Carreker v. Romanowski
| Decision Date | 21 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:11-cv-15577 |
| Parties | JAMES CARREKER, #243649, Petitioner, v. KENNETH ROMANOWSKI, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
HONORABLE NANCY G. EDMUNDS
Petitioner James Carreker has filed a pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The habeas petition challenges Petitioner's conviction and sentence of twelve to twenty years in prison for first-degree home invasion, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.110a(2). Petitioner alleges that (1) the evidence at trial was not sufficient to support his conviction, (2) the sentencing judge did not know the law relative to sentencing in criminal cases, and (3) he is entitled to credit for time spent in jail before his sentencing.
Respondent Kenneth Romanowski argues in an answer to the habeas petition filed through counsel that the state court's decision on Petitioner's first claim was a reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, that Petitioner's second claim is procedurally defaulted, and that Petitioner's third claim is not cognizable on habeas review. The Court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Therefore, the habeas petition is denied. A procedural history and discussion follow.
Petitioner was charged with first-degree home invasion as a result of a breaking and entering at Korey Hall's home on Canterbury Street in Detroit. At Petitioner's bench trial in Wayne County Circuit Court, Korey testified that, between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m. on August 2, 2008, his home alarm sounded. He ran downstairs and noticed that the couch in front of a window at the back of the house had been pushed forward and the drapes were hanging over the couch. The screen had been cut and the window was open slightly. He saw a shadow pass outside the window. After running upstairs to put on some shorts, he ran back downstairs and exited the back door of his house. He heard a rustling noise in the bushes as though someone were moving the branches. By then, his father, who lived next door, had come outside. His father pointed toward the side of the house, and then the police drove up. After Korey and his father pointed toward Cambridge Street, the officers left, and he and his father proceeded to get in Korey's vehicle. Another police car then arrived, and after talking briefly to those officers, he and his father drove toward Cambridge Street. Within a block of his house, he noticed that the first set of officers had apprehended someone. The suspect was sweating profusely, and he had twigs on him. Korey Hall identified Petitioner at trial as the person whom the police apprehended a block from his home early on August 2, 2008. He admitted, however, that he did not see anyone in the back of his house or in his yard that night.
Korey's father, Hollis Hall, testified that he got up and went outside about 2:00 or 2:30 a.m. on August 2, 2008, because his daughter got a phone call saying there was a break-in next door. He saw a man run between his son's house and the vacant house nextdoor. The man ran down the street, and when the police arrived, he (Hollis Hall) pointed in the direction where the man had run. He and Korey then got in a car with the intention of circling the street. An officer approached them and said that the other officers had caught someone around the block. He informed the police that the person they had apprehended was the same person that he had seen running between the houses.
At trial, Hollis Hall stated that he had not noticed whether the suspect had one or two hands, but he identified Petitioner as the person whom he saw run between the houses on August 2, 2008. He claimed that Petitioner's height, complexion, and weight fit the description of the man he saw back on August 2, 2008.
Police Officer Alvin Cherry testified that, on August 2, 2008, he was dispatched to a house on Canterbury to assist with a breaking and entering in progress. After speaking with two men at that location, he proceeded to Cambridge and Parkside Streets, about forty feet away from the residence in question. He observed Petitioner walking down the street. When he shined a flashlight on Petitioner, Petitioner dropped a claw hammer onto the ground. Petitioner's shirt was wet, and he had grass on the back of it. The complainant and the witness at the house then drove up and identified Petitioner as the man who had tried to break into the complainant's house on Canterbury. Petitioner informed Officer Cherry that his name was James Green, and although he had been walking toward Seven Mile Road, he said that he was going to Eight Mile Road.
Officer Andre Guyton was Officer Cherry's partner on the night of the home invasion, and his trial testimony was similar to Officer Cherry's testimony. Officer Detrick Mott testified that he took a statement from Petitioner about noon on August 2, 2008. After advising Petitioner of his constitutional rights, Petitioner admitted that he had been at thecomplainant's house, that he had jumped over the fence there, and that he heard the alarm. He admitted that he did not have permission to be at the house, but he denied breaking into the house. He said that someone else was with him, that his man went into the house, and that he (Petitioner) was the lookout. Petitioner claimed that he ran away when the alarm went off.
Although Petitioner denied being threatened or promised anything for his statement, Officer Mott mistakenly wrote on his interrogation report that Petitioner had responded affirmatively when asked whether he was threatened or promised something to make a statement. Petitioner signed each page of his statement and he did not make any corrections to it.
Petitioner did not testify or present any witnesses. Defense counsel pointed out during closing arguments that Petitioner was not found in possession of anything from the house on Canterbury and that the homeowner got only a fleeting image of someone leaving the house. Defense counsel maintained that, because Petitioner had only one arm, he could not have committed the crime by himself. Defense counsel argued that Petitioner's statement to the police was not reliable and that the trial court should not presume an intent to steal from proof of a breaking. Counsel concluded his argument by stating that, at most, the prosecution had proved a breaking and the crime was home invasion in the third degree. In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that the facts were not mere coincidences, and for the requisite intent to be present, all that was necessary was a minimum of circumstances.
On January 26, 2009, the trial court found Petitioner guilty, as charged, of first-degree home invasion, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.110a(2). The trial court gave the followingreasons for its decision:
(Trial Tr. Vol. III, 18-19, Jan. 26, 2009.)
On February 10, 2009, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to imprisonment for twelve to twenty years.1 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence, but remanded his case to enable the trial court to (1) change the sentencing information report to reflect Petitioner's correct sentencing guidelines range of 51 to 170 months and (2) amend the judgment of sentence to show that Petitioner was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender. See People v. Carreker, No. 290501 (unpublished).
On September 27, 2010, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded Petitioner's case to the trial court to comply with the Court of Appeals judgment and to correct Petitioner's sentencing information report to show that Petitioner was convicted of first-degree home invasion following a bench trial, not a guilty plea. The state supreme court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded to review the issues. See People v. Carreker, 488 Mich. 868;788 N.W.2d 446 (2010) (table).
Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition on December 21, 2011. His claims are:
Respondent claims that Petitioner's second claim is procedurally because the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed that claim for "plain error." A procedural default is "a critical failure to comply with state procedural law." Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997). It "is not a jurisdictional matter," id., and "federal courts are not required to address a procedural-default issue before deciding against the petitioner on the merits." Hudson v. Jones, ...
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