Carr v. Conyers

Decision Date20 January 1890
Citation84 Ga. 287,10 S.E. 630
PartiesCarr v. City or Conyers.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

City Ordinances—Quarreling—Profanity.

1. Quarreling, as related to police, is the exchange of angry utterances, between two or more persons, and not the mere use, in an ordinary tone, of vituperative and threatening words by one to another, who remains silent. Where the charge is also for cursing, and the words of the accused, as repeated by one witness for the prosecution, were free from profanity, and the only other witness repeats them as including the word "damn, " "or something to that effect, " the alleged cursing is not proved.

2. To consign to the chain-gang for failure to pay a fine imposed for violating a municipal ordinance, it is at least necessary that the power should be conferred by statute.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, Rockdale county; Boynton, Judge.

The official report referred to in the opinion is as follows:

" Ike Carr was brought before the mayor of Conyers charged with ' quarreling, cursing, and acting otherwise disorderly, ' in the corporate limits of Conyers, on May 1, 1889. On May 21, 1889, he was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of $10 and costs, and. upon failure to pay the same, that he work in the city chain-gang for 25 days, and then be discharged. The evidence introduced upon his trial before the mayor was as follows: One Rich Jones testified that, in front of a furniture store of a Mr. Tucker, defendant met him on the sidewalk, and told him he had sworn a lie on defendant, and he could whip witness in two minutes. Mr. Smith, the marshal, was about three feet off. Defendant told witness he had told a lie on him in the mayor's court, and he could whip him in five minutes. No one was present but Smith, and no one was near on the streets. Smith, the marshal, testified that defendant had been fined to work on the streets 15 days by the mayor, on the 1st of May, on a charge of fighting, quarreling, and acting otherwise disorderly. Witness took him out of the court-house, and went on down with him to get some tools and put him to work. When they were going down the street, defendant said that Rich swore a lie on him, and he would whip him for it if it took him ten years. They met Rich on the street, and defendant told him he had sworn a damn lie on him, or something to that effect, and he could whip him. There was no one near but witness, Rich, and defendant. What defendant said was in an ordinary tone. Rich testified against Ike in the other case. One Langford testified that he was in the back part of his store, and heard a noise towards the front door. Went up there, and Smith had defendant, and was taking a knife out of his pocket. Heard some talk, but could not tell anything that was said. The defendant made the following statement, in brief: Rich Jones testified before the mayor on the first case that defendant and his wife were fighting and quarreling, and acting otherwise disorderly, which was not true, and the mayor sentenced him to work on the streets fifteen days. Smith took defendant, and they went down the street, and in front of the furniture store defendant saw the mayor and Rich Jones going in the store, and they were having a big laugh and glee over the matter, and it made him mad, and when Rich stepped out he told Rich he had sworn a lie on him, and he could whip him (Rich) in five minutes. This was said in a low tone, and no one was present but Smith, Rich, and defendant. Rich told Smith to make a case against defendant, and Smith grabbed him, and told him he had a knife in his pocket, and to give it to him, (Smith.) Defendant told him he had one. Smith got sorter excited, and talked loud, and Lang-ford came to the door. That was all that was said or done. Defendant was fined for nothing in the first case, and had had no fight or quarrel with his wife. The summons in the first case was introduced, and then defendant proposed to prove that Rich Jones had testified that defendant and his wife were quarreling and fighting, and otherwise acting disorderly; and also to prove by a number of witnesses that what Jones testified to was untrue. This proof the mayor refused to allow, and passed the judgment above mentioned. Defendant, by petition for certiorari to the superior court, alleged as error: (1) The refusal to admit the testimony last above mentioned. (2) The court has no jurisdiction of the offense; if anything, it was simply abusive language, likely to cause a breach of the peace, and could not be tried except on indictment. (3) It ('.id not disturb the town, but was simply a personal matter, in which the town had no concern. (4-6)...

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