Carpenter v. US
| Decision Date | 13 July 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-S-82-208-PMP.,CV-S-82-208-PMP. |
| Citation | 710 F. Supp. 747 |
| Parties | Shauna CARPENTER and Dennis Bailey, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America; Nevada Power Company, a Nevada Corporation; Coast Catamaran Corp., a California Corporation; Coleman Company, Inc., a Kansas Corporation; and Does I-V, inclusive, Defendants. COAST CATAMARAN CORPORATION, a California Corporation; and Coleman Company, Inc., a Kansas Corporation, Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. CALLVILLE BAY RESORT & MARINA, INC., Del Webb Recreational Properties, Inc., Third-Party Defendants. NEVADA POWER COMPANY, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff, v. CALLVILLE BAY RESORT & MARINA, INC., Del Webb Recreational Properties, Inc., Third-Party Defendants. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff, v. CALLVILLE BAY RESORT & MARINA, INC., Del Webb Recreational Properties, Inc., Third-Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Thomas W. Biggar, Biggar & Shulman, Las Vegas, Nev., for plaintiffs Shauna Carpenter and Dennis Bailey.
Paul G. Sterling, Torts Branch, Civ. Div., San Francisco, Cal., for defendant/third-party plaintiff U.S.
Bruce R. Laxalt and Greg W. Marsh, Las Vegas, Nev., for defendant/third-party plaintiff Nevada Power Co.
Bruce Alverson and David Mortensen, Las Vegas, Nev., and Walt Millar, San Marcos, Cal., for defendant/third-party plaintiff Coast Catamaran Corp. and Coleman Co., Inc.
Richard Desruisseaux and Patrick Murphy, Rawlings, Olson & Cannon, Las Vegas, Nev., for third-party defendants Callville Bay Resort & Marina, Inc. and Del Webb Recreational Properties, Inc.
On April 20, 1980, David Alward, SHAUNA CARPENTER and DENNIS BAILEY rented a sailboat from CALLVILLE BAY RESORT AND MARINA, INC. and DEL WEBB RECREATIONAL PROPERTIES, INC. (CALLVILLE and DEL WEBB). The vessel was a 1980, 16-foot Hobie Cat sailboat with a 27-foot aluminum mast. The vessel was designed, manufactured and distributed by COAST CATAMARAN CORPORATION and COLEMAN COMPANY, INC. (COAST and COLEMAN). While navigating the vessel at the Lake Mead National Recreation area, Plaintiffs sustained personal injuries and damages when the sailboat mast came into contact with an overhead power line which was owned and maintained by NEVADA POWER COMPANY.
On November 26, 1980, Third-Party Defendants CALLVILLE and DEL WEBB filed a petition for limitation of liability pursuant to 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 183-185 ().
On January 13, 1982, and January 15, 1982, after settlement negotiations, Third-Party Defendants CALLVILLE and DEL WEBB obtained full releases from Plaintiffs SHAUNA CARPENTER and DENNIS BAILEY, respectively, for a total amount of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00). On February 8, 1982, a Stipulation and Order of Dismissal was submitted to and signed by Judge Harry Claiborne (See exhibit B, attached to # 126).
On April 8, 1982, Plaintiffs CARPENTER and BAILEY filed a Complaint against Defendants UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NEVADA POWER COMPANY, and COAST CATAMARAN CORPORATION (# 1). On July 23, 1984, Plaintiffs' Complaint was amended to include Defendant COLEMAN COMPANY, INC. (# 53). On June 27, 1986, Defendants COAST and COLEMAN filed a Third-Party Complaint against CALLVILLE and DEL WEBB (# 110). Additional Third-Party Complaints were subsequently filed by NEVADA POWER on July 1, 1986 (# 113), and by the UNITED STATES on December 3, 1986 (# 176).
On July 22, 1986, Third-Party Defendants CALLVILLE and DEL WEBB filed a Motion to Dismiss (# 126). On September 24, 1986, the Honorable Roger D. Foley entered an Order denying this Motion Without Prejudice (# 154).
