Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc., EC 6861-S.

• Decision Date: 14 February 1969
• Docket Number: No. EC 6861-S.,EC 6861-S.
• Citation: 295 F. Supp. 1281
• Parties: Grozelia CARR et al., Plaintiffs, v. CONOCO PLASTICS, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

295 F. Supp. 1281

Grozelia CARR et al., Plaintiffs, v. CONOCO PLASTICS, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. EC 6861-S.

United States District Court N. D. Mississippi, E. D.

February 14, 1969.

Robert Fitzpatrick, Jackson, Miss., for plaintiffs.

Marion Halley, Washington, D. C., for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, amicus curiae.

Robert D. Patterson, Patterson, King & Lee, Aberdeen, Miss., H. L. Hutcherson, Gen. Counsel, Mississippi Employment Security Commission, Jackson, Miss., for defendant.

ORMA R. SMITH, District Judge.

This action is brought by plaintiffs pursuant to the authority of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964¹ to enjoin unlawful employment practices on the part of defendants against plaintiffs and all other persons similarly situated. Jurisdiction of the Court is invoked pursuant to the provisions of the act² and Title 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiffs are adult Negro citizens of the United States and residents of the Aberdeen Division of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of other Negroes similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendant Conoco Plastics, Inc. is engaged in the operation of an industry affecting commerce and is an employer within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Defendant Aldridge is Chairman of MESC,³ which administers the Mississippi State Employment Service, an employment agency as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c). Defendant Wooten is MESC's manager at its office in Aberdeen, Mississippi, and is responsible for the administration of MESC's job classification and referral program in Monroe County, Mississippi.

On March 5, 1968, plaintiffs filed sworn charges with the EEOC⁴ alleging violation by defendant company and MESC of rights protected by the act.

There is no controversy as to the sufficiency of the charges described in the complaint and set forth in the affidavits filed by plaintiffs with EEOC.

On August 20, 1968, the defendant company received from the New Orleans office of EEOC copies of the charges made and filed with it by plaintiffs, each being dated March 2, 1968, and marked "received" by the New Orleans Office of EEOC on March 5, 1968. Similar copies were received by defendant Wooten at his Aberdeen office on August 23, 1968, and forwarded to defendant Aldridge, who received them at his Jackson, Mississippi office on August 24, 1968.

On September 10, 1968, EEOC notified each plaintiff by certified mail that the Commission had been unable to achieve voluntary compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.⁵ This action was filed October 9, 1968.

EEOC did not take any action after receiving the complaints, before the filing of this suit, except to send copies of the charges to defendants and to write letters to plaintiffs as aforementioned.

THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Defendants filed motions to dismiss, alleging that before issuing its letters of September 10, 1968, EEOC did not (1) investigate any one of the charges filed by plaintiffs, (2) make any determination that there existed reasonable cause to believe that one of the charges was true, (3) make any efforts to eliminate the alleged unlawful practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion.

Defendants contend that it is a prerequisite to the filing of suits of this nature that the Commission (1) furnish defendant with a copy of the charge, (2) make an investigation of the charge, and, (if the Commission determines, after such investigation that there is a reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true) (3) endeavor to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion; that plaintiffs cannot maintain this action because, before issuing its letters of September 10th, EEOC did not do anything except furnish defendants with copies of the charges; and that the failure of the EEOC to investigate the charges, make a determination as to the truthfulness of the same, and endeavor to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion, before issuing its September 10th letters is fatal to plaintiffs' right of action.

On the other hand plaintiffs contend that the failure of EEOC to perform these duties does not prevent them from prosecuting the action; that they are authorized to file suit when they (1) have filed sworn charges with EEOC, and (2) after the expiration of sixty (60) days, have received notice from EEOC, that the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with Title VII of the Act.

The parties have filed excellent briefs and have made able arguments in support of their respective positions.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Court is of the opinion that the motions must be overruled on the authority of Dent et al. v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., et al., 5 Cir., 406 F.2d 399, Jan. 8, 1969, reversing 265 F.Supp. 56, N.D.Ala., 1967.

In Dent the charge was filed September 10, 1965. Copies of Dent's charge were served on the defendants on October 8, 1965. On December 8, 1965, the Commission issued a decision, after an investigation, to the general effect that there was reasonable cause to believe that defendants were violating Title VII of the Act.

December 15, 1965, defendant company was informed of this decision by letter from the Commission. January 5, 1966, the Commission advised Dent that "the conciliatory efforts of the Commission have not achieved voluntary compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Since your case was presented to the Commission in the early months of the administration of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Commission was unable to undertake extensive conciliation activities. * * * Under Section 706(e) of the Act, you may within thirty (30) days from receipt of this letter commence a suit in Federal District Court".

Action was filed in the District Court on February 7, 1966.

The District Court dismissed the action on the ground that "conciliation * * * is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the institution of a civil action under Title VII". The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, and said:

"Section 706(a), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(a), after making reference to the receipt by the Commission of a charge of unlawful employment practice, provides:

`The Commission shall * * * make an investigation of such charge * * *. If the Commission shall determine, after such investigation, that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion.'

"Section 706(e), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e), provides:

`If, within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission * * * (except that * * * such period may be extended to not more than sixty days upon a determination by the Commission that further efforts to secure voluntary compliance are warranted), the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this title, the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved, and a civil action may, within thirty days thereafter, be brought against the respondent named in the charge * * *.'

"Section 706(e) further provides:

`Upon request, the court may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending * * * the efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance.'

"Thus it is quite apparent that the basic philosophy of these statutory provisions is that voluntary compliance is preferable to court action and that efforts should be made to resolve these employment rights by conciliation both before and after court action. However, we are of the opinion that a plain reading of the statute does not justify the conclusion that, as a jurisdictional requirement for a civil action by the aggrieved employee under Section 706(e), the Commission must actually attempt and engage in conciliation."

The opinion of the Court continues:

"In arriving at the conclusion that actual conciliatory efforts are jurisdictionally prerequisite, the District Court relied heavily on the legislative history of the Act. The majority and the dissenting opinions in Johnson and Walker, 4 Cir., supra⁶ extensively analyze this aspect of the problem, obviating any necessity for prolonged repetition here. As a matter of fact, the Congressional committee reports and floor debates lend great comfort to both sides. This, we believe, leaves no clearly discernible Congressional intent, certainly not enough to avoid plain statutory language. Section 2000e-5(e), Title 42, U.S.C.A. very clearly sets out only two requirements for an aggrieved party before he can initiate his action in the United States district court: (1) he must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and (2) he must receive the statutory notice from the Commission that it has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance.

Since the plaintiffs have met suit recharges with the Commission and received notices from the Commission that it had been unable to obtain voluntary compliance. The two requirements of the statute as determined by Dent have been met by plaintiffs. The Court is of the opinion that they had a right to bring this action.

Judge Coleman, Circuit Judge, in Dent added:

"The Court does not have before it, and it is not now passing upon, a situation, if there were to be one, in which the Commission as a matter of routine simply abandons all efforts at actual conciliation."

Since the plaintiffs have met suit requirements as laid down in Dent, The Court does not feel that the facts of this case brings it within the class of cases to which Judge Coleman had reference.

Even if no efforts were made at all, plaintiffs should not be made the...