Carolina Ctr. Bldg. Corp. v. Enmark Stations, Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2017-001555,Opinion No. 5804 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CAROLINA CENTER BUILDING CORP., Appellant, v. ENMARK STATIONS, INC.; and the Town of Hilton Head Island, Respondents. |
H. Fred Kuhn, Jr., of Moss Kuhn & Fleming, P.A., of Beaufort, for Appellant.
Russell Pierce Patterson and Lauren Patterson Williams, of Russell P. Patterson P.A., of Hilton Head Island, for Respondent Enmark Stations, Inc.
Gregory Milam Alford, of Alford Law Firm, LLC, of Hilton Head Island, for Respondent Town of Hilton Head Island.
In this appeal, Carolina Center Building Corporation (Carolina) appeals the master-in-equity's order finding Enmark Stations, Inc. (Enmark) had a prescriptive easement to use a paved roadway (Roadway) situated on Carolina's property. Carolina also appeals the master's refusal to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the Town of Hilton Head (Hilton Head) to enforce Hilton Head's Land Management Ordinance Official's (LMO Official) order that the Roadway be removed. We affirm as modified.
Carolina owns property on Greenwood Drive near Sea Pines Circle on Hilton Head Island, and on its property sits multiple buildings (Welcome Center). Enmark operates a gas station (Station) on Palmetto Bay Road adjacent to the Welcome Center. Behind the Station and adjacent to Carolina's property is a restaurant and shopping complex (Shopping Center). The Roadway covers a portion of the Welcome Center's property at its northern border and connects the Station's southern border to the parking lot on the restaurant's and Shopping Center's southern border. The Roadway initially forked around a small vegetative island located on the Shopping Center's property and had two connections to the parking lot, but now only one exists after the Shopping Center removed the island and placed a trash dumpster in its place. The Station's patrons use the Roadway as an alternative entrance and exit for the Station. The general public also uses it to bypass Sea Pines Circle and access the Shopping Center.
The chain of title for the Station is as follows. On March 12, 1974, Chevron Oil Company (Chevron) purchased the real property. On August 1, 1983, Chevron obtained a development permit to build the Station and completed construction on June 1, 1984. In 1985, Chevron leased the Station to Ron Ballenger, who was married to Alice Means. Means and Ballenger divorced in 1989, and Means assumed the lease following the divorce. Sometime before the divorce, Ballenger made repairs to the Roadway due to customer complaints. On August 23, 1993, Means, through her company, ASA, Inc. (ASA), purchased the Station from Chevron. During her ownership, Means also performed maintenance on the Roadway due to complaints. On March 19, 2009, Enmark purchased the Station from ASA.
As to the Welcome Center, State Savings Service Corporation purchased it from Sea Pines Plantation Company on January 29, 1973. On November 26, 1986, Fogelman Properties purchased the Welcome Center and subsequently sold it to SeP Limited Partnership on March 7, 1990. The Welcome Center was conveyed to Palmetto Federal Savings Bank of South Carolina on January 11, 1994, who then sold it to Sea Pines Company, Inc. on July 21, 1994. On October 31, 1996, Carolina purchased the Welcome Center.
On July 24, 2013, Enmark and Carolina entered a tolling agreement (Tolling Agreement) in which they agreed Carolina would file a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment to determine each party's rights attendant to the Roadway. The Tolling Agreement also provided that the parties would not close or impede travel over the Roadway in any way and any applicable limitation period related to the Roadway would be tolled.
After entering the Tolling Agreement but prior to filing a complaint, Carolina asked Theresa B. Lewis, the LMO Official, who interprets and enforces Hilton Head's Land Management Ordinances (LMO), whether the Roadway violated the LMO. In a letter sent on August 8, 2013 (2013 Letter), the LMO Official notified Carolina that the Roadway violated the LMO and ordered it to remove the Roadway and plant a vegetative buffer. Carolina subsequently forwarded the letter to Enmark. After receiving the 2013 Letter, Enmark contacted the LMO Official and informed her of (1) the Roadway's importance to its business and the public and (2) the Tolling Agreement and its provision providing for a court determination of the parties’ rights and obligations attendant to the Roadway. Enmark also informed the LMO Official it believed the Roadway predated the LMO.1 On September 26, 2013, the LMO Official sent Carolina an email (2013 Email) stating that after discussing the situation with Hilton Head's attorney, the 2013 Letter was premature and she should have advised Carolina that a court would need to address the issue of the Roadway's existence before she could determine whether the Roadway violated the LMO. She also indicated she would formulate a new response and send it to Carolina and Enmark. The LMO Official subsequently decided the Roadway was grandfathered into the LMO. Pursuant to the LMO Official's request, Hilton Head's attorney informed Carolina of the decision and stated Hilton Head would not require the Roadway's removal.
