Chupp v. State
| Decision Date | 08 July 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 20A05-0410-CR-578.,20A05-0410-CR-578. |
| Citation | 830 N.E.2d 119 |
| Parties | Ryan C. CHUPP, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
William J. Cohen, Cohen Law Offices, Elkhart, for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.
Appellant-Defendant, Ryan C. Chupp, pleaded guilty to one count of Dealing in Marijuana as a Class C felony.1 Upon appeal, Chupp presents one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court should have applied the doctrine of "sentencing entrapment" when sentencing Chupp.
We affirm.2
The record reveals that during an undercover "sting" investigation, a "cooperating source" working with the Goshen Police Department sold eighteen pounds of marijuana to Chupp. As a result, the State charged Chupp on February 2, 2004 as follows:
"on or about the 27th day of January, 2004, at the County of Elkhart and the State of Indiana, one RYAN C. CHUPP, did then and there knowingly finance the delivery of a quantity of marijuana, having an aggregate weight in excess of ten (10) pounds, to wit: approximately eighteen (18) pounds ...." Appendix at 5.
On May 27, 2004, Chupp pleaded guilty to dealing in marijuana as a Class C felony. At a sentencing hearing held on July 1, 2004, Chupp argued that the amount of marijuana involved should not be considered an "aggravating circumstance elevating his crime from a D[f]elony to a C[f]elony, and that [Chupp]'s sentence should be no more than the 3 year maximum sentence under a D [f]elony" because, according to Chupp, the State "created" the Class C felony by selling Chupp more than ten pounds of marijuana. Appellant's Br. at 1. The trial court rejected this argument and imposed an enhanced sentence of six years incarceration.3 Chupp filed a motion to correct error on September 2, 2004, again requesting that the trial court reduce his sentence. The trial court denied the motion that same day. Chupp then filed a notice of appeal on September 27, 2004.
Upon appeal, Chupp argues that we should adopt the concept of "sentencing entrapment." As explained in Salama v. State, 690 N.E.2d 762, 765 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, some federal courts have authorized sentence reduction "where the defendant `although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped in committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment.'" (quoting United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir.1994)).4 In essence, Chupp claims that although he was predisposed to commit dealing in marijuana, the State entrapped him in purchasing an amount of marijuana in excess of ten pounds. Thus, Chupp argues, the trial court should have sentenced him as if he had been convicted of a Class D felony.5
The State argues that, by pleading guilty to dealing in marijuana as a Class C felony, Chupp knowingly relinquished any claim that he was entitled to a lesser sentence. Specifically, the State refers to Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind.2004), wherein the court observed that Indiana courts "have long held that plea agreements are in the nature of contracts entered into between the defendant and the State." Here, the trial court explained at length to Chupp the consequences of his guilty plea. The trial court specifically advised Chupp regarding the possible punishment he would face by explaining to him that he was pleading guilty to a Class C felony and reading the sentencing statute for Class C felonies, Indiana Code § 35-50-2-6. Chupp stated that he understood these advisements and answered in the affirmative when asked if he "committed the offense as alleged in the charge filed against [him] in this court." Tr. at 11.
