Carr v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 18 June 1913
• Citation: 84 N.J.L. 667,87 A. 132
• Parties: CARR v. EDWARDS, Comptroller.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

87 A. 132

84 N.J.L. 667

CARR

v. EDWARDS, Comptroller.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

June 18, 1913.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to Supreme Court.

Action by Samuel Carr, Executor, etc., against Edward I. Edwards, Comptroller. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

An inheritance tax was imposed upon the estate of Raymond, who was at the time of his death in 1910 domiciled in Massachusetts, and owned stocks in New Jersey corporations. Some of his legatees were of the class subject to tax.

Edward A. Day, of Newark (Edward A. & William T. Day, of Newark, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

Edmund Wilson, Atty. Gen. (Theodore Backes, of Trenton, on the brief), for defendant in error.

SWAYZE, J. This case involves the construction of the transfer tax act of 1909 (P. L. 325). Sawter v. Schoenthal (Sup.) 83 Atl. 1004, arose under the act of 1906, with title as amended in 1909. The provisions of the two acts applicable to the present case do not differ materially, and the question now raised was necessarily involved in that case. It was not argued or dealt with because the court and probably the counsel supposed it had been decided in effect by our opinion in Dixon v. Russell, 79 N. J. Law, 490, 76 Atl. 982. We there held that the act of 1906 attempted to impose a transfer tax and that this object was not indicated by its title. In the present case counsel have argued most forcibly that the act of 1909 ought not to be construed as imposing a transfer tax, and we have, notwithstanding our former opinions, given the subject the renewed consideration that its importance merits, but without reaching a different result. It is plain that the Legislature meant by the act of 1909 to reach all transfers from a decedent to his successors, whether they succeeded to the whole estate as a universal succession, or to the estate in New Jersey as a universal succession of the New Jersey executor or administrator, or the singular succession of a devisee or legatee. The language of the first section is broad. So far as we are now concerned, it imposes a tax upon the transfer of any property of the value of $500 or over when the transfer is by will or intestate law, of property within the state, and the decedent was a nonresident at the time of his death. We had in Neilson v. Russell, 76 N. J. Law, 655, 71 Atl. 286, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 887, 131 Am. St. Rep. 673, just prior to the passage of the act of 1909, held that a legacy under a nonresident's will was not taxable here because, among other reasons, it depended for its validity and amount upon the law of the testator's domicile. We said that the justification of special taxes of this character, imposed without regard to the limitation contained in our Constitution upon property taxes, was found in the fact that the rights of testamentary disposition and of succession were creatures of law, upon the exercise and operation of which the lawmaker might impose terms, and that it followed logically that the only law that could impose the terms was the law that created the right. The only special right given by the New Jersey law in case of a nonresident decedent is the right of an executor or administrator to succeed to the property having its situs in New Jersey. Unless, therefore, the Legislature meant by the act of 1909 to tax this right (the transfer by grace of our law of the property having its situs here from the decedent to his representative), its enactment was futile, as far as the estates of nonresidents are concerned. We cannot attribute such futility to a legislative act. The intent apparent on its face was to overcome the effect of our decision in Neilson v. Russell, which we must assume, as the fact undoubtedly was, the Legislature had in mind. If the statutory definitions of "estate" and "property" in section 26 conflict with this construction, they are not applicable. Section 26 expressly excepts from the statutory definition those parts of the act where the subject or context is repugnant to the definitions. The exception proves that the...