Carrel v. Allied Products Corp.

Decision Date23 April 1997
Docket NumberNo. 95-1773,95-1773
Citation677 N.E.2d 795,78 Ohio St.3d 284
PartiesCARREL, Appellant, v. ALLIED PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Appellee, et al.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. The common-law action of negligent design survives the enactment of the Ohio Products Liability Act, R.C. 2307.71 et seq.

2. In a products liability case, assumption of the risk may be a viable defense against an employee injured by a defective product in the workplace. An employee will be deemed to have voluntarily exposed himself or herself to a risk when he or she has elected to use a defective product. However the defense of assumption of the risk is not available when the employee is required to encounter the risk while performing normal job duties. ( Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Mfg. Co. [1991], 57 Ohio St.3d 145, 566 N.E.2d 1203, explained and followed.)

On July 13, 1988, plaintiff-appellant, Donald Carrel, an employee of Whirlpool Corporation, was injured while working on a six-hundred-ton transfer press. This press was designed and manufactured by Verson Allsteel Press Company, now a division of Allied Products Corporation ("Allied"), defendant-appellee. At the time of the injury, appellant was assisting a co-worker in determining the cause of the misalignment of a workpiece.

The Verson Transmat 600 Press is a ten-station press approximately twenty feet in length and five feet in width. A ram, on which ten upper dies can be mounted, runs the length of the press. Steel is fed into one end of the press and progressively moves along ten die stations through the use of transfer fingers. When the cycles are complete a part is formed. The press operates in two modes, automatic and inch.

At the time of the accident, the press had barrier guards running the length of the die spaces that, when in the down position, prevented access to the point of operation. These guards were electrically interlocked only when the press was in the automatic mode.

On the evening in question, appellant, who was assigned to operate a Transmat four-hundred-ton press, was assisting a newly trained co-worker, Stephen Price, in determining the cause of a misaligned workpiece on the Verson Transmat 600 press, which Price had been assigned to operate.

To determine why the workpiece was misfeeding, it was necessary to take the press out of the automatic mode and place it in the inch mode. The inch mode allows the operator to incrementally stroke the press to watch the action of the various components and to bring the transfer fingers to the desired extension.

Immediately prior to the accident, appellant was adjusting the transfer fingers on the back length of the press at station eight. Price was on the front length of the press directly across from appellant and was likewise adjusting the transfer fingers on his side of the press. They were able to see each other through the three-and-one-half-inch space between the die halves and were both looking at the alignment of the workpiece. Appellant assumed that his co-worker recognized what steps would have to be taken to get the piece properly aligned in the die space. Price, however, thought the piece was properly aligned. He testified that he went to the control panel, sounded the warning horn, and activated the press. Appellant's left hand (his dominant hand) was in the die space. When the die halves came together, appellant sustained a partial amputation of his left index and left ring finger and a complete amputation of his left middle finger.

The configuration of the press made it impossible for appellant to communicate with Price while he was operating the press. One of appellant's experts averred that this is a common problem on large, straight presses like the Verson Transmat 600 press. Both of appellant's experts averred that in order to prevent injury to a person performing adjustments, the press must have interlocked barrier guards to prevent the machine from cycling not only in automatic mode, but also in inch mode.

While the press did not have this electrical interlocked barrier guard in the inch mode, this feature was available at the time the press was designed and had been incorporated into the design of other Verson Transmat presses prior to the design of the press in question.

At the time of the accident, appellant had been employed with Whirlpool almost twenty years. Appellant was an experienced and skilled press operator and was, in fact, assisting a new press operator at the time. Moreover, the press was equipped with several safety features, such as a safety cable, stop buttons, a warning horn, and warning plates. The co-worker sounded the warning horn prior to activating the press; however, the horn, sounding similar to warning horns on other presses in the factory, failed to notify appellant that the press was about to be activated.

In April 1990, appellant filed his complaint against Allied, raising, under R.C. 2307.71 et seq., Ohio's Products Liability Act, claims of defective design and inadequate warnings, among others. In addition to these statutory claims, appellant also brought a common-law claim for negligent design.