To accept Chupp's argument would be to allow him to escape the known consequences of a voluntary "Alford plea."6 There is abundant case authority in Indiana precluding acceptance of a guilty plea when at the same time the defendant asserts his innocence. See Carter v. State, 739 N.E.2d 126 (Ind.2000); Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420 (Ind.1983). Nevertheless, our courts have acknowledged that a defendant might legitimately wish to admit guilt to a lesser offense in order to avoid going to trial on the greater charge risking conviction and a much more severe penalty. In Trueblood v. State, 587 N.E.2d 105, 108 (Ind.1992), cert denied 506 U.S. 897, 113 S.Ct. 278, 121 L.Ed.2d 205, Chief Justice Shepard, speaking for our Supreme Court, noted that defendants should have the option
Be that as it may, Chupp would have us hold that a defendant may knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently admit guilt to a higher class of felony, yet somehow be entitled to be sentenced as if he had committed a lesser class of felony. In other words, although Chupp knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently admitted to dealing in over ten pounds of marijuana, he now argues that he should be sentenced as if the amount involved were not more than ten pounds. We reject such reasoning. If Chupp believed that the State somehow manipulated the circumstances surrounding his conviction, he had the choice to either be bound by a knowing and voluntary plea or to challenge the police conduct at a trial.7
Upon appeal, Chupp acknowledges the contractual nature of the plea agreement but claims that due process principles supercede any contractual obligations. Chupp refers to Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976), for the proposition that there may be some occasions when police involvement in criminal activity could reach such proportions as to bar conviction of even a predisposed defendant. While Justice Powell's concurring opinion does support such concept, see id. at 493-94, 96 S.Ct. 1646, the leading plurality opinion in Hampton undercuts Chupp's position by holding that the defendant's conceded predisposition rendered the defense of entrapment unavailable to him. See id. at 489-90, 96 S.Ct. 1646. Chupp also refers to Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), wherein the Court overturned the defendant's conviction which was supported by evidence resulting from police conduct involving illegally breaking into the defendant's room, struggling to force open his mouth, removing what was there, and forcibly extracting his stomach contents. We note that neither Hampton nor Rochin involved the terms of plea agreements. In any event, we acknowledge that due process concerns might, under some circumstances, allow a defendant to challenge the terms of his plea agreement. Cf. Lee, 816 N.E.2d at 38 (). Nevertheless, accepting Chupp's version of the events as true, the police conduct here did not reach the levels of over-involvement referred to by Justice Powell in Hampton or the "outrageous" conduct involved in Rochin.
Chupp also cites United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 858, 117 S.Ct. 158, 136 L.Ed.2d 102, claiming that due process bars the government from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction where the State causes a defendant initially predisposed to commit a lesser crime to commit a more serious crime. However, Garcia does not support Chupp's contentions. In that case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's claim of sentencing entrapment, or as it referred to the concept, "sentencing manipulation," by holding that "there is no defense of sentencing manipulation in this circuit." Id. at 76. More importantly, the court rejected the defendant's claim that his constitutional rights were violated, stating, "A suspect has no constitutional right to be arrested when the police have probable cause." Id. Garcia simply does not support Chupp's argument.
Chupp also refers to Lee, supra, wherein the defendant claimed that the sentence he received pursuant to his guilty plea was illegal, and his guilty plea was therefore void. 816 N.E.2d at 36. Lee, however, was challenging the validity of the plea itself, not just the sentence he received.8 Id. Because this is an appeal from a guilty plea, Chupp may not now challenge the validity of his plea. See Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ind.1996).
We therefore view Chupp's challenge as one to the sentencing discretion of the trial court, i.e. that the trial court should have exercised its discretion and imposed a sentence that, although still authorized for a Class C felony, was also within the statutory range of sentencing for a Class D felony. The trial court found three mitigators: that Chupp was young — twenty seven years old, that Chupp was addicted to drugs, and that Chupp accepted responsibility for his criminal activities. The trial court also found several aggravators: that Chupp was on probation when he committed the instant offense, that Chupp had a criminal record consisting of two misdemeanors and one prior felony conviction, that Chupp had failed to appear for court hearings in the past, that Chupp's past behavior indicated a disregard for the law, and that prior leniency had been unsuccessful in deterring Chupp's criminal behavior. The trial court also found as an aggravating circumstance that Chupp, although in arrears for child support, had $11,200 in cash when arrested.9 Based on its balancing of these aggravators and mitigators, the trial court enhanced Chupp's sentence by two years, for a sentence of six years on the C felony conviction. See I.C. § 35-50-2-6(a).
Although Chupp made no argument in his appellant's brief or his reply brief that the trial court violated the rule set forth in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), reh'g denied, Chupp...
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