Carone v. Mascolo
| Decision Date | 07 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:06CV01094 (DJS).,3:06CV01094 (DJS). |
| Citation | 573 F.Supp.2d 575 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Ann CARONE, Plaintiff, v. Maryanne MASCOLO, Cathy A. Goodrich, James Freund, and Thomas Petruny, Defendants. |
John R. Williams, Katrena K. Engstrom, John R. Williams and Associates, LLC, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff.
Stephen M. Sedor, Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson & Cortese-Costa PC, Bridgeport, CT, for Defendants.
The plaintiff, Ann Carone ("Carone") brings the present action against the defendants, Maryanne Mascolo, Cathy A. Goodrich, James Freund, and Thomas Petruny (collectively, "the Defendants"), alleging violations of her rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and under Connecticut common law. Specifically, Carone alleges that the Defendants (1) retaliated against Carone for exercising her First Amendment free speech rights; (2) violated Carone's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection; (3) violated Carone's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights; (4) violated Carone's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights; and (5) engaged in conduct amounting to intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment (dkt. # 32) pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ.P."), arguing that there exists no issue of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all claims. The Defendants have also filed a motion to strike (dkt. # 45) portions of Carone's Local Rule 56(a)(2) statement, portions of Carone's memorandum of law in opposition to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and affidavits submitted by Carone in support of her opposition to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Defendants' motion to strike (dkt. # 45) is DENIED, and the Defendants' motion for summary judgment (dkt. # 32) is GRANTED.
The Defendants move to strike several portions of Carone's submissions. Specifically, the Defendants assert that: (1) several denials in Carone's response to the Defendants' Local Rule 56(a)(1) statement are unsupported by admissible evidence; (2) several statements in Carone's affidavit contradict her deposition statement, are unsupported by personal knowledge or are otherwise inadmissible; (3) several statements in the affidavit of Marlene Pudim contain inadmissible evidence or conclusory allegations; and (4) portions of Carone's memorandum of law misstate the record, present no evidentiary support, or conflict with Carone's deposition testimony. Carone did not file an opposition to the Defendants' motion to strike.
The undersigned has recently expressed his disapproval of filing motions to strike during the summary judgment process, noting that "in the context of summary judgment, motions to strike are unnecessary and produce only redundant statements by the court that it has not relied on such inadmissible evidence in deciding the summary judgment motion." Martin v. Town of Westport, 558 F.Supp.2d 228, 231-32 (D.Conn.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The parties to an action "should have faith . . . that the court knows the difference between admissible and non-admissible evidence, and would not base a summary judgment decision simply upon the self-serving ipse dixit of a particular party." Id. "If a party wishes to argue that an asserted material fact is not supported by the evidence, that party may do so in its summary judgment briefing." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, as in Martin, the court sees no need to "strike" any portions of the plaintiffs submissions which may not be admissible because "Local Rule 56(a) requires a court to consider only those statements of fact that are supported by the evidence." Id. Consequently, the Defendants' motion to strike (dkt.# 45) is DENIED.
Despite having denied the Defendants' motion to strike, the court notes that the Defendants have pointed to several deficiencies in the materials submitted by Carone. First, there are deficiencies in Carone's responses to the Defendants' Local Rule 56(a)(1) statement. Local Rule 56(a)(3) requires the party opposing a motion for summary judgment to follow each denial in their Rule 56(a)(2) statement "by a specific citation to (1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at trial and/or (2) evidence that would be admissible at trial." D. Conn. Loc. Civ. R. 56(a)(3). The Second Circuit has accordingly noted that Vt. Teddy Bear Co., Inc. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir.2004). This principle also applies to those materials submitted by the non-moving party in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Knight v. Hartford Police Dept., No. 3:04 CV 969(PCD), 2006 WL 1438649, at *6 (); Henton v. City of New London, No. 3:06 CV 2035(EBB), 2008 WL 2185933, at *5 (same).
The Defendants allege that Carone's denials for paragraphs 9, 10, 27 and 45 are not supported by the evidence to which they cite. The Defendants argue that the specific statements with which Carone disagrees are drawn directly from Carone's own deposition and that Carone's disagreements themselves are unsupported by the record. Upon review of the record, the court agrees with the Defendants. In addition, Carone's response to paragraph 45 was not a disagreement with the stated facts, but with the manner in which the facts contained therein were presented. In this regard, the court observes that Giglio v. Derman, 560 F.Supp.2d 163, 166-67 (D.Conn.2008). As such, the Defendants' statements in paragraphs 9, 10, 27 and 45 will be deemed admitted.
The Defendants also allege deficiencies in Carone's denials to paragraphs 42, 58 and 60 because they are not actual disagreements with the Defendants' statements, but instead seek to explain, or contextualize, the Defendants' statements. "When a party fails to appropriately deny material facts set forth in the movant's Rule 56(a)(1) statement, those facts are deemed admitted." Knight, 2006 WL 1438649, at *4 (citing SEC v. Global Telecom Servs. L.L.C., 325 F.Supp.2d 94, 109 (D.Conn.2004)). As such, paragraphs 42, 58 and 60 will be deemed admitted to the record.
The Defendants also allege deficiencies in Carone's denials to paragraphs 31, 34 and 46 because they are inconsistent with submitted deposition testimony. The court agrees with regard to responses 34 and 46, and as such, the underlying statements will be deemed admitted. The court notes, however, that the Defendants' own paragraph 31 misinterprets the record. Defendants' paragraph 31 asserts that "Ms. Mascolo, Mr. Petruny, and Mr. Freund were not involved in the decision to issue the December 14, 2005 letter of reprimand," citing to page 85 of Carone's deposition testimony. (Defs' Rule 56(a)(1) Statement ¶ 31.) Carone's testimony reveals that she did not know whether or not Mascolo, Petruny, and Freund were involved. (Carone Dep. at 85.) The court will therefore not consider the Defendants' paragraph 31 in ruling on the underlying motion for summary judgment.
The Defendants also allege deficiencies in Carone's denial to paragraph 56 because it is not a proper denial. Paragraph 56 states that: (1) Carone did not visit her physician or treating nurse, Joanne Priolo, prior to taking herself out of work on May 16, 2006; (2) Carone's last visit to her nurse was on May 9, 2006, during which she did not discuss work; and (3) Carone's next visit to her nurse, during which she did not discuss work, was after the school year ended, on July 12, 2006. Although Carone's denial does not refute the fact Carone did not visit Nurse Priolo prior to taking herself out of work, or that Carone later visited Nurse Priolo, the Defendants' assertions that work was not discussed during Carone's visits to Nurse Priolo are unsupported by the record. Thus, the court shall not consider that portion of the Defendants' statement in ruling on the underlying motion for summary judgment.
The Defendants also allege deficiencies in Carone's denial to paragraph 59 because it is not in fact a proper denial of the Defendants' statement. Paragraph 59 asserts that Maryanne Mascolo sent a letter to Nurse Priolo inquiring about Carone's ability to return to work. Although the court agrees that Carone's denial is not proper, the Defendants' statement is inaccurate in stating that the second letter was sent to Nurse Priolo. The cited evidence shows that the second letter was sent to a Dr. Michael Olsen, not Nurse Priolo. (See Def.'s Exhibit Q.) The court will therefore not consider that portion of the Defendants' statement in ruling on the underlying motion for summary judgment.
The Defendants also challenge certain passages in Carone's affidavit as contradicting her deposition statement, unsupported by personal...
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