Carranza v. Brown
| Decision Date | 24 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:14-cv-00773-GPC-AGS |
| Parties | SELVIN O. CARRANZA, CDCR #T-67780, Plaintiff, v. EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr., Governor, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
1) GRANTING MOTION TO EXCEED PAGE LIMITS [ECF No. 33]
2) DISMISSING SELECTED DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b)
3) DENYING MOTION FOR URGENT PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [ECF No. 29]
4) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO EFFECT SERVICE UPON REMAINING DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)
SELVIN O. CARRANZA ("Plaintiff"), currently incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State Prison ("PVSP") and proceeding pro se, first initiated this civil rights action in March 2014, by filing a letter with the Clerk of Court containing allegations that unidentified correctional officials at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJD") staged a "gladiator-style fight" between him and another inmate on June 22, 2012, while he was incarcerated there. (See ECF No. 1 at 1.)
The Court has since granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") (ECF No. 14), denied his multiple requests for injunctive relief (ECF Nos. 16, 20, 22, 27), and has granted him six separate extensions of time in which to file a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). (ECF Nos. 4, 6, 9, 14, 15, 27.) On August 17, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff one "final" opportunity to amend, provided him with another copy of its form civil rights complaint, directed that he file it within 45 days, or by approximately October 3, 2016, and ordered him not to attach more than fifteen additional pages pursuant S.D. CAL. CIVLR 8.2.a. (ECF No. 27 at 6, 9.) Plaintiff was advised that should he fail to comply with the Court's Order, it would dismiss his case. (Id. at 9.)
In response, before the Court entered a final Order of dismissal, and more than a month after the time for compliance elapsed, Plaintiff filed another "Motion for Urgent Preliminary Injunction" (ECF No. 29), followed by a "Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits," attached to which is his proposed Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 33). Plaintiff has since submitted several additional documents supplementing his latest Motion for Injunctive Relief, including an ex parte request to schedule a status conference related to his most recent request for injunctive relief. (ECF Nos. 31, 35, 38, 40).
The Court has previously ordered Plaintiff to amend in compliance with FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 8.2.a which requires that complaints filed by prisoners pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be legibly written on forms supplied by the Court, contain a short and plain statement of the claim, and not include more than 15 additional pages. See ECF No. 27 at 8-9 & n.2 (citing cases).
Plaintiff has now submitted a 71-page SAC (ECF No. 33 at 4-75), which is untimely, and is comprised of more than 420 separately numbered paragraphs alleging multiple causes of action arising between June 2012 and May 2013 against more than 50 named and unnamed California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") administrative officials, California Peace Officers' Association ("CCPOA") members, CDCR appeals officials, RJD correctional officials, and RJD medical personnel. (Id. at 4-20.) Plaintiff seeks leave to exceed the Court's page limitations because he "is not a professional writer" and has "never filed a civil action," but he "had to name 55 defendants," had to "show what each Defendant did," and has tried not to be "argumentative," "redundant" or "prolix." (See ECF No. 33 at 1-2.)
Although the Court must construe his pleadings liberally, "[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants." King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Carter v. Comm'r, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986). On the other hand, "'strict time limits . . . ought not to be insisted upon' where restraints resulting from a pro se prisoner plaintiff's incarceration prevent timely compliance with court deadlines." Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Tarantino v. Eggers, 380 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1967)); see also McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997); Bennett v. King, 205 F.3d 1188, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000) ().
Here, the Court has, and will continue to construe Plaintiff's pleadings liberally in light of his pro se status and his transfers between several prisons since he first initiated this case. See, e.g., ECF No. 27 at 1-2, n. 1. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff'sMotion to Exceed Page Limitations (ECF No. 33 at 1-3), and will further excuse his failure to file his SAC (ECF No. 33 at 4-77) within the forty-five days provided by its August 17, 2016. Plaintiff's SAC, currently attached to his Motion to Exceed Page Limits (ECF No. 33 at 4-77) is hereby deemed filed nunc pro tunc to October 28, 2016, and shall hereafter be considered the operative pleading in this case. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) () (citing Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967)).
As Plaintiff knows, the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") required the Court review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," at the time of filing "as soon as practicable after docketing." See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
"The purpose of § 1915A is 'to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.'" Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). "The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim." Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); accord Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113,1121 (9th Cir. 2012) ().
Every complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. The "mere possibility of misconduct" falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
While a plaintiff's factual allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts "have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt," Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not "supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Even before Iqbal, "[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations" were not "sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." Id.
As noted above, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 33 at 4-77) names more than 50 prison officials as Defendants. (Id. at 4-20.) Some are named asindividuals; others are unnamed groups. He does, however, divide his pleading into five separate counts which allege several identifiable causes of action.
In Count One, Plaintiff claims that on June 22, 2012, RJD officials L. Tillman, S. Rink, K. Thaxton, E. Pimentel, N. Scharr, J. Rodriguez, J. Reyes, E. Garcia, L. Brown, and W. Suglich conspired and set him up to...
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