariously liable for the alleged negligent provision of medical care to a passenger by its shipboard physician. However a number of federal district courts and courts of appeal have ruled on this issue.3 The question thus becomes whether the Third District was bound to follow the rule of law on this issue as espoused by the majority of such cases. In other words, the questions that must be answered are whether there is a uniform federal position on the issue and whether application of the Nietes rule would violate the rule of uniformity.

Generally, state courts are not required to follow the decisions of intermediate federal appellate courts on questions of federal law. "Although state courts are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing federal law, Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 220-221, 51 S.Ct. 453, 75 L.Ed. 983 (1931), there is no similar obligation with respect to decisions of the lower federal courts." Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 Mich. 603, 677 N.W.2d 325, 327 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 870, 125 S.Ct. 98, 160 L.Ed.2d 117 (2004). Decisions of numerous state supreme courts have similarly held that state courts are under no obligation to follow the decisions of the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Jackson, 194 Okla. 183, 148 P.2d 182, 185 (1944) ("[D]ecisions of lower federal courts are persuasive and usually followed unless a conflict between the decisions of such courts makes it necessary to choose between one or more announced interpretations.").

Under federal maritime law a state may, in exercising its in personam4 jurisdiction in maritime cases, adopt such remedies as it sees fit so long as it does not make changes in the substantive law.5 This rule is violated when the state remedy "works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations." American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447, 114 S.Ct. 981, 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994) (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917)). With regard to the need for harmony within the field of maritime law in the absence of controlling federal legislation, the United States Supreme Court specifically held that "[u]niformity is required only when the essential features of an exclusive federal jurisdiction are involved." Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 392, 61 S.Ct. 687, 85 L.Ed. 903 (1941).

Harmony and Uniformity of Maritime Law

Carnival asserts that, by following Nietes v. American President Lines, Ltd., 188 F.Supp. 219 (N.D.Cal.1959), the Third District has crafted a dramatic change in settled federal maritime law and thus violated the long-standing principle of uniformity. More specifically, Carnival asserts that cases following Barbetta, with Nietes as the lone exception, have established a settled rule of maritime law that a ship owner may not be held vicariously liable for the negligence of a shipboard physician.

In Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.1988), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a ship owner could be held liable to a passenger under a theory of respondeat superior for the medical negligence of the ship's doctor. The ship owners asserted that, because the doctor was not their servant or agent, they could not be held vicariously liable for his negligent actions under general maritime law. The ship owners also proffered a provision of the ticket contract that disclaimed all liability for the negligence of the physician. The trial court noted that the general maritime law offered no completely consistent answer regarding the vicarious liability of a ship owner to a passenger for alleged negligent medical treatment by...

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