Carolina filed a complaint on August 15, 2013, and subsequently amended it on November 19, 2014. Carolina sought an order (1) finding Enmark did not have an express or prescriptive easement to use the Roadway, (2) ordering Enmark to remove the Roadway and to deter the public from using it, (3) permitting Carolina to make reasonable changes to the Roadway at Enmark's expense should an easement exist, and (4) prohibiting Enmark from using the Roadway. Carolina additionally brought causes of action for slander of title, nuisance, and trespass and also requested a writ of mandamus against Hilton Head to enforce the LMO. Enmark and Hilton Head filed answers seeking dismissal of Carolina's claims, and Enmark filed a counterclaim asserting it had an easement over the Roadway. Carolina moved for summary judgment, and on October 23, 2015, the trial court granted summary judgment in its favor as to the issue of an express easement but denied summary judgment as to all other issues.
The matter was referred to the master on November 30, 2015, and the trial occurred on June 20–21, 2016. On March 30, 2017, the master issued an order finding Enmark established by clear and convincing evidence that it had a prescriptive easement to use the Roadway.
The master denied Carolina's request for a writ of mandamus, finding the LMO Official's 2013 Letter was not a final decision. The master further found a writ was inappropriate because (1) the Roadway did not violate the LMO, (2) Hilton Head had discretion in fashioning a remedy, and (3) Carolina failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.
Finally, the master dismissed Carolina's actions for slander of title, nuisance, and trespass, finding Carolina failed to establish these claims because Enmark possessed a prescriptive easement to use the Roadway.
Carolina filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion, which the master denied. This appeal followed.
I. Did the master err in failing to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Hilton Head to enforce the LMO Official's 2013 Letter requiring the removal of the Roadway?
II. Did the master err in finding Enmark satisfied the elements of a prescriptive easement?
Carolina argues the master erred in failing to issue a writ of mandamus compelling Hilton Head to enforce the LMO Official's decision contained in the 2013 Letter. We affirm.
"Mandamus is the highest judicial writ and is issued only when there is a specific right to be enforced, a positive duty to be performed, and no other specific remedy." City of Rock Hill v. Thompson , 349 S.C. 197, 199, 563 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002). The master exercises discretion in determining whether to issue a writ of mandamus, and its decision will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Steele v. Benjamin , 362 S.C. 66, 70, 606 S.E.2d 499, 501 (Ct. App. 2004). An abuse of discretion occurs when the master commits an error of law or bases the order on factual conclusions lacking any evidentiary support. Id. "An appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the [master] on a mandamus petition if the [master]’s findings are supported by any reasonable evidence." Id.
Carolina asserts the master erred in finding the 2013 Letter was not a final decision. Carolina contends the 2013 Letter was a final decision because it found the Roadway violated the LMO and prescribed the specific remedy of removing the Roadway and restoring the vegetative buffer. Carolina therefore argues the master erred in declining to issue a writ of mandamus.
We find the master did not abuse its discretion in denying Carolina's petition for a writ of mandamus. The master found that the 2013 Letter was not a final decision because the LMO Official later rescinded it. The record reasonably supports this finding. See id. (). In the 2013 Email, the LMO Official informed Carolina that the 2013 Letter was premature and that she would formalize a new response for Carolina. Furthermore, the LMO Official testified that even though it did not include the word "rescission," her 2013 Email rescinded the 2013 Letter. The LMO Official testified the 2013 Letter was based on evidence supplied only by Carolina. She stated that when she issues a decision based on information supplied only by one party in a dispute and subsequently learns new information from the other side, her practice is to retract the decision and issue a new one. We find this evidence supports the master's factual finding that...
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