Allied moved for summary judgment on the statutory products liability claims and the common-law negligence claim on the basis of assumption of risk. Appellant moved for summary judgment on the issue of assumption of the risk. The trial court granted Allied's motion and denied appellant's motion. The trial court further found that appellant's common-law negligent design claim was statutorily abrogated by R.C. 2307.71 et seq., and, thus, Allied was entitled to judgment on that claim as well. The court of appeals affirmed.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

Nurenberg, Plevin, Heller & McCarthy Co., L.P.A., Richard C. Alkire and Sandra J. Rosenthal, Cleveland, for appellant.

Michael Garth Moore, Hilliard, and Mark Hellner, Chicago, IL, for appellee.

James D. Dennis, Dayton, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers.

FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, Sr., Justice.

This case presents three issues for our review. First, we are asked to decide whether a common-law cause of action, negligent design, survives the enactment of R.C. 2307.71 et seq., the Ohio Products Liability Act. In addition, the court is asked to determine whether the law applicable to assumption of the risk as set forth in Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Mfg. Co. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 145, 566 N.E.2d 1203, is available under R.C. 2307.71 et seq. Finally, we must decide whether summary judgment was erroneously entered in the manufacturer's favor. For the following reasons, we answer these questions in the affirmative. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.

I

We must first decide whether a common-law cause of action for negligent design survives the enactment of the Products Liability Act. The court of appeals found that the General Assembly, by codifying products liability law, had abrogated the common-law negligent design claim. 1 In reaching this determination, the appellate court considered the General Assembly's failure to specifically mention the common-law negligent design cause of action in either R.C. 2307.72 or R.C. 2307.78(A)(1). 2 The court concluded that the statutes' silence meant that the General Assembly had chosen to eliminate this type of action against a manufacturer.

Although Allied agrees with the court of appeals' determination that the Act abrogates common-law causes of action against a manufacturer for products liability, it bases its argument on R.C. 2307.71(M) and 2307.73, in addition to R.C. 2307.72.

We find these assertions and conclusions contrary to well-established rules of statutory construction, as well as this court's recent decision in McAuliffe v. W. States Import Co., Inc. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 534, 651 N.E.2d 957.

According to principles of statutory construction, the General Assembly will not be presumed to have intended to abrogate a common-law rule unless the language used in the statute clearly shows that intent. State ex rel. Morris v. Sullivan (1909), 81 Ohio St. 79, 90 N.E. 146, paragraph three of the syllabus. Thus, in the absence of language clearly showing the intention to supersede the common law, the existing common law is not affected by the statute, but continues in full force. Id. "There is no repeal of the common law by mere implication." Frantz v. Maher (1957), 106 Ohio App. 465, 472, 7 O.O.2d 209, 213, 155 N.E.2d 471, 476.

R.C. 2307.71(M) 3 defines the statutory products liability claim. Although couched in broad language, this definition does not mention or otherwise discuss the common-law action of negligent design. More important, there is no explicit statement that this definition was meant to abolish common-law actions sounding in negligence. 4 The same can be said about R.C. 2307.73. This section provides that a manufacturer is subject to liability for compensatory damages based on a products liability claim if the claimant establishes that the product is defective as found within the specific subsections of the Act addressing manufacture (R.C. 2307.74), design (R.C. 2307.75), warning (R.C. 2307.76), or representation (R.C. 2307.77). Again, there is no explicit statement that they are the only products liability claims that may be pursued against a manufacturer.

But Allied argues that the General Assembly did clearly express its intention that all products liability claims must be brought pursuant to R.C. 2307.71 et seq. Allied relies upon the statement of R.C. 2307.72(A) that any recovery for compensatory damages on a products liability claim is subject to R.C. 2307.71 to 2307.79.

However, as amicus curiae, the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, aptly points out, the phrase "subject to" is not strong enough to completely eliminate unmentioned common-law theories. The rule of strict...

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