Caron v. State

• Citation: 824 N.E.2d 745
• Decision Date: 31 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 20A03-0406-CR-280.,20A03-0406-CR-280.
• Parties: Joseph D. CARON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

824 N.E.2d 745

Joseph D. CARON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 20A03-0406-CR-280.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

March 31, 2005.

Transfer Denied May 20, 2005.

Nancy A. McCaslin, McCaslin & McCaslin, Elkhart, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Maureen Ann Bartolo, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

FRIEDLANDER, Judge.

Joseph D. Caron appeals his convictions for two counts of Dealing in Methamphetamine in Excess of Three Grams,¹ a class A felony. The first dealing charge was for possession of methamphetamine in excess of three grams with intent to deliver (possession offense), and the second was for manufacturing methamphetamine in excess of three grams (manufacturing offense). Caron presents the following restated issues for review:

1. Did alleged juror misconduct amount to fundamental error?

2. Are Caron's two convictions for dealing in methamphetamine violative of the double jeopardy clause of the Indiana Constitution?

3. Did the trial court improperly sentence Caron based upon aggravating factors not found by a jury?

We affirm in part and reverse in part.

In the late morning of July 21, 2003, a woman drove Robert Storey and Joseph Caron to the edge of a cornfield in Elkhart County. The two went into the field and began manufacturing methamphetamine. Caron, who assisted in the production and acted as a lookout, did this in order to pay off a debt he owed to Storey. The men left the field (i.e., their methamphetamine lab) early in the afternoon and went back to Storey's home in Millersburg so that Caron could pick up his girlfriend from work. Thereafter, Caron returned to Storey's home, where another woman drove them in a maroon car back to the field later that afternoon. The two went back to the same spot in the field, and the manufacturing process continued.

Area residents had noticed the men earlier in the day and alerted Glen Graber, the owner of the field. Graber, his son, and a neighbor went to the field to investigate. The men observed two sets of fresh footprints and a tank, later found to contain anhydrous ammonia. Soon thereafter, the men observed a maroon car in the area, which they followed into Millersburg before deciding to return to the field. While en route, they called the Elkhart County Sheriff's Department and Eugene Moser, another neighbor. Moser met Graber and the other men at the edge of the field while they waited for officers to arrive.

About ten minutes later, Storey emerged from the cornfield and was startled at the sight of the men. Storey explained that he was looking for his dog and then walked toward an adjacent railroad. When Graber's son followed, Storey ran and hid in some tall grass. Deputy Sheriff Jason Reaves arrived on the scene and quickly apprehended Storey.

In the meantime, Deputy Sheriff James Snyder began to investigate further. He discovered several items indicating that methamphetamine had been or was being manufactured in the field. Upon further information, Deputy Snyder encountered Caron walking about a half mile away from the field. Caron appeared nervous, sweaty, and covered in mud. He initially told Deputy Snyder that he had been riding a four-wheeler that had gotten stuck. Later that night, however, Caron provided an incriminating statement at the jail, admitting to assisting Storey while Storey "was trying to make some kind of drug" in the field that day. Exhibit Book at State's Exhibit 16A.

The Indiana State Police Clandestine Laboratory Team (the Team) was called to the scene. The Team found substantial evidence of an active methamphetamine lab in the field. There was evidence of a batch in process and a finished amount of methamphetamine. The Team recovered 22.69 grams of finished methamphetamine.

Following a three-day jury trial, Caron was convicted as charged as set forth above. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Caron to concurrent sentences of thirty-five years on each count. Caron now appeals. Additional facts will be presented as necessary.

1.

Caron initially argues that fundamental error occurred when the trial court failed to determine whether juror bias denied him a fair trial. In particular, Caron asserts juror Bonnie Christner (Juror Christner) was a prior acquaintance of his and should not have been on the jury, as she did not indicate her relationship with Caron when the prospective jurors were asked during voir dire if they knew Caron or any other trial participant.²

The day before Caron's sentencing hearing, two unsworn letters were filed with the court. Peggy Caron, Caron's former wife, wrote the trial court on Caron's behalf and, among other things, informed the court: "When I was married to Joe, we knew and associated with Bonnie Christner. She used to come to our home in Wawaka back into the 1980's." Appendix at 115. The other letter, which was signed by Caron's aunt and grandmother, stated in relevant part:

After the trial we found out who one of the jurors were [sic], Bonnie Christner. She used to go to Joe and his ex-wife's house in Wawaka to cut their hair. She used to be a beautician and still might be. She didn't like Joe very much. I thought the jurors were asked if they knew the person on trial. I don't think she should have been on the jury.

