Carpenter v. Calvert

• Decision Date: 30 September 1876
• Citation: 1876 WL 10290,83 Ill. 62
• Parties: RACHEL ANN CARPENTER et al.v.JOSEPHINE CALVERT.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

83 Ill. 62

1876 WL 10290 (Ill.)

RACHEL ANN CARPENTER et al.

v.JOSEPHINE CALVERT.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1876.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Henry county; the Hon. GEORGE W. PLEASANTS, Judge, presiding.

Mr. LEVI NORTH, and Mr. GEO. W. SHAW, for the appellants.

Mr. E. C. MODERWELL, and Mr. CHARLES DUNHAM, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE DICKEY delivered the opinion of the Court:

Lydia W. Nandain, a resident of Geneseo, Illinois, died at Philadelphia, July 6, 1873, leaving as her last will an instrument, which was admitted to probate on the 20th of October, 1873.

Mrs. Nandain, at the time of her death, was about 75 years of age. She was married in 1831 to John Burnham, and, after his death, was married to Dr. Thomas Nandain, in 1836, with whom she lived until December 21, 1872, when he died.

Some fourteen years before her first marriage to Burnham, Mrs. Nandain, whose maiden name was Lydia W. Hough, being unmarried, became a mother, and the child was called Josephine Hough. This child afterwards became the wife of Dr. Calvert. Mrs. Nandain had no other children.

By this will of Mrs. Nandain, her house and lot in Geneseo, and furniture, were devised to her niece, Rachel Ann Carpenter; her wardrobe and jewelry were bequeathed to Jemima W. Carpenter, Lizzie C. Hall and Rachel Ann Carpenter, to be divided as her niece, Rachel, and her daughter, Josephine Calvert, should direct. To her daughter, Josephine Calvert, she gave $300; to her grandson, Harry Calvert, $300; to her granddaughter, Mrs. Elizabeth Gender, $300; to her nephew, James Walter, $300; to Mrs. Sarah Granger, $100; to Jemima Carpenter, $300; to Lizzie C. Hall, $300; to Sally C. Worth, $300; to Edward G. Carpenter, $300, and to Frank G. Carpenter, $300.

In her will, the testatrix expressed the hope that Mrs. Jemima Carpenter and family should come to Geneseo and reside at the homestead left to her niece. By this will, the residue of her property is left to Rachel Ann Carpenter. George W. Shaw and W. Sanford were appointed executors.

Josephine Calvert filed her bill in chancery in the circuit court of Henry county, seeking to set aside this will. The bill charges that Mrs. Nandain, before and at the time of the execution of the will, was partially insane, not of sound mind and in her dotage, and so weak and feeble in mind as to be incapable of making a proper disposition of her property, and that she was so much under the influence of pain and narcotics that her faculties were stupefied, and she was subject to be unduly influenced against her friends, and subject to insane and morbid delusions, of which the will was the result. The bill further charges that Rachel Ann Carpenter, her niece, stimulated such delusions, and resorted to falsehood, threats, promises and misrepresentations to induce Mrs. Nandain to execute the will, and that the will was executed under the influence of undue restraint from such threats, and so forth.

Appellants were made defendants, and filed answers, admitting the death of Mrs. Nandain, the execution and probate of the will and the issuing of letters testamentary, but denying all allegations in the bill tending to invalidate the will.

A general replication was filed, and the issues thus formed were tried by a jury at the October term, A. D. 1875. A verdict was rendered against appellants, finding the supposed will of no validity. A motion for a new trial was denied, and thereupon it was decreed by the court that the instrument in writing purporting to be the last will and testament of Lydia W. Nandain, and all proceedings under the same, are null and void. To reverse this decree this appeal is brought.

After a most careful and thorough consideration of the evidence, which is very voluminous, we find no proof tending to charge Mrs. Rachel Ann Carpenter with any improper conduct towards her aunt, the testatrix. The charge, therefore, that the will was the result of undue influence exercised by her, is entirely without support.

The only question of fact which is open to debate upon this record is, whether, at the time of the execution of this will, the testatrix was of sound mind and memory--in other words, whether she was capable of making a will. On this question the whole controversy depends. The testimony of a great many witnesses was taken upon this subject, and while some of them expressed the opinion that she was of sound mind, and had sufficient capacity to make a will, many others expressed the opinion that she had not at the time the necessary capacity. No person, however, with unbiased mind and with a proper appreciation of what necessary testamentary capacity is, can read with care the whole of this testimony without perceiving that those witnesses who have expressed opinions against the testamentary capacity of the testatrix have done so under a great misapprehension as to the degree of mental capacity essential to that end. For instance, Dr. Pomeroy says he does not think she had mind enough to make a will, but explains his views by saying he thinks sufficient capacity to make a will requires a clear understanding and a steady will. He says she might, in the main, know what property she had well enough, and presumes she had capacity to know who her daughter and her niece were, but expresses the opinion that she was “hardly competent to make a judicious will.”

The test of capacity in this record, sanctioned by the circuit court upon the trial, is shown by questions which witnesses were permitted to answer against objection, in which the court substantially held that it was essential to testamentary capacity that the testatrix should have had sufficient mental capacity to understand and know the extent of her property, who her relatives were, and what were their claims upon her bounty, and how she wished to dispose of her property, and that she should have had mental capacity to hold all these things in her mind at the same time.

Metaphysically this proposition may not be unsound; but the proposition itself, when submitted to the mind of a witness, or presented to a juror, as the standard or test of testamentary capacity; is calculated to mislead an ordinary mind, and to present a standard far above that which the law really requires.

In Meeker et al. v. Meeker, 75 Ill. 266, it was said, that “a person who is capable of transacting ordinary business is also capable of making a valid will. It is not required that he shall possess a higher capacity for that than for the transaction of the ordinary affairs of life. A man capable of buying and selling property, settling accounts, collecting and paying out money, or borrowing or loaning money, must usually be regarded as capable of making a valid disposition of his property by will. The rule is the same in the case of a sale of property and its disposition by will, and the usual test is, that the party be capable of acting rationally in the ordinary affairs of life.”

This doctrine, thus laid down by this court, is referred to with approbation in the opinion of the court, in Rutherford et al. v. Morris et al. 77 Ill. 410, and that important case was...