Sawter v. Shoenthal

• Decision Date: 20 June 1912
• Citation: 83 A. 1004,83 N.J.L. 499
• Parties: SAWTER et al. v. SHOENTHAL, SURROGATE.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

83 A. 1004

83 N.J.L. 499

SAWTER et al.

v. SHOENTHAL, SURROGATE.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

June 20, 1912.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to Supreme Court.

Certiorari prosecuted by Mary L. Sawter and others, administrators with the will annexed, against Isaac Shoenthal and others to review a tax imposed upon the transfer of shares of stock standing in the name of a nonresident decedent. From a judgment setting aside the assessment (81 N. J. Law, 197, 80 Atl. 101), respondents bring error. Reversed, and judgment entered affirming the tax.

Edmund Wilson, Atty. Gen., for plaintiff in error.

Frank H. Sommer and Ralph B. Lum (Edward A. Day, on the brief), all of Newark, for defendants in error.

SWAYZE, J. The question raised in this case is the constitutionality and effect of the act of 1909 (P. L. 304), which undertakes to change and amend the title of the act of 1894 (P. L. p. 318), imposing inheritance taxes. The Supreme Court held that the object of the act is not expressed in the title.

This conclusion was rested in part at least upon a distinction explained at length in the opinion between the purpose and the object of legislation. We are unable to adopt this distinction. If we are to go to the dictionaries for aid in the construction of the Constitution, we find the words treated as synonyms. Webster's New International groups these words with others as synonyms under the definition of "intention." The New English Dictionary gives as its first definition of "purpose," "that which one sets before oneself as a thing to be done or attained; the object which one has in view"; and, as its third definition, "the object for which anything is done or made or for which it exists; the result or effect intended or sought; end; aim." The same dictionary gives as its fifth definition of "object," "the end to which effort is directed, the thing aimed at; that which one endeavors to attain or carry out; purpose, end, aim."

These definitions are supported as usual in that monumental work by extracts from English authors covering the life of the language, some of them from legal writers of repute. So far as the argument rests upon a supposed difference of meaning between purpose and object, we think it lacks foundation. We are unwilling, however, to deal with the question of the constitutionality of a statute upon so narrow a basis as that afforded by lexicographers. We prefer, and we think we are required, to look at the matter from a different, if not a broader, point of view. There can be no doubt that the ultimate object of the Legislature in passing the act of 1909 was to validate the act of 1906 (P. L. p. 432) imposing transfer taxes, which had then just been questioned in Dixon v. Russell, 78 N. J. Law, 296, 73 Atl. 51, a case argued in the Supreme Court at November term, 1908. We subsequently held the act invalid as far as it sought to impose a legacy duty because that object was not expressed in the title. Dixon v. Russell, 79 N. J. Law, 490, 76 Atl. 982. The intent of the Legislature in 1909 was to put beyond question for the future an act which had been questioned, but had not yet been declared invalid by the courts. We ought, if possible, to effectuate that legislative intent. It is not questioned that the language used in the act of 1909 is apt to effectuate the legislative purpose, if the title is sufficient to comply with the constitutional requirement. If the Constitution means that the immediate object only should be expressed in the title, that is done in this act. The immediate object is, as the title declares, to change and amend the title of the act of 1894. It would, however, be going too far to say that in every case it suffices to express the immediate object, although the ultimate object be left unexpressed. That would open the door to the abuse so forcibly suggested by the Supreme Court; and, although we cannot logically argue from an abuse of power to a negation of it (Fritts v. Kuhl, 51 N. J. Law, 191, at page 205, 17 Atl. 102, at page 107; Pangborn v. Young, 32 N. J. Law, 29, 40), yet we ought not to adopt a lax construction of an important constitutional limitation. The true rule is that the object expressed in the title must give notice of the effect of the legislation to one conversant with the existing state of the law. The validity of the title is not to be determined by nice distinctions of etymology or definition of words, but by the facts of the case and the history of the legislation. Language which at one time may be quite inadequate to warn the public of the object of legislation may at another, owing to custom or usage, be entirely sufficient. A striking illustration is afforded by the legislation as to riparian rights. The title of the original act is "An act to ascertain the rights of the state and of the riparian owners in the lands lying under the waters of the bay of New York and elsewhere in the state." This would seem to indicate that the object of the Legislature was merely to ascertain the facts; and yet, under supplements to that act, commissioners have been authorized to convey property of great value, and no one now questions the validity of the legislation. The reason is that, regardless...