Carothers v. Presser, 86-5476
| Decision Date | 12 May 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-5476,86-5476 |
| Parties | 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2225, 260 U.S.App.D.C. 277, 55 USLW 2633, 106 Lab.Cas. P 12,381 William J. CAROTHERS, et al. v. Jackie PRESSER, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, (Civil Action No. 85-02645).
Gary S. Witlen, with whom Joseph E. Santucci, Washington, D.C., and Paul S. Lefkowitz, Cleveland, Ohio, were on the brief, for appellants.
Paul Alan Levy, with whom Alan B. Morrison and Arthur L. Fox II, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellees.
Before WALD, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and D.H. GINSBURG, Circuit judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HARRY T. EDWARDS.
In this case, we are called upon to decide whether section 101(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA" or "Act"), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411(a) (1982), affords union members a "right of access" to their union's mailing list for the purpose of disseminating their views on a contract proposal submitted to the membership for ratification. 1 The plaintiffs-appellees are three members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America ("Teamsters" or "Union") who belong to dissident groups within the Teamsters known as Teamsters for a Democratic Union ("TDU") and the Carhaul Coordinating Committee ("CCC"). 2 Anxious to express their opposition to a proposed collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the Union leadership, the appellees asked the Union to provide them with "access" 3 to the addresses of all Union members covered by the proposed agreement. The Union refused, prompting the present litigation.
In their initial complaint against the Union and its General President, Jackie Presser, the appellees sought a temporary restraining order suspending a vote on the proposed contract until such time as the Union provided access to its mailing list. The District Court, per Judge Oberdorfer, denied the temporary restraining order. See Carothers v. Presser, No. 85-2645, slip op. (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1985), reprinted in Record Excerpts ("R.E.") 31-33. The voting proceeded and the contract was ratified by the Union membership.
The appellees subsequently filed an amended complaint seeking two forms of permanent relief. First, they sought a declaration that the appellants had violated section 101(a) of the LMRDA by denying their request for access to the Union mailing list. 4 Second, they sought an injunction requiring the appellants, in the future, to provide access to the list to any Union member interested in disseminating his views on a contract submitted to the membership for ratification.
Concluding that a "right of access" to a union's mailing list "may be found" under section 101(a), the District Court, per Judge Gasch, granted both forms of relief requested by the appellees. See Carothers v. Presser, 636 F.Supp. 817, 827-28 (D.D.C.1986). First, the court declared that the appellants had violated subsections 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2) by denying the appellees' request for access to the mailing list. Second, the court enjoined the appellants to permit access to the list in the future to any Union member interested in expressing his opposition to a contract proposal submitted to the national membership for ratification.
We conclude that the District Court erred in finding that the denial of access to a union's mailing list, standing alone, is a "violation" of the LMRDA, or, in other words, that the LMRDA affords union members an absolute "right of access" to their union's mailing list. We find that access to a union's mailing list may only be granted in appropriate circumstances as a remedy for an independent violation of the statute. In the instant case, the District Court failed to identify with particularity an independent violation of the statute that would entitle the appellees to any relief under the LMRDA, much less to a sweeping injunction that requires the appellants to make the addresses of Union members accessible to any dissident member who asserts an interest in commenting on a proposed contract. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court.
The appellees are three members of the Teamsters who belong to two dissident groups within their Union--the TDU and the CCC. The appellees' principal work--referred to as "carhauling"--involves transporting automobiles and other vehicles by truck to various locations across the country. As "carhaulers," the appellees' terms of employment are governed by the National Automobile Transporters Agreement ("NATA").
The NATA is a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement that governs relations between 100 Teamsters locals and 39 employers. It consists of a master agreement setting certain wages and working conditions on a nationwide basis, and a series of supplemental agreements establishing certain terms of employment by region and job classification. The contract is normally negotiated at three-year intervals by the Teamsters' negotiating committee, which, in accordance with the Union constitution, submits negotiated agreements to the entire national membership for ratification. Under the Union's interpretation of its constitution--upheld against legal challenge in Davey v. Fitzsimmons, 413 F.Supp. 670 (D.D.C.1976)--the master agreement and all supplementals are voted on by the entire membership as a single package. The Union's usual practice, however, is to send each member a ballot packet containing only the master agreement and the one supplemental agreement governing that member's region and job classification.
The events giving rise to this litigation began in June of 1985 when a proposed contract was submitted to the membership for ratification. The TDU and the CCC disseminated a significant amount of literature urging Union members to vote against ratification. The Union, on the other hand, included a notice in its ballot packet urging members to vote in favor of the contract. The contract proposal was defeated by a vote of approximately four to one.
A strike ensued, and the Union returned to the bargaining table in an attempt to reach an acceptable agreement. Before negotiations on a new agreement had been completed, the appellees requested "access" to the Union's mailing list for the purpose of communicating their expected opposition to the forthcoming agreement. 5 The appellees proposed to distribute their literature in much the same way as the Union distributes its materials to the membership--through an independent mailing service 6--and they agreed to assume the full cost of the mailing.
The Union rejected the appellees' request, asserting that it was not legally obligated to provide access to the list because it did not intend to include a letter in its second ballot packet urging ratification of the agreement. Because the Union had by this time negotiated a new agreement and prepared a second ballot packet, the appellees filed suit in District Court seeking a temporary restraining order prohibiting the Union from conducting the vote until access to the mailing list was provided. Judge Oberdorfer, sitting as motions judge, refused to issue a restraining order, citing the apparent availability of alternative means of communication and the need to avoid disruption of collective bargaining in an important national industry. See Carothers v. Presser, No. 85-2645, slip op. (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1985), reprinted in R.E. 31-33. The voting proceeded and the contract was ratified by a vote of 8,792 to 6,808.
The appellees subsequently amended their complaint to request a declaration that the Union had violated section 101(a) of the LMRDA by denying their request for access, and an injunction compelling the Union to provide such access in future ratification votes. On cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge Gasch ruled in favor of the appellees and issued an order granting both declaratory and injunctive relief. See Carothers v. Presser, 636 F.Supp. 817 (D.D.C.1986). 7 This appeal followed.
We begin our analysis with a proposition that we regard as self-evident from the unambiguous statutory language; namely, that section 101(a) of the LMRDA does not grant union members an absolute "right of access" to their union's mailing list. As the District Court recognized, the " 'overriding objective' " of the LMRDA is to ensure that unions will be " 'democratically governed'." 636 F.Supp. at 822 (quoting Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 441, 102 S.Ct. 1867, 1873, 72 L.Ed.2d 239 (1982)). However, in enacting the LMRDA, Congress did not leave courts without guidance in defining this concept of "democracy" in the union setting, for the statute sets forth certain specific regulations governing internal union affairs. In other words, "democracy" under the LMRDA is not merely a boundless ideal to be defined by the whim of any dissident voice; rather, the statutory notion of internal union democracy is precisely limited by the scope of the protections codified by Congress in the LMRDA.
When unions violate the specific statutory proscriptions established by Congress, section 102 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 412 (1982), grants district courts broad discretion to fashion appropriate relief. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 10-11, 93 S.Ct. 1943, 1948-1949, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973). However, before granting relief, courts must first identify the specific statutory right that has been infringed. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 412 (1982) (); Mallick v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 749 F.2d 771, 786 (D.C.Cir.1984) (...
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