Id. at 117. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel made note of one of these letters³ "for the record." Id. at 162. After indicating that it might be necessary to deal with the issue on appeal or in a motion to correct error,⁴ defense counsel immediately proceeded with argument related to sentencing matters. Thereafter, Caron addressed this matter during his sentencing testimony as follows:

[Caron]: There was one woman on the jury that's associated with our family. She has cut my hair in her beauty salon. I did not recognize her. I knew she looked familiar, but I couldn't put my finger on it. I couldn't figure it out. And she had a beauty salon in Millersburg. She has cut my hair. She has trimmed my daughter's hair. She has trimmed my wife's hair.

She has came [sic] to our house at different times with her at-the-time boyfriend. There was trouble at our house once. I tried to knock a window out of her car as she was leaving, and I did not realize that was her on the jury.

[The Court]: You tried to knock a window out of her car.

[Caron]: Yes, sir. At my house. She's been to our house numerous different times with her boyfriend.

[The Court]: And how many times has she cut your hair?

[Caron]: Once I know of, yes. I'm not sure if she trimmed it after that. I don't remember.

[The Court]: Is there anything else you would like to say?

[Caron]: No, sir.

Id. at 168-69. The trial court then proceeded to announce Caron's sentence.

On appeal, Caron couches his argument in terms of fundamental error because he failed to properly preserve the issue below.⁵See Hornbostel v. State, 757 N.E.2d 170 (Ind.Ct.App.2001)

(failure to object at trial results in waiver of the issue on appeal unless appellant can establish fundamental error), trans. denied. The fundamental error exception to the waiver rule is an extremely narrow one. Glotzbach v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1221 (Ind.Ct. App.2003). To rise to the level of fundamental error, the error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible. Id. This exception permits reversal only when there has been a blatant violation of basic principles that denies a defendant fundamental due process. Pinkins v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1079 (Ind.Ct.App.2003),

trans. denied. When raising an issue as fundamental error, the defendant bears the burden of proving that such a violation occurred, which rendered the trial unfair. Id. In determining whether an alleged error rendered a trial unfair, we must consider whether the resulting harm or potential for harm is substantial. Myers v. State, 718 N.E.2d 783 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). We look to the totality of the circumstances and decide whether the error had a substantial influence upon the outcome. Id.

As Caron correctly observes, proof that a juror lied on voir dire generally entitles the defendant to a new trial. See Lopez v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind. 1988)

; see also Dickenson v. State, 732 N.E.2d 238, 241 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) ("[i]t is misconduct for a juror to make false statements in response to questions on voir dire examination, and such is held to constitute reversible error because it impairs the right to challenge the juror, either peremptorily or for cause"). A defendant seeking a hearing on juror misconduct must initially present some specific, substantial evidence showing a juror was possibly biased. Dickenson v. State, 732 N.E.2d 238. In order for juror misconduct to warrant a new trial, the defendant must show that the misconduct was gross and that it probably harmed the defendant. Carr v. State, 728 N.E.2d 125 (Ind.2000).

Caron impliedly asserts that his family's letters to the trial court, which were unsworn statements, and his scant testimony during sentencing should serve as substantial proof that Juror Christner lied on voir dire. On the record before us, we cannot agree that Caron has established fundamental error in this regard. Rather, we find it unlikely that Juror Christner provided dishonest answers on voir dire. Of particular note, Caron's own testimony at the sentencing hearing reveals he did not even recall his prior encounters with Juror Christner until after the guilty verdict had been entered against him following a three-day trial. Moreover, the alleged encounters were few in number, limited in nature, and many years earlier. Caron's eleventh-hour, vague recollection of Juror Christner does not establish specific, substantial evidence that Juror Christner lied on voir dire.

Furthermore, our review of the transcript of voir dire reveals Juror Christner was forthcoming in her responses. She was questioned individually and as a member ...