Carr v. Wright

• Decision Date: 26 January 1968
• Citation: 423 S.W.2d 521
• Parties: Geraldine CARR, etc., Appellant, v. William L. WRIGHT and City of Louisville Board of Education, Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 521

423 S.W.2d 521

Geraldine CARR, etc., Appellant, v. William L. WRIGHT and City of Louisville Board of Education,

Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Jan. 26, 1968.

Irving I. Friedman, Edwin I. Baer, Louisville, for appellant.

S. Lloyd Cardwell, John K. Gordinier, Stites, Peabody & Helm, Louisville, for Wright.

Henry A. Triplett, Louisville, for City of Louisville Board of Education.

PALMORE, Judge.

The appellant, Geraldine Carr, a junior high school student, brought this action against the Louisville Board of Education and William L. Wright, a teacher, for damages resulting from an assault and battery alleged to have been committed against her by Wright while acting within the scope of his employment. Both defendants pleaded governmental immunity. Each was awarded a summary judgment. Miss Carr appeals.

Wood v. Board of Education of Danville, Ky., 412 S.W.2d 877 (1967) and Cullinan v. Jefferson County, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 407 (1967), settle the question of the school board's immunity. However, the trial court erred in concluding that if, as alleged, Wright was acting within the scope of his authority as a servant of the school board he cannot be held liable.

In J. F. Schneider & Son v. Watt, Ky., 252 S.W.2d 898, 901 (1952), holding that individual members of the Kentucky National Park Commission were not civilly liable for having procured the institution of an abortive condemnation proceeding against the plaintiff, this court relied on 'the general rule of law which absolves administrative agents of government of civil liability for their official acts.' But the rule is not absolute. The subject was considered at length in Spillman v. Beauchamp, Ky., 362 S.W.2d 33, 2 A.L.R.3d 814 (1962), and the principle there stated is that a public officer acting within the scope of his authority is not personally liable for his actions unless there is 'some element of personal fault * * * such as negligence or deliberate wrongdoing.' Conversely, it follows that he is liable for damages resulting from negligence or deliberate wrongdoing, regardless of whether he was acting within the scope of his authority. Cf. 4 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 12.211, at 153 et seq. (3d ed. 1949); Annotation, 'Teacher's civil liability for administering corporal punishment to pupil,' 43 A.L.R.2d 469.

Wright does not contend on this appeal that he is embraced within the cloak of governmental immunity. ¹ His argument is that from a legal standpoint he could not have committed an intentional tort ² without exceeding the scope of his official authority, and that since the complaint and amended compaint say he was acting within the scope of such authority, which is admitted in his answer, the allegation of intentional tort is negated ant the complaint as amended is fatally defective. We find this approach unsound for two reasons. In the first place, it is not consistent with the rule of liberal construction stated by CR 8.05. In the second place, Spillman v. Beauchamp, Ky., 362 S.W.2d 33, 36, 2 A.L.R.3d 814 (1962), necessarily refutes the permise that a public officer cannot commit an...