Carr v. State

• Decision Date: 13 January 1896
• Citation: 27 S.E. 148,98 Ga. 89
• Parties: CARR v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

27 S.E. 148

98 Ga. 89

CARR

v.STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Jan. 13, 1896.

Certiorari—When Lies—Inquisition in Insanity.

The writ of certiorari does not lie from the finding of a jury summoned under section 4666 of the Code to inquire into the sanity of a person who has been convicted of a capital offense, and sentenced to be executed, and who is alleged to have become insane after such conviction. Proceedings under this section are in the nature of an inquisition, and are not judicial in character; and there is no provision of law for reviewing the same.

Atkinson, J., dissenting.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, Pulton county; R. H. Clark, Judge.

Certiorari by Alexander A. Carr, by his next friend, to review a decision finding him' sane. From an order denying the writ, petitioner brings error. Affirmed.

Arnold & Arnold, for plaintiff in error.

C. D. Hill, Sol. Gen., and J. A. Anderson, for the State.

LUMPKIN, J. The majority of this court are of the opinion that the inquisition authorized by section 4666 of the Code is not a judicial proceeding. That section does not provide either that the sheriff or the ordinary shall preside over the deliberations of the jury, or in any manner participate in the inquiry made by them into the alleged insanity of the convict. It imposes upon neither of the officers mentioned the exercise of any judicial function. Their authority in the premises is confined to the single act of summoning the jury; or, rather, the sheriff is to do the summoning "with concurrence and assistance of the ordinary." The inquisition itself is to be made by the jury, and the section mentioned contains not a syllable conferring any authority upon the sheriff or the ordinary to give any direction whatever to the inquiry which they are to make. If either is to preside, there is no reason for holding that this function shall fall upon the ordinary rather than upon the sheriff, except the fact that the ordinary is a judicial officer of the state, and the sheriff is not. Be this as it may, the law in question certainly does not declare that either of them shall have anything whatever to do with the matter, except to summon the jury. There is an entire absence of any direction as to procedure. No mode of trial is pointed out; nothing is said as to who shall pass upon the competency of jurors or administer the oath to be taken by them, nor as to who shall determine any question which may arise as to the admissibility of evidence....