In re Gail K. BUGNACKI

• Decision Date: 01 September 2010
• Docket Number: Adversary No. 08-3078.,Bankruptcy No. 08-30755 (ASD).
• Citation: 439 B.R. 12
• Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: In re Gail K. BUGNACKI, Debtor. Carol M. Rzasa, as Executrix of the Estate of Irene V. Kozlowski, Plaintiff v. Gail K. Bugnacki, Defendant.

439 B.R. 12

In re Gail K. BUGNACKI, Debtor.Carol M. Rzasa, as Executrix of the Estate of Irene V. Kozlowski, Plaintiff

v.Gail K. Bugnacki, Defendant.

Bankruptcy No. 08-30755 (ASD).

Adversary No. 08-3078.

United States Bankruptcy Court,D. Connecticut.

Sept. 1, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Kathleen M. LaManna, Esq., Shipman & Goodwin, LLP, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Heidi J. Alexander, Esq., Alexander Law Offices, LLC, Middletown, CT, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ALBERT S. DABROWSKI, Bankruptcy Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

In this adversary proceeding the Plaintiff, Carol M. Rzasa, as Executrix of the Estate of Irene V. Kozlowski, seeks to have declared non-dischargeable a debt owed to the decedent by the Debtor-Defendant. The Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment based upon the alleged preclusive effect of a prior judgment rendered by default in the Superior Court for the State of Connecticut. For the reasons which follow, the motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED IN PART.

II. JURISDICTION

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over the instant proceeding by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b); and this Court derives its authority to hear and determine this matter on reference from the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), (b)(1). This is a “core proceeding” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(1).

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 11, 2008, Gail K. Bugnacki (hereafter, the “Debtor,” “Defendant,” or “Debtor-Defendant”) commenced the instant bankruptcy case, In re Bugnacki, Case No. 08-30755, by the filing of a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. On April 30, 2008, this Court dismissed the Debtor's bankruptcy case based upon certain deficiencies. On May 1, 2008, the Connecticut Superior Court re-entered a Civil Action Judgment against the Debtor-Defendant in Carol M. Rzasa, as Executrix of the Estate of Irene V. Kozlowski v. Gail Bugnacki.(Docket No. MMX-06-CV-4006333-S). ¹ On May 21, 2008, this Court vacated the April 30, 2008 dismissal order, but denied a motion filed by the Debtor to reinstate the automatic stay of Section 362(a) retroactive to April 30, 2008, leaving the re-entered Civil Action Judgment intact with full force and effect. See Order on Motion to Vacate Court Order, and to Reinstate Automatic Stay, Relating Back, ECF No. 43. The Debtor received a discharge on October 14, 2008.

On June 9, 2008, the Plaintiff commenced the instant adversary proceeding (Adversary Proceeding No. 08-3078) against the Debtor-Defendant to determine the dischargeability of the debt arising from the Civil Action Judgment (hereafter, the “Debt”). Specifically, in her Complaint to Determine Non-Dischargeability of Debt (hereafter, the “Complaint”), the Plaintiff asserts that the Debt should be deemed non-dischargeable pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A) (Count One), 523(a)(4) (Count Two), and 523(a)(6) (Count Three).

On December 19, 2008, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter, the “Motion”), ECF No. 32, and thereby commenced the instant contested matter. In the Motion the Plaintiff asserts that each of the Complaint's claims for nondischargeability have “been conclusively resolved by the Connecticut Superior Court”. Motion at 1. Specifically, the Plaintiff directs the Court's attention to numerous determinations of the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut in the Civil Action claimed by the Plaintiff to include findings of fact entitled to preclusive effect in the present matter and dispositive of the Complaint.

The Motion was accompanied by a Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement, with Exhibits attached (including, inter alia, the above referenced Civil Action Judgment and the related Civil Action Memorandum of Decision (Aurigemma, J.), ECF No. 34, and a Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 33). The Debtor responded by filing an Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter, the “Objection”), ECF No. 50, accompanied by a Brief in Support of Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 51, exhibits and affidavits related thereto, ECF Nos. 52-57, and a Local Rul (sic) 56(a) (sic) Statement, ECF No. 58. The Motion is now ripe for resolution.

IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), made applicable to these proceedings by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056, directs that summary judgment enter when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Novak v. Blonder (In re Blonder), 246 B.R. 147, 150 (Bankr.D.Conn.2000) (internal citations omitted).

When ruling on motions for summary judgment “the judge's function is not ... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.

Id., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court, in deciding a summary judgment motion, “cannot try issues of fact, but can only determine whether there are issues of fact to be tried.” R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir.1984) (quoting Empire Electronics Co. v. United States, 311 F.2d 175, 179 (2d Cir.1962)).

The moving party has the burden of showing that there are no material facts in dispute and all reasonable inferences are to be drawn, and all ambiguities resolved, in favor of the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (superceded on other grounds); see also, In re Blonder, 246 B.R. at 150. On a motion for summary judgment, even if the moving party's assertions are accepted as true, such as by failure of the non-movant to adequately respond, the moving party must still demonstrate a prima facie case of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law before the burden shifts to the non-movant to show genuine issues of material fact in dispute. See Vermont Teddy Bear Co. Inc. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 246 (2d Cir.2004). However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 does not place a duty upon the Court to independently traverse the record in a treasure hunt for disputed facts. See Amnesty America. v. Town of W. Hartford, 288 F.3d 467, 470 (2d Cir.2002).

B. Rule 56, Local Rules of Civil Procedure

Local Rule 56(a) of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (hereafter, “Local Rule(s)”) supplements Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) by requiring, inter alia, statements of material fact from each party to a summary judgment motion. ² Under Local Rule 56(a) 1, the material facts set forth in a movant's statement and adequately supported, “will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be filed and served by the opposing party in accordance with Local Rule 56(a) 2.”

The underlying purpose of Local Rule 56(a) is to assist the Court in the efficient determination of motions for summary judgment and thereby conserve limited and valuable judicial resources. Coger v. Connecticut, 309 F.Supp.2d 274, 277 (D.Conn.2004) (“The purpose of [Local] Rule 56 is to aid the court, by directing it to the material facts that the movant claims are undisputed and that the party opposing the motion claims are disputed.”).

V. DISCUSSION

A. The Local Rule 56(a) Statements

Initially, the Court notes that in the Objection the Defendant states, “as the Defendant's Statement of Facts indicates the entire string of assumptions that form the basis of the Plaintiff's complaint are controverted.” Objection at 1-2. ³ In determining whether there are material facts in genuine issue, this Court looks first to the parties' Local Rule 56(a) Statements. For the purposes of this contested matter a comparison of those Statements has produced a body of facts deemed admitted, and therefore uncontested, largely the consequence of the Debtor-Defendant's deficient Local Rule 56(a) 2 Statement.

In the present matter the Plaintiff has complied with the requirements of Local Rule 56(a) 1 and 3. By contrast, the Defendant simply ignores the requisites of Local Rule 56(a) 2, and, through her lack of attention to the Local Rules has deprived the Court of their intended benefit and compounded the Court's burden in fairly and efficiently determining the present motion.

The Defendant's purported Local Rule 56(a) 2 Statement, captioned “Local Rul (sic) 56(a) (sic) Statement” (hereafter, the “Local Rule 56(a) 2 Statement”), fails to comply, in form and in substance, with the requirements of Local Rule 56(a)(2) in several respects. ⁴ The Local Rule 56(a) 2 Statement does not state “in separately numbered paragraphs ... corresponding to the paragraphs contained in the moving party's Local Rule 56(a) 1 Statement whether each of the facts asserted by the moving party is admitted or denied.” (emphasis supplied). ⁵ Indeed, the numbered paragraphs in the Local Rule 56(a) 2 Statement lack any correspondence whatsoever to the Plaintiff's Local Rule 56(a) 1 Statement. ⁶ Instead, the Local Rule 56(a) 2 Statement merely provides the Defendant's version of material facts she deems of import without any attempted correlation to the Local...