On October 15, 1986, a settlement conference was held and all Defendants subsequently settled with Plaintiffs. NEVADA POWER paid a total amount of one hundred eighty-five thousand dollars ($185,000.00); the UNITED STATES paid a total amount of sixty-five thousand dollars ($65,000.00); and COAST and COLEMAN jointly paid a total amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00). On January 7, 1987, upon Stipulation of the parties, an Order was entered dismissing this matter, with the exception of the Third-Party Complaints against CALLVILLE and DEL WEBB (# 181).
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on January 22, 1988 (# 205). Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiffs COAST and COLEMAN, NEVADA POWER and the UNITED STATES filed their Oppositions to this Motion on February 18, 1988 (# 209, # 210 and # 211). CALLVILLE and DEL WEBB filed their Reply on March 7, 1988 (# 213).
The Third-Party Complaints basically allege that the Plaintiffs' damages were caused or contributed to by the active and primary negligence, fault and breach of duty of Third-Party Defendants CALLVILLE and DEL WEBB. Third-Party Plaintiffs therefore allege that CALLVILLE and DEL WEBB are liable to them for the amount paid in favor of Plaintiffs, or for an appropriate portion thereof as may be determined by the Court, whether by way of indemnity or contribution recovery or otherwise.
By their Motion for Summary Judgment, Third-Party Defendants CALLVILLE and DEL WEBB state that they have settled with and been released by the Plaintiffs from liability, therefore they are not responsible to the Third-Party Plaintiffs for liability arising by way of contribution. Third-Party Defendants further allege that the complaining Third-Party Plaintiffs are not entitled to indemnity as a matter of law.
Third-Party Plaintiff UNITED STATES adopts and joins in COAST and COLEMAN's Opposition to Third-Party Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter referred to as COAST and COLEMAN, but understood to also include the UNITED STATES). By this Opposition, they allege that this case is not governed by Nevada law, but falls within the Federal Court's Admiralty Jurisdiction. They further argue that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning: (1) whether the amount of CALLVILLE and DEL WEBB's settlement was so disproportionate to their share of comparative liability that it violated the requirements of a good faith settlement; (2) whether the Limitation of Liability statute, 46 U.S.C. App. § 183, has any application to the factual circumstances of Plaintiffs' accident; and (3) whether admiralty law recognizes a right to indemnity as between active and passive tortfeasors.
In its Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Third-Party Plaintiff NEVADA POWER focuses on the issue of whether the settlement between Third-Party Defendants and Plaintiffs was a good faith settlement, and argues that it is entitled to indemnity from CALLVILLE and DEL WEBB.
In Reply to these Oppositions, CALLVILLE and DEL WEBB argue: (1) that they have contributed their proportionate share under the law and the circumstances of this case; (2) that Third-Party Plaintiffs have not raised a sufficient genuine issue of fact concerning the good faith of the settlement to preclude summary judgment; (3) that Third-Party Plaintiffs have no right of indemnity as a matter of law; (4) that insofar as admiralty law is silent on this issue, Federal Courts in admiralty have used the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act; and (5) that a dispute concerning whether the Limitation of Liability Act is applicable does not create a genuine issue of material fact, but only reinforces the position and decision of the attorneys who negotiated the settlement.
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Zoslaw v. MCA Distributing Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir.1982). However, this does not require that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Once the movant's burden is met by presenting evidence which, if uncontroverted, would entitle the movant to a directed verdict at trial, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Richards v. Neilsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir.1987).
"A `material' fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose existence might affect the outcome of the suit." T.W. Elec. Service v. Pacific Elec. Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987). All facts and inferences drawn must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, when determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for summary judgment purposes. Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); State of Idaho v. Hodel, 814 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1987).
Third-Party Plaintiffs COAST and COLEMAN allege that this case falls within the Court's admiralty jurisdiction.
To invoke the federal admiralty jurisdiction in tort cases, the tort must occur on navigable waters and bear a "significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 672-75, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 2656-58, 73 L.Ed.2d 300 (1982); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268, 93 S.Ct. 493, 504, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972).
Complaint of Paradise Holdings, Inc., 795 F.2d 756, 759 (9th Cir.1986). Based on these guidelines and the facts of the instant case, it remains questionable whether admiralty jurisdiction is...
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