Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Capital Trucking, Inc.
| Decision Date | 05 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | 18 Civ. 10871 (PED) |
| Citation | 523 F.Supp.3d 661 |
| Parties | CAROLINA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL TRUCKING, INC., Robert G. Anderson, Diane C. Anderson, Defendants. Robert G. Anderson, Diane C. Anderson, Counterclaim Plaintiffs, v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Company & Imperium Insurance Company, f/k/a Delos Insurance Company, Counterclaim Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Christopher James Soverow, Dennis M. Wade, Thomas J. Bracken, Wade Clark Mulcahy LLP, Nicholas Philip Pallese Schaefer, Kennedys CMK LLP, New York, NY, Scott Wayne McMickle, McMickle, Kurey & Branch, LLP, Alpharetta, GA, for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Carolina Casualty Insurance Company.
Michael David Shalhoub, Goldberg Segalla, LLP, White Plains, NY, for Counterclaim Defendant Imperium Insurance Company.
Holly Ostrov Ronai, Ronai & Ronai, LLP, Port Chester, NY, for Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.
DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Carolina Casualty Insurance Company ("Carolina") commenced this action for declaratory relief against Defendants Robert and Diane Anderson. [Dkt. 7.] The Andersons commenced a third-party action against third-party Defendant Imperium Insurance Company, f/k/a Delos Insurance Company ("Imperium") and asserted counterclaims against Carolina. [R. 20.] Before me are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the Andersons [Dkt. 77] and Carolina [Dkt. 84], and a motion to dismiss filed by Imperium [Dkt. 81]. Oral argument was held on January 12, 2021. For the reasons that follow, the Andersons’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Carolina's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Imperium's motion is GRANTED .
II. BACKGROUND
The facts are largely undisputed. This case arises from an collision between a passenger vehicle driven by Defendant Robert Anderson and a tractor-trailer driven by Constantin Bagiu on November 1, 2010. The tractor, a 2005 Freightliner bearing Illinois license plate number P678944, was owned by Marius Pandaru and leased to Capital Trucking, Inc., an Illinois corporation insured by Carolina. The trailer was owned by Adrian Goia and leased to Trucker's Association of Chicago, LLC, an Illinois corporation insured by Imperium.
The Andersons commenced an action in New York State Supreme Court, Orange County, on April 8, 2013 against Bagiu, Pandaru, Goia, Capital Trucking, and Trucker's Association of Chicago. Each of the state court defendants, as well as Carolina on behalf of Capital Trucking, tendered their defenses to Imperium, which accepted. Following competing motions for summary judgment, the state court issued a decision holding, in relevant part, that Bagiu was negligent and 100 percent at fault for the collision. [Dkt. 35-1.] The state court also held that Bagiu was a statutory employee of both Trucker's Association of Chicago and Capital Trucking, and that each could be held liable for Bagiu's negligence under 49 C.F.R. § 390.5.
Following the state court's decision, the Andersons made a demand of $1 million to Imperium and $750,000 to Carolina. In response, Imperium offered $993,434.32, the remaining limit of Imperium's $1 million insurance liability coverage for the collision. Carolina rejected the demand, maintaining that the insurance policy it issued to Capital Trucking did not apply to the tractor involved in the collision, and that Capital Trucking's liability should be covered under Imperium's insurance policy pursuant to the tender of defense. Carolina further maintained that the MCS-90 endorsement, which was attached to Carolina's insurance policy to Capital Trucking as mandated by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, did not require Carolina to provide coverage to Capital Trucking for the collision. See 49 C.F.R. § 387.7.
Carolina seeks declaratory relief that the insurance policy it issued to Capital Trucking does not cover the subject tractor and, therefore, does not provide coverage for the collision. Carolina also seeks declaratory relief that the MCS-90 endorsement it issued to Capital Trucking does not require Carolina to provide coverage. The Andersons seek declaratory relief that Carolina's insurance policy does cover the subject tractor and collision or, in the alternative, that the MCS-90 endorsement requires Carolina to provide certain coverage. The Andersons also assert claims of fraud and civil conspiracy against Carolina and Imperium. Imperium moves to dismiss the Andersons’ claims against Imperium.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
"[I]n assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to a material fact, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. , 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004). If there is admissible evidence in the record as to any material fact from which an inference could be drawn in favor of the non-movant, summary judgment is unavailable. To this end, the district court is charged under Rule 56 with the function of "issue-finding," and not "issue-resolution." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship , 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). "The Court must not weigh evidence or assess the credibility of potential witnesses, for such evaluations are to be conducted solely by the jury." Gomez v. Pellicone , 986 F. Supp. 220, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ().
The burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists rests on the movant. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).
When the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmoving party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim. In that event, the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.
Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co. , 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Accordingly, the nonmoving party must offer "concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor," Anderson , 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and "may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation," Scotto v. Almenas , 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (1955) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ " Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
The Declaratory Judgment Acts states:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
"[T]he phrase ‘case of actual controversy’ in the Act refers to the type of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are justiciable under Article III." MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. , 549 U.S. 118, 127, 127 S.Ct. 764, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007). Because federal courts may only adjudicate "Cases" and "Controversies," an actual controversy must be extant at the time the complaint is filed and throughout all stages of the litigation. Velvet Underground v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. , 890 F. Supp. 2d 398, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 130, 130 S.Ct. 576, 175 L.Ed.2d 447 (2009) ). The controversy must at all times remain definite and concrete and must touch the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal interests. Id. (citing MedImmune Inc. , 549 U.S. at 127, 127 S.Ct. 764 ).
"Throughout the litigation, the party seeking relief must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id. (citing United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 936, 131 S.Ct. 2860, 180 L.Ed.2d 811 (2011) ). As with any federal action, courts may not entertain actions for...
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