Carpenter v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n
| Decision Date | 06 June 1949 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | RICHARD CARPENTER & another v. YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION. |
February 9, 1949.
Present: QUA, C.
J., LUMMUS, RONAN WILKINS, & SPALDING, JJ.
Corporation Charitable corporation. Charity.
A corporate Young Men's Christian Association, supported mainly by contributions, organized for the "purpose of improving the spiritual and mental condition of young men," and subscribing to the declaration that it was a "fellowship of men and boys united . . . for the purpose of developing Christian personality and building a Christian society," could not properly have been found not to be a charitable corporation.
A playground conducted by a charitable Young Men's Christian Association corporation, at which it undertook for moderate dues to care for and supervise the play of children, could not properly be found to have been conducted as a business.
The mere fact, that children of both sexes were admitted to a playground conducted by a charitable Young Men's Christian Association corporation, did not justify a finding that the playground was not an activity falling within the scope of the corporation's purpose of "improving the spiritual and mental condition of young men."
TORT. Writ in the Superior Court dated December 9, 1944. The action was tried before Forte, J.
M. Michelson, for the plaintiffs. R. L. Mapplebeck, for the defendant.
The minor plaintiff, seven years of age, who was hurt at a playground of the defendant, brings this action of tort. There is a count by his father for consequential damages. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, Section 6A inserted by St. 1939, c. 372, Section 1. The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs, but the judge, under leave reserved, entered verdicts for the defendant, and the plaintiffs excepted.
The jury could have found these facts: The defendant owned and operated a playground for children, known as "Y Land," in the Dorchester district of Boston. On August 15, 1944, the minor plaintiff (hereinafter called the plaintiff) was sent to "Y Land" and "entrusted to the defendant." The plaintiff's father paid the defendant fifty cents a week under an agreement by which the defendant undertook to supervise his play and to care for him. The defendant had employees whose duty it was to watch and supervise the children, who were divided into age groups. The children brought their lunches and bought milk (but not of the defendant) at the playground. On the day of the injury the supervisor of the plaintiff's group had lunch with the group about noon and immediately afterwards went away. Thereafter until about 3:30 P.M., the time of the injury, there was no supervisor watching that group, but there were four other supervisors on duty watching other groups. The plaintiff and another boy of his age from his group wandered over to a "stunt bar," five and one half feet high, erected for older children. The plaintiff climbed upon a stool under the bar and, reaching as high as he could, grasped the bar. The other boy removed the stool. The plaintiff hung from the bar, calling in vain for help. Finally, becoming tired and unable longer to maintain his hold, he fell to the ground and broke his leg. The "plaintiff had not been told not to climb up the stunt bar."
The issues are whether there was evidence that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the defendant's negligence and, if so, whether the defendant is exempt as a domestic charitable corporation. On the latter issue there was, in addition to evidence that the defendant paid no real estate taxes, a stipulation, hereinafter summarized, which was read to the jury.
We assume, without deciding, that the plaintiff's injuries could have been found to be due to the defendant's negligence. See Collentine v. New York, 279 N.Y. 119; Howard v. Tacoma School District No. 10, 88 Wash. 167; Holt v. School District No. 71, 102 Wash. 442; Restatement: Torts, Section 320.
We proceed to the question whether the defendant could have been found to be subject to liability for such negligence. Reavey v. Guild of St. Agnes, 284 Mass. 300 , 301-302. See Scott on Trusts, Sections 402, 402.1. Compare Restatement: Trusts, Section 402. The plaintiff does not question the foregoing, but argues that it could have been found that the defendant was not a charitable corporation, or that the playground was conducted as a business, or that operating the playground was not a purpose for which the defendant was organized. We, accordingly, consider those contentions.
The stipulation contained the following: The defendant was incorporated under the name of "Boston Young Men's Christian Association" by St. 1852, c. 73, for the "purpose of improving the spiritual and mental condition of young men with all the powers and privileges, and subject to all the duties, liabilities, and restrictions, set forth in the forty-fourth chapter of the Revised Statutes." The defendant's constitution declares, "In spirit and in practice we conform to the purpose of the Young Men's Christian Associations of the United States of America as expressed in the following statement: `The Young Men's Christian Association we regard as being in its essential genius a world-wide fellowship of men and boys united by a common loyalty to Jesus Christ for the purpose of developing Christian personality and building a Christian society.'" Throughout its corporate existence the defendant has had an annual deficit. It was supported by popular subscriptions until it became an agency of the Greater Boston Community Fund. In 1944 the defendant ran at a loss of $164,629.91, of which $139,920.54 was received from the Community Fund and the balance from incomes from other funds. The Dorchester Branch, with which the playground was connected, ran at a loss of $10,536.55, expenditures being $12,367.01 and income $1,831.46. "Y Land" comprises four and one half acres surrounded by a seven-foot fence. Its activities consist of softball, track, basketball, folk dances, horseshoes, hand ball, movies, clay modeling, painting, paper craft, scrap book, sandbox, circle game, and the horizontal bar in question. No refreshments are sold there by the defendant. "Y Land" has a paid staff, as well as volunteers who serve solely for the experience. The defendant's officers and directors are elected by the members. The directors are unpaid. Each branch has an unpaid board of managers elected by the members of the branch. The dues for membership in the Dorchester Branch are fifty cents weekly for the groups six years of age and under, and aged seven and eight, and for the older girls; $1 a year for boys about twelve years of age; and $2 a year for young people and adults. The summer enrolments in these groups were respectively sixty-six, fifty, forty-eight, thirty, fifty, and two hundred. At the Huntington Avenue...
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