Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co.
| Decision Date | 31 August 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. D016720,D016720 |
| Citation | 18 Cal.App.4th 644,22 Cal.Rptr.2d 419 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Stephen J. CARO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Specthrie & Lerach, William S. Lerach, San Diego, Alan M. Mansfield, Santa Ana, Darren J. Quinn, Kaitlin M. McCarty, San Diego, Bushnell, Caplan & Fielding, Alan M. Caplan, Gary J. Near, Philip Neumark, San Francisco, and Jonathan D. McCue, San Diego, for plaintiff and appellant.
Mitchell, Keeney & Waite, Thomas R. Mitchell, Todd F. Stevens, San Diego, Dinsmore & Shohl, Thomas S. Calder and Joseph E. Conley, Jr., Cincinnati, OH, for defendants and respondents.
Plaintiff Stephen J. Caro appeals an order denying his motion for class certification of his lawsuit against defendants The Procter & Gamble Company (P & G), N.W. Ayer, Inc. (Ayer), and The Vons Companies, Inc. (Vons). Caro contends in denying class certification the superior court applied improper legal criteria, impermissibly weighed the lawsuit's merits, and made unsupported findings about the atypicality of Caro's claims and the predominance of individual questions over common issues. We affirm the order.
In April 1991 Caro filed a class action complaint against defendants for fraud and deceit; negligent misrepresentation; unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice (Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 17200, 17500); violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ.Code, § 1750 et seq.); unjust enrichment and imposition of constructive trust; breach of contract and rescission; misbranding food (Health & Saf.Code, § 26566); and falsely advertising food (Health & Saf.Code, §§ 26460, 26461).
Caro's complaint alleged: Defendants falsely represented various P & G "Citrus Hill" products to be fresh orange juice, made from the heart of the orange, 100 percent pure orange juice, additive free, and from oranges picked and squeezed on the same day. Caro bought a Citrus Hill product at Vons's San Diego market in reliance upon its labeling and defendants' advertising representations. 1 However, the Citrus Hill products were not fresh but instead were reconstituted from frozen concentrate, contained additives including water and flavor enhancers, were made from the entire orange, and were not made from oranges picked and squeezed the same day. P & G was the subject of actions by various state and federal regulators involving its Citrus Hill products. 2
Caro's complaint also alleged: Caro sought to represent a class composed of "all" the "millions of persons" in the United States who bought Citrus Hill products; and as a buyer of the "bogus" Citrus Hill product he was asserting claims typical of the claims of the entire class and would adequately represent the class' interests.
In February 1992 Caro filed a motion for class certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 382, asserting the lawsuit was "properly maintained as a class action on behalf of all California residents who purchased Citrus Hill Fresh Choice orange juice products...." In support of his motion, Caro submitted declarations by his counsel and himself. Caro also submitted documents about state and federal actions involving P & G's advertising and labeling. Opposing Caro's motion, defendants submitted various declarations and lodged Caro's deposition. 3
After hearing, the superior court denied Caro's motion for class certification. The court concluded:
Caro appeals the order denying his motion for class certification.
Asserting the superior court erred in denying his motion for class certification, Caro seeks reversal and remand with instructions to enter an order certifying the class. Caro contends the superior court applied improper legal criteria; made erroneous legal assumptions by misapplying California law, considering irrelevant issues and impermissibly weighing the action's merits; made unsupported findings about the atypicality and inadequacy of Caro's claims with respect to the remainder of the class; and made unsupported findings about the predominance of individual questions over common issues.
On a motion for class certification, the plaintiff has the "burden to establish that in fact the requisites for continuation of the litigation in that format are In Hogya v. Superior Court, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 142 Cal.Rptr. 325, we concluded Civil Code section 1781, subdivision (b), established exclusive criteria for class certification in suits brought under CLRA. (Id. at p. 140, 142 Cal.Rptr. 325.) 4 "If the statutory criteria are satisfied, a trial court is under a duty to certify the class and is vested with no discretion to deny certification based upon other considerations." (75 Cal.App.3d at p. 140, 142 Cal.Rptr. 325, italics in original.) However, we also noted the criteria for class certification were broader for actions brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 382. (75 Cal.App.3d at pp. 134-135, 142 Cal.Rptr. 325.) 5 In Hogya the superior court denied class certification because substantial benefits would not accrue to the litigants, the class, the public and the courts, and because it was unlikely a high percentage of class members would ultimately come forward to prove separate claims to a portion of the total class recovery. (75 Cal.App.3d at pp. 127, 134, 142 Cal.Rptr. 325.) We stated: "Undoubtedly, these factors are germane to class certification in actions brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 382." (Id. at p. 134, 142 Cal.Rptr. 325, fn. omitted.)
present. [Citations.]" (Hamwi v. Citinational-Buckeye Inv. Co. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 462, 471, 140 Cal.Rptr. 215.) Caro's complaint alleged various causes of action including claims under CLRA. With respect to the propriety of the denial of class certification, we must analyze Caro's CLRA claims separately from his other causes of action. (Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 142 Cal.Rptr. 325.)
With respect to Caro's causes of action other than his claims arising under CLRA, we conclude the superior court properly determined class treatment would not substantially benefit the litigants and the court. With respect to all of Caro's causes of action including his CLRA claims, we conclude the superior court properly determined Caro's claims were not typical and individual issues predominated. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying class certification.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Trial courts have great discretion with regard to class certification. (Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 470, 174 Cal.Rptr. 515, 629 P.2d 23.) "Our task on appeal is not to determine in the first instance whether the requested class is appropriate but rather whether the trial court has abused its discretion in denying certification." (Osborne v. Subaru of America, Inc. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 646, 654, 243 Cal.Rptr. 815.) 6 The "ultimate decision as to the showing required Appeal of an order denying class certification "presents an exception to the general rule on review that we look only to the trial court's result, not its rationale." (National Solar Equipment Owners' Assn. v. Grumman Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1281, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 325.) Erroneous legal assumptions or improper criteria may require reversal "even though there may be substantial evidence to support the court's order." (Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605, 612, 236 Cal.Rptr. 605.) Thus, we must determine whether the trial court engaged in correct legal analysis. (National Solar Equipment Owners' Assn. v. Grumman Corp., supra, at p. 1281, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 325.) Accordingly, we will analyze the reasons given by the superior court in denying class certification. Any valid pertinent reason stated will be sufficient to uphold the order. (Petherbridge v. Altadena Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 199, fn. 2, 112 Cal.Rptr. 144.) Review of the entire record here discloses the court's conclusion was based upon proper criteria and substantial evidence.
at the pretrial level in order to maintain the class action should be within the discretion of the trial court, providing it applies the correct criteria in making its determination. [Citations.]" (Petherbridge v. Altadena Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 193, 199-200, 112 Cal.Rptr. 144.) Absent other error, we will "not disturb a trial court ruling on class certification which is supported by substantial...To continue reading
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