Carr v. Cnty. of Sullivan
| Decision Date | 03 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | 16-CV-06850 (NSR) |
| Parties | JAMES CARR, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SULLIVAN, SULLIVAN COUNTY, SULLIVAN COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, "JOHN Does 1-4," persons employed by SULLIVAN COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, TOWN OF FALLSBURG, TOWN OF FALLSBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, DETECTIVE BRENDAN PAVESE, DETECTIVE TRAVIS HARTMAN, "JOHN DOES 1-4," persons employed by TOWN OF FALLSBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, VILLAGE OF MONTICELLO, VILLAGE OF MONTICELLO POLICE DEPARTMENT, POLICE OFFICER MICHAEL G. DAVIS, "JOHN DOES 1-4," persons employed by VILLAGE OF MONTICELLO POLICE DEPARTMENT, TOWN OF LIBERTY, VILLAGE OF LIBERTY, VILLAGE OF LIBERTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, SERGEANT STEVEN D'AGATA, OFFICER J.T. WUTZ, "JOHN DOES 1-4," persons employed by VILLAGE OF LIBERTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, and NEW YORK STATE TROOPER INVESTIGATOR WILLIAM YOUNG, JR., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff James Carr commenced this action alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 as well as several state law claims against Sullivan County, Sullivan County District Attorney's Office, "John Does 1-4," persons employed by Sullivan County District Attorney's Office (collectively "Sullivan Defendants"), the Town of Fallsburg, Fallsburg Police Department, Detective Brendan Pavese in his personal and official capacity, Detective Travis Hartman in his personal and official capacity, "John Does 1-4," persons employed by Fallsburg Police Department (collectively "Fallsburg Defendants"), the Village of Monticello, Monticello Police Department, "John Does 1-4," persons employed by Monticello Police Department, Sergeant Steven D'Agata in his personal and official capacity, the Town of Liberty, Village of Liberty, Village of Liberty Police Department, Officer J.T. Wutz in his personal and official capacity, Officer Michael G. Davis in his personal and official capacity, "John Does 1-4," persons employed by Village of Liberty Police Department (collectively "Monticello/Liberty Defendants"), and New York State Trooper Investigator William Young, Jr. in his personal and official capacity. (See First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), ECF No. 33.)
Presently before the Court are the Sullivan Defendants', Fallsburg Defendants', and Monticello/Liberty Defendants' motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 41, 44, 51, 52.) Also before the Court is the United States' motion to be substituted as a Defendant and dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (ECF No. 34.) For the following reasons, the Sullivan, Fallsburg, and Monticello/Liberty Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED. The motion to substitute the United States as a Defendant and dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is DENIED as moot.
Following an investigation conducted by Defendants in the Sullivan County area, on or about September 26, 2014, Defendant D'Agata arrested Plaintiff James Carr ("Plaintiff").2 (FAC ¶¶ 20, 21.) While in police custody, Defendants "jointly and collectively created a writtenconfidential informant agreement with Plaintiff."3 (Id. ¶¶ 22, 24.) As part of the agreement Plaintiff made several drug purchases for Defendants which were captured on video by cameras installed on Plaintiff's person and vehicle by the Defendants.4 (Id. ¶¶ 28, 29.) On an unspecified date, and in an unspecified manner, the surveillance videos were "leaked to unauthorized personnel and/or individuals" while allegedly in Defendants' possession, and were somehow posted on Facebook.5 (Id. ¶¶ 31, 32.)
On or about September 16, 2015, Otha Smith, a non-party to this action, approached Plaintiff outside of a bar and allegedly stated "[s]nitches get [s]titches" before slashing Plaintiff in the face, causing Plaintiff to suffer a wound that required sixty sutures. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 34.)
Plaintiff commenced the instant action on September 9, 2016. (ECF No. 6.) On March 29, 2017, Brandon Cowart filed a notice of appearance on behalf of the United States of America as an interested party. (ECF No. 32.) On the same day, this Court held a conference in which Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint on or before May 15, 2017, in order to withdraw several of his state law claims. A motion schedule was also set for Defendants' contemplated motions to dismiss. (See March 29, 2017 Minute Entry.) Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on May 12, 2017 (ECF No. 33). On June 15, 2017, the United States filed a motion to be substituted as a Defendant and dismiss the complaint (ECF No. 59).
To defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when the factual content pleaded permits a court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although legal conclusions can offer a framework for the complaint, "they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679. In considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must take all relevant factual allegations as accurate and draw reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor, but the Court is not required to "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Nor must the Court credit statements which are merely conclusory or "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, a district court must consider the context and "draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.
Plaintiff brings federal claims against all named Defendants, in their official and individual capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under a theory of municipal liability for violations of his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (See FAC ¶¶ 37-53.) Plaintiff also asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights (See FAC ¶¶ 54-63), and 42 U.S.C. § 1986 for "[r]efusing [or] [n]eglecting [to] [p]revent." (See FAC ¶¶ 64-75.) The court considers each claim in turn.
Plaintiff brings his section 1983 claims against both the municipal Defendants and the individual Defendants in their official and individual capacity and alleges a violation of substantive due process under a theory of municipal liability. (See FAC ¶¶ 37-53.)
Section 1983 does not create substantive rights; "it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere." City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). Therefore, Plaintiff's 1983 claims against the officers and the municipalities "depend on a single threshold question: did the [Defendants'] actions violate [Plaintiff's] constitutional rights?" Matican v. City of N.Y., 524 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, (1986) (per curiam)). Otherwise, a section 1983 claim against individuals or municipalities necessarily fails. Id.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to establish liability against any of the municipal Defendants, because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged the existence of an official policy or custom that violates a constitutional right. (See Monticello/Liberty Defs. Mot. to Dismiss at 12; Fallsburg Defs. Mot. to Dismiss at 4; Sullivan Defs. Mot to Dismiss at 12.) The Court agrees.
The language of § 1983 makes clear that "Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." As a result, a municipality "cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor." Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Moreover, it is well-settled that a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees, Barrett v. City of Newburgh, No. 13-Civ-04118, 2014 WL 1092176, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2014), aff'd, 720 F. Appx. 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (summ. order), and that a constitutional violation must exist in order to succeed on a claim for municipal liability. Blue v. City of New York, No. 16-CV-9990 (VSB), 2018 WL 2561023, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2018) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). In order to state a claim against a municipality under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish "(1) actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury." Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91).
Plaintiff can fulfill the "policy or custom" requirement by plausibly alleging one of the following:
(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which asupervising policy-maker must have been aware; or (4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those who come into contact with the municipal employees.
Brandon v. City of New York, 705 F. Supp. 2d 261, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations omitted). Additionally, Plaintiff must establish...
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