Carpenter v. City of Little Rock
| Decision Date | 11 December 1911 |
| Citation | 142 S.W. 162 |
| Parties | CARPENTER et al. v. CITY OF LITTLE ROCK. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Actions by J. W. Carpenter and another against the City of Little Rock. From a judgment dismissing the complaint in each case, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
J. W. Carpenter instituted an action in the Pulaski chancery court against the city of Little Rock, in which he sought to enjoin the enforcement of a milk ordinance. His complaint alleges, in substance: That he is a citizen and taxpayer of Pulaski county and is a dairyman selling milk in the city of Little Rock from his own cows. That the city council passed ordinance No. 1,711, entitled "An ordinance to protect the health of the citizens of Little Rock by providing for milk and dairy inspection, and providing a penalty for violation, and for other purposes." That said ordinance is unreasonable. That it is a revenue measure. That it takes property without due process of law and is in violation of the statutory laws of the state.
J. H. Bilby instituted a similar action against the city, alleging: That he is a producer of domestic meats which he sells in the city, and that as such he is not subject to be licensed, hindered, interfered with, or obstructed in regard to the sale thereof. That the meat inspection ordinance passed by the city council, and of which he complains, was beyond the power of the city to enact. The ordinance in question is No. 1,706, and is entitled "An ordinance to protect the health of the citizens of Little Rock by prohibiting the sale of contaminated foods, providing for the inspection of all meats and other articles of food and fixing a penalty for violation." The prayer of his complaint is for an injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance.
The city filed an answer in each case, in which it admitted the passage of the ordinance in question, and that plaintiffs were, respectively, a milk producer and meat dealer, selling their products in the city. Each answer alleged that the ordinance was passed for the sole purpose of protecting and promoting the health of the citizens of Little Rock, and that the fees and expenses mentioned therein were imposed to pay for the expenses incurred in enforcing said ordinance and carrying out its provisions. Each answer also denied that the ordinance was unreasonable, or that it was passed for the purpose of revenue, or that it was beyond the power of the city council to pass the same.
The plaintiff in each case demurred to the answer, on the ground that the city had no power to pass the ordinance in question and because it conflicted with the provisions of an act of the General Assembly of the state of Arkansas approved May 31, 1911, and entitled "An act to protect producers in selling their products in the state of Arkansas."
The court overruled the demurrer in each case, and, the plaintiff in each case electing to stand on his demurrer, his complaint was dismissed for want of equity. The cases are here on appeal.
Carmichael, Brooks & Powers, for appellants. Harry C. Hale, H. M. Armistead, and Ashley Cockrill, for appellee.
HART, J. (after stating the facts as above).
These two cases were submitted by consent upon the same abstracts and briefs, and considered by the court at the same time.
Section 5461 of Kirby's Digest, commonly known as the "general welfare clause," gives to municipal corporations the power to make and publish such by-laws and ordinances, not inconsistent with the laws of the state, as to them shall seem necessary to provide for the safety, preserve the health, etc., of such corporations and the inhabitants thereof.
Section 5648 of Kirby's Digest provides that, in order to better provide for the public welfare, comfort, and convenience of their inhabitants, certain enlarged and additional powers are conferred upon cities of the first class.
Subdivision 4 of the section authorizes such cities "to prevent or regulate the carrying on of any trade, business or vocation of a tendency dangerous to morals, health or safety."
The importance of securing to a community pure and wholesome food has led to the very general enactment of statutes and ordinances regulating the sale of such products. Impure and adulterated foods, especially milk and meats, are a prolific source of disease and a menace to the public health. Therefore it is generally held that ordinances regulating the sale of milk and fresh meats are a valid exercise of the police power delegated to cities to protect health and prevent fraud. Many of the authorities on the subject are cited by counsel for appellee in their briefs, and many more will be found in the case notes to the following: City of St. Louis v. Liessing (Mo.) 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 918, 4 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 112; Commonwealth v. Wheeler (Mass.) 18 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 319; New Orleans v. Charouleau (La.) 15 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 46; City of St. Louis v. Schuler (Mo.) 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 928; City of St. Louis v. Grafeman Dairy Co., 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 936; North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago et al., 211 U. S. 306, 29 Sup. Ct. 101, 53 L. Ed. 195, 15 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 276.
But counsel for appellants contend that the power delegated to cities to enact such ordinances under the sections of the statute above referred to was taken away by the passage of Act No. 372 by the General Assembly of 1911. The act reads as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Carpenter v. Little Rock
... ... Appeal ... from Pulaski Chancery Court; John E. Martineau, Chancellor; ... affirmed ... STATEMENT ... BY THE COURT ... J. W ... Carpenter instituted an action in the Pulaski Chancery Court ... against the city of Little Rock, in which he sought to enjoin ... the enforcement of a milk ordinance. His complaint alleges in ... substance that he is a citizen and taxpayer of Pulaski ... County, and is a dairyman selling milk in the city of Little ... Rock from his own cows. That the city council passed